UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA.  SAN  DIEGO 


3  1822  01581  7265 


LIBRARY  I 

UNrVERSITY  OP  I 

CAUFORNtA  I 

SAN  DIEGO  J 


^ERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  S'VN  DIEGO 


3  1822  01581  7265 


Central  University  Library 

University  of  California,  San  Diego 
Note:  This  item  is  subject  to  recall  after  two  weeks. 

Date  Due        

MAR  0  7  1993 


0139(1/91) 


UCSD  Lib. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE 
BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR 

AND  ITS   RELATION  TO  THE 

PRESENT  CONFLICT 


BY    THE   SAME   AUTHOR 

THE  CIVILIZATION  OF 

BABYLONIA  AND 

ASSYRIA 

ITS  REMAINS,  LANGUAGE,  HISTORY, 

RELIGION,    COMMERCE,    LAW,    ART 

AND  LITERATURE 

BY 
MORRIS  JASTROW,  Jr.,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 

Professor  of  Semitic  Languages,  University  of  Pennsylvania 

With  map  and  164  illustrations.    Octavo.    Gilt  top, 
in  a  box.     Net  ^7.00. 

Art  and  Archji;ology: — "This  magnificent  book 
gives  a  comprehensive  and  complete  survey  of  the 
whole  civilization  of  the  ancient  peoples,  who  dwelt  in 
the  Tigro-Euphrates  Valley.  It  is  written  by  one  of 
the  foremost  Semitic  scholars  of  the  world,  and  super- 
sedes all  works  upon  the  subject.  Written  in  the 
author's  characteristic  lucid  style,  it  is  sumptuously 
illustrated,  and  is  a  beautiful  specimen  of  bookmaking. 


THE  WAR  AND  THE 
BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  AND  ITS 
RELATION  TO  THE  PRESENT  CONFLICT 

BY 

MORRIS  XASTROW,  Jr.,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR   IN    THE  UNIVERSITY   OF   PENNSYLVANIA 
AUTHOR   OF    "THE   CIVILIZATION   OF   BABYLONIA    AND   ASSYRIA,"  ETC. 


WITH  14  ILLUSTRATIONS 
AND  A  MAP 


'Hard  Days,  Sword  Days,  Death  Days. 
(Vaulundar  Saga) 


PHILADELPHIA  AND  LONDON 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

1917 


COPYRIGHT,   I9I7,    BY  J.    B.    LIPPINCOTT   COMPANY 


PUBLISHED    NOVEMBER,    I9I7 


PRINTED    BY   J.    B.   LIPPINCOTT    COMPANY 

AT  THE  WASHINGTON  SQUARE  PRESS 

PHILADELPHIA,  U.  S.  A. 


TO   THE 
MEMBERS    OF  THE    WEDNESDAY 
MORNING  CLUB   OF  PITTSFIELD,  MASS. 
WITH    MANY    PLEASANT    MEMORIES 


PREFACE 

The  purpose  of  this  volume  is  to  elucidate  an 
aspect  of  the  war  which  although  it  is  overshadowed 
at  present  by  the  paramount  issue — the  menace  of 
a  militarism  in  league  with  autocracy — was  the  most 
significant  single  factor  contributing  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  long-foreseen  war  in  1914,  and  will  form  one 
of  the  most  momentous  problems  when  the  time 
for  the  peace  negotiations  arrives.  Ever  since  the 
announcement  was  made  towards  the  close  of  the 
year  1899  that  the  Turkish  government  had  con- 
ceded to  a  German  syndicate  the  privilege  of  build- 
ing a  railway  to  connect  Constantinople  with 
Bagdad  through  a  transverse  route  across  Asia 
Minor,  the  Bagdad  Railway  has  been  the  core  of 
the  Eastern  Question.  There  were  to  be  sure  other 
aspects  of  that  question,  which  led  to  the  two  Balkan 
wars  of  1912  and  1913,  but  the  addition  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway  was  an  aggravating  factor  to  an  already 
sufficiently  complicated  situation  that  involved  the 
great  European  powers — England,  France,  Germany 
and  Russia — in  a  network  of  diplomatic  negotiations, 
the  meshes  of  which  became  closer  as  the  years  rolled 
on.  The  railway  became  the  spectre  of  the  twen- 
tieth century.  It  was  a  spectre  that  always  appeared 
armed  "  from  top  to  toe  "  and  when  occasionally  he 
"  wore  his  beaver  up,"  the  face  was  that  of  a  grim, 
determined  warrior. 

As  an  industrial  enterprise,  the  project  of  a  rail- 
way through  a  most  notable  historic  region,  and 
passing  along  a  route  which  had  resounded  to  the 
tread  of  armies  thousands  of  years  ago,  was  fraught 

7 


8  PREFACE 

with  great  possibilities  of  usefulness  in  opening  up 
the  nearer  East  to  brisk  trade  with  Europe  that 
would  follow  in  the  wake  of  the  locomotive,  and  in 
infusing  the  young  Western  spirit  into  the  old  East, 
carrying  western  ideas,  western  modes  of  education, 
and  western  science  to  the  mother-lands  of  civiliza- 
tion. The  railway  would  also  prove  to  be  a  short 
cut  to  India  and  the  farther  East,  and  as  such  the 
undertaking  was  on  a  plane  of  importance  with  the 
cutting  of  the  Suez  Canal.  Connecting  through 
junctions  and  branches  with  the  other  railway  sys- 
tems of  Asia  Minor,  Syria  and  Palestine,  the  Bagdad 
Railway  would  result  in  covering  the  entire  region 
with  a  perfect  network  of  modern  methods  of  trans- 
portation that  would  embrace  eventually  also  the 
projected  railways  of  Persia.  Full  credit  should  be 
given  to  the  German  brains  in  which  this  project 
was  hatched,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suspect  that 
at  the  outset,  the  German  capitalists  who  fathered 
the  enterprise  were  actuated  by  any  other  motive 
than  the  perfectly  legitiinate  one  to  create  a  great 
avenue  of  commerce.  When,  however,  the  German 
government  entered  the  field  as  the  backer  and  pro- 
moter of  the  scheme,  the  political  aspect  of  the  rail- 
way was  moved  into  the  foreground,  and  that  aspect 
has  since  overshadowed  the  commercial  one.  The 
full  political  import  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  becomes 
apparent  in  the  light  of  the  eventful  history  of  Asia 
Minor  which  can  now  be  followed,  at  least  in  general 
outlines,  from  a  period  as  early  as  2000  B.C.  To 
illustrate  the  main  thesis  suggested  by  the  route  of 
the  railway  that  the  control  of  the  historic  highway 
stretching  from  Constantinople  to  Bagdad  has  at 
all  times  involved  the  domination  of  the  Near  East, 
it  has  been  necessary  to  sketch  the  history  of  Asia 


PREFACE  9 

Minor  in  its  relation  to  the  great  civilizations  of 
antiquity  and  to  follow  that  history  through  the 
period  of  Greek,  Roman,  Parthian  and  Arabic  con- 
trol, past  the  efforts  of  the  Crusaders  to  save  the 
route  for  Christian  Europe,  to  the  final  conquest  of 
it  by  the  Ottoman  Turks.  That  event,  marked  by  the 
capture  of  Constantinople  in  1453,  directly  led  to  the 
discovery  of  America  in  1492. 

I  feel  that  no  apology  is  needed  for  thus  devoting 
a  large  chapter  of  the  volmne  to  this  history,  for 
apart  from  its  intrinsic  interest,  our  understanding 
of  the  present  situation  in  the  Near  East  is  dependent 
upon  an  appreciation  of  the  position  that  Asia  Minor, 
as  the  bridge  leading  to  the  East,  has  always  held. 

The  war  has  resulted  in  bringing  many  countries 
closer  to  our  horizon,  but  no  lands  more  so  than 
those  to  which  Asia  Minor,  as  I  shall  attempt  to  show, 
is  the  Hinterland — Mesopotamia,  Syria,  Arabia  and 
Egypt.  Until  recently,  the  history  of  these  lands 
has  been  looked  upon  by  the  general  public  as  the 
domain  of  the  specializing  historian,  philologist  and 
archaeologist.  With  the  extension  of  the  European 
war  into  these  eastern  lands,  they  become  a  part — 
and  an  essential  part — of  the  general  political  situa- 
tion. Their  history  needs  to  be  known,  if  the  prob- 
lems arising  from  the  relation  of  Asia  Minor  to  the 
issues  of  the  war  are  to  be  dealt  with  at  the  peace 
conference  in  an  intelligent  manner.  I  cherish  the 
hope  which,  I  trust,  is  not  a  delusion,  that  my  sketch 
of  the  history  of  Asia  Minor  will  help  to  illuminate 
the  factors  underlying  "  the  trend  towards  the  East  " 
which  began  with  Alexander  the  Great,  which  led 
modern  nations  to  take  possession  of  eastern  lands, 
and  of  which  the  Bagdad  Railway  is  the  latest 
manifestation. 


10  PREFACE 

I  have  thought  it  proper  to  give  the  story  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway  in  some  detail,  because  through 
this  we  can  best  follow  the  growth  of  the  spirit  of 
hostile  rivalry  among  European  nations  which  cul- 
minated in  the  outbreak  three  years  ago.  A  war 
like  the  present  one  cannot,  to  be  sure,  be  carried 
back  to  any  one  issue,  isolated  from  all  others,  but 
although  many  issues  are  behind  the  war,  it  is  the 
Bagdad  Railway  that  created  the  frame  of  mind 
among  the  European  powers  which  made  the  war — 
one  is  inclined  to  put  it — inevitable.  A  war  breaks 
out  when  nations  are  ready  for  it — ready,  I  mean, 
in  their  disposition.  The  Bagdad  Railway  made 
them  ready  in  this  sense.  The  story  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway  tells  us  how  this  frame  of  mind  was  pro- 
duced— and  yet  back  of  it  all,  we  must  bear  in  mind 
the  deeper  currents  of  history  that  produce  the 
agitation  on  the  surface. 

The  study  of  the  relation  of  Asia  Minor  to  the 
present  conflict — on  the  basis  of  its  history — would  be 
incomplete  without  at  least  an  attempt  to  peer  into 
the  future,  a  hazardous  undertaking  but  which 
nevertheless  has  its  value  in  at  least  suggesting 
the  line  along  which  the  solution  of  the  problem 
of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  and  with  it  the  Eastern 
Question  of  which  it  is  the  core  is  to  be  sought. 
As  a  preliminary  to  this  outlook,  I  have  tried  to 
set  forth  the  sharp  distinction  between  what  I  would 
call  the  two  wars — the  war  of  1914  and  the  war  of 
1917.  The  recognition  of  this  distinction  appears  to  me 
to  be  essential  for  an  understanding  of  the  situation 
that  will  arise  at  the  time  of  the  peace  conference. 

The  former  war  is  in  the  main  the  European 
struggle  for  supremacy,  the  latter  is  the  great  world 
.war  for  the  preservation  and  spread  of  the  spirit 


PREFACE  11 

and  the  institutions  of  democracy.  I  am  writing  as 
a  student  of  history  and  not  as  a  partisan,  except 
in  so  far  as  my  position  is,  as  I  believe  it  to  be,  in 
accord  with  the  American  point  of  view  as  voiced 
by  its  most  thoughtful  and  most  sober  representa- 
tives. I  have  no  sympathy  even  in  war  time  with 
that  blatant  form  of  patriotism  which  warps  one's 
judgment  and  prevents  a  penetration  into  the  deeper 
meaning  of  this  war.  It  is  the  existence  of  that 
kind  of  patriotism  in  Germany  which  has  produced 
the  Pan-Germanic  spirit,  and  the  strength  of  which 
(though  waning)  prevents  the  German  people  from 
even  now  recognizing  the  reason  for  the  hostility 
that  they  have  aroused  throughout  the  world.  My 
indictment,  therefore,  of  Germany's  conduct  of  the 
war  which  has  been  the  main  factor,  as  I  see  it,  lead- 
ing from  the  war  of  1914  to  that  of  1917,  is  set  forth 
"  more  in  sorrow  than  in  anger  " — a  sorrow  that 
must,  I  think,  be  shared  by  all  who  admired  the 
Germany  before  the  war  for  her  remarkable  achieve- 
ments in  all  fields,  and  that  bears  heaviest  on  the 
thousands  of  Americans  who,  like  myself,  received 
the  training  for  their  careers  at  German  universities 
and  who  feel  keenly  the  intellectual  ties  that  bind 
them  to  that  country.  But  Germany  has  none  but 
herself  to  blame  for  having  thus  transformed  her 
friends  into  her  opponents.  She  first  handicapped 
those  who  were  disposed  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
to  see  and  present  her  side  sympathetically  by  the 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  she  then  condemned 
them  to  silence  by  the  atrocious  treatment  of  the 
Belgians  and  by  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  and 
she  finally  converted  them  into  enemies  in  arms  by 
her  ruthless  submarine  warfare  that  has  done  far 
more  harm  to  the  German  name  than  any  injury 


12  PREFACE 

that  the  sink-at-sight  procedure  can  inflict  on  the 
world's  shipping.  As  I  write  these  lines  I  have 
before  me  a  monograph  by  a  German  scholar  on 
Germany's  position  in  the  East  after  the  two  Balkan 
wars  in  1912  and  1913.  Incidental  to  the  discus- 
sion the  author  gives  some  shocking  details,  vouched 
for  by  reliable  witnesses,  of  the  atrocities  committed 
in  the  first  of  these  wars  by  the  Bulgarians  and 
Serbians.  He  speaks  of  the  systematic  attempt  to 
wipe  out  the  Turks  by  wholesale  massacres  on  a 
huge  scale,  and  the  author  asks,  in  a  tone  of  right- 
eous indignation,  whether  the  voice  of  humani- 
tarianism  and  civilization  can  remain  silent  with  such 
deeds  going  on?  The  Bulgarians  are  now  the  allies 
of  the  Germans,  and  in  the  present  war  the  Turks 
seem  to  be  following  exactly  the  same  policy  towards 
the  Armenians  that  the  Bulgarians  adopted  to  anni- 
hilate an  entire  people.  Did  the  German  govern- 
ment respond  to  the  desperate  cry  of  humanity  to 
stop  officially  ordered  massacres  in  Armenia?  And 
yet  the  Turk  is  neither  cruel  nor — unless  stirred  up — 
fanatical.  Those  who  have  lived  longest  in  Turkish 
countries  and  who  know  the  Turk  best  bear  evi- 
dence to  the  fine  traits  of  his  character  and  that  under 
normal  conditions,  Turkish  Moslems  and  Christian 
Armenians  live  quite  amicably  side  by  side.  The 
Armenian  massacres  represent  a  part  of  the  policy 
of  the  Turkish  government,  as  the  Russian  pogroms 
under  the  old  regime  were  always  organized  by  the 
Russian  government.  The  population  is  stirred  up 
by  spreading  false  reports  of  a  proposed  revolt  on 
the  part  of  the  Armenians — and  the  rest  follows. 
The  war  of  1914  as  conducted  by  Germany  forms 
a  close  parallel.  The  cruelties  practised  and  the 
inhuman  methods  of  warfare  resorted  to  are  part  of 


PREFACE  13 

the  military  policy,  and  for  which  the  German  gov- 
ernment, following  a  deliberate  plan  of  spreading 
terrorism  and  enforcing  subordination,  must  bear 
the  responsibility.  The  author  whom  I  have  quoted, 
assuming  (as  I  do)  that  he  is  sincere  in  his  denuncia- 
tion of  cruelties  officially  carried  out  by  the  Bul- 
garian government,  ought  certainly  to  be  able  to 
answer  the  question  why  the  whole  civilized  world 
has  changed  its  former  admiration  for  Germany  into 
a  realization  that  through  her  military  policy,  dic- 
tated by  an  autocratic  group  that  cannot  be  called 
to  account  by  the  people,  Germany  has  become  a 
menace  to  the  safety  of  the  world.  The  German 
army — in  its  origin  the  creation  of  the  German 
people  organized  to  fight  for  its  liberty  as  a  nation — 
has  become  a  mighty  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the 
rulers  of  Germany  to  hold  the  people  at  their  mercy 
and  to  use  the  splendid  patriotism  of  the  people  (that 
brought  1,800,000  volunteers  to  the  front  within 
one  week  after  the  declaration  war),  for  the  fur- 
therance of  plans  that  endanger  the  happiness  of 
other  nations  and  that  are  to  serve  towards  strength- 
ening the  power  of  autocracy.  This  "  new  "  Ger- 
many, revealed  by  the  conduct  of  the  war,  must  be 
overcome  in  order  to  bring  back  the  Germany  of 
ante-bellum  days.  The  "  old  "  Germany,  we  now 
sadly  recognize,  died  in  1914 — possibly  earlier,  on 
June  15,  1888,  when  Frederick  III,  surnamed  the 
"  Noble,"  passed  away  after  a  reign  of  one  hundred 
days.^  The  old  Germany,  as  Brandes  well  says, 
gave  us  "  everything  German  that  is  loved  or  appreci- 
ated."   It  can  be  recreated  only  through  the  democra- 

^  George  Brandes,  a  friend  and  lover  of  Germany  if  ever 
there  was  one,  calls  these  one  hundred  days  the  "  short  gleam 
of  a  clear  human  spirit  breaking  in  on  our  war-mad  empire." 
The  World  at  War,  p.  6. 


14  PREFACE 

tization  of  Germany's  form  of  goverrmient.  This 
advance  will  assuredly  come  about  either  during 
the  war,  or  as  a  direct  result  of  the  war,  when  the 
ghastly  crisis  through  which  the  world  is  passing 
shall  happily  be  a  thing  of  the  past,  to  become, 
after  the  lapse  of  some  years,  a  memory  that  will 
continue  to  haunt  the  world  for  generations  to  come. 

Unless,  however,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  the  great 
nations  of  the  world  give  the  proper  cue  for  the 
work  of  reconstruction  by  advocating  a  policy  of 
co-operation  with  the  East,  instead  of  open  or  dis- 
guised exploitation,  we  will  continue  to  have  an 
Eastern  Question  that  may  again  pass  through 
the  same  process  (with  perhaps  different  contest- 
ants) to  culminate  in  open  hostility.  "  Internation- 
alization "  of  all  schemes  for  opening  up  the  East 
to  the  West  is  the  solution  of  the  Eastern  Question 
for  which  I  have  ventured  to  enter  a  plea  at  the 
close  of  this  book. 

It  remains  for  me  to  make  acknowledgment,  as 
in  the  case  of  all  my  publications,  to  the  invaluable 
assistance  given  to  me  by  my  dear  wife  in  reading 
both  the  manuscript  and  the  proof,  and  helping  in 
various  other  ways,  including  the  encouragement 
to  trespass  upon  fields  adjacent  to  my  own  and  to 
which  the  study  of  the  war  in  the  East  led  me.  I 
also  wish  to  make  grateful  acknowledgment  to  my 
friend,  Mrs.  Gardiner  Gayley,  for  many  sugges- 
tions made  in  discussing  with  her  the  plan  and  the 
thesis  of  this  study.  To  my  former  student,  Hon. 
Edward  I.  Nathan,  American  Consul  at  Mersina 
from  1910  to  the  breaking  of  our  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Turkey,  and  who  has  rendered  distin- 
guished services  at  his  responsible  post,  I  am 
under  obligations  for  criticisms  and  for  valuable 
information  regarding  the  industries  of  Turkey,  par- 


PREFACE  15 

ticularly  at  Mersina,  which  I  have  embodied  in 
one  of  the  notes  attached  to  the  volume.  I  should 
like  to  call  particular  attention  to  these  notes  in 
w^hich  I  have  given  bibliographical  and  explanatory 
details  for  those  who  wish  to  pursue  the  subject 
further.  The  map,  prepared  by  Mr.  Earl  Thatcher 
with  great  care,  will,  I  trust,  prove  useful.  I  am 
indebted  to  Mr.  Leon  Dominian,  of  the  American 
Geographical  Society,  for  permission  to  make  use 
of  his  map  of  railroads  in  Turkey  published  by  him 
in  "  Frontiers  of  Language  and  Nationality  in 
Europe  "  (Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  N.  Y.,  1917).  A  special 
feature  of  my  map  is  the  inclusion  of  all  railroads, 
both  those  constructed  and  those  projected  in  Asia 
Minor,  Syria,  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia.  The 
map  will  enable  the  reader  to  follow  the  further 
course  of  development  of  the  war  in  the  various 
sections  of  the  Near  East.  For  countries,  lying  out- 
side of  the  special  topic  of  this  volume,  I  have  contented 
myself  with  indicating  merely  a  few  places  as  an  orien- 
tation ;  and  in  order  not  to  confuse  the  reader  by  making 
the  map  too  crowded,  I  have  selected  for  Asia  Minor 
only  the  important  places  and  more  particularly 
those  that  are  connected  with  events  in  the  history 
of  the  region.  My  thanks  are  due  to  Dr.  Edward 
Robinson,  Director  of  the  Metropolitan  Museum  of 
New  York,  who  kindly  placed  at  my  disposal  a 
photograph  of  the  fine  Hittite  monument  of  the 
Museum — the  only  one  of  the  kind  (so  far  as  I  am 
aware)  in  this  country.  To  my  friend  and  colleague, 
Professor  J.  H.  Breasted,  of  the  University  of 
Chicago,  and  to  the  publishers,  Ginn  &  Co.  and  the 
University  of  Chicago,  I  am  indebted  for  permission 
to  use  two  illustrations,  one  in  his  excellent  manual 
on  Ancient  History  (Boston,  1916)  and  the  other 
from  his  monograph,  The  Battle  of  Kadesh  (Chicago, 


16  PREFACE 

1901);  to  Professor  John  Garstang  for  permission 
to  use  some  of  the  illustrations  in  his  Land  of  the 
Hittites  (Button  &  Co.,  New  York)  ;  to  Mr.  Ernest 
Leroux  for  the  similar  courtesy  to  use  some  illustra- 
tions from  Nettancourt-Vaubecourt  Sur  Lcs  Grandes 
Routes  de  I'Asie  Mineure  (Paris,  1908)  published  by 
him ;  and  to  Mr.  C.  E.  Lydecker,  the  Counsellor  of 
the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Constanti- 
nople, for  his  approval  in  using  several  illustrations 
from  The  Levant  Trade  Review — a  most  important 
source  of  information  for  the  commerce  and  indus- 
tries of  the  Near  East,  and  to  which  I  am  particularly 
glad  to  call  the  attention  of  all  interested  in  Eastern 
matters. 

To  the  Hon.  Otis  A.  Glazebrook,  who  has  made 
such  a  notable  record  as  United  States  Consul  at  Jeru- 
salem till  the  diplomatic  break  with  Turkey,  I  beg  to 
make  acknowledgment  for  authentic  information  in  re- 
gard to  present  conditions  of  railways  in  Palestine. 

Mr.  H.  De  Wolf  Fuller,  the  editor  of  The  Nation 
(New  York)  has  kindly  permitted  me  to  embody  in 
this  book,  in  an  enlarged  and  revised  form,  some  views 
set  forth  by  me  in  an  article  written  for  The  Nation 
and  published  in  the  issue  of  August  30,  1916,  under  the 
title  of  "  The  World's  Highway."  Lastly,  it  is  a  gen- 
uine pleasure  to  dedicate  the  little  volume  to  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Wednesday  Morning  Club,  of  Pittsfield 
(Mass.),  in  recollection  of  many  visits  to  the  charming 
"  heart  of  the  Berkshires  "  as  their  guest.  To  speak 
before  the  delightful  and  sympathetic  audience  that 
gathers  at  the  weekly  reunions  of  this  Club  during  the 
summer  months  is  a  privilege  which  I  am  sure  all  who 
are  invited  to  do  so  value  as  highly  as  I  do. 

Morris  Jastrow,  Jr. 
University  of  Pennsylvania 
November,  1917 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    THE  WAR  IN  THE  EAST 23 

II.    THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR 31 

III.    THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 82 

IV.    THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK 122 

NOTES 153 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


English  Steamers  on  the  Tigris  at  Bagdad ....  Frontispiece 

View  Near  Sardis,  the  Ancient  Capital  of  Lydia 32 

(Reproduced  from  Garstang,    The  Land  of  the  Hitliles,   Plate 
XXVI.) 

The  Entrance  of  the  Famous  Cilician  Gates  Across  Which 
Armies  have  Passed  from  Before  2000  B.C.  Down  to 
Our  Own  Days,    The  Bagdad  Railway  Passes  a  Little  to 

the  East  of  the  Pass 32 

(Reproduced  from  Garstang,  Plate  XXI.) 

Hittite  Rock  Sculpture  at  Ivriz,  not  Far  from  Eregli,  on  the 
Bagdad  Railway  Route,  Representing  a  Hittite  Ruler 
in  an  Attitude  of  Adoration  Before  a  God  of  Agricul- 
ture and  Viniculture — A  Hittite  Bacchus.  A  Specimen 
of  the  Enormous  Rock  Sculptures  Found  in  Central  and 
Northern  Asia  Minor,  Dating  from  the  Days  of  the 
Hittites.  The  Figure  of  the  Deity  is  14  Feet  High; 
that  of  the  King  8  Feet  High.  The  Sculpture  Dates 
from  About  1000  B.C 36 

(Reproduced    from    Nettancourt-Vaubecourt,    Sur    les    Grandes 
Routes  de  I'Asie  Mineure,  Leroux,  Paris,  1908,  Plate  XVII.) 

Ruins  of  the  Entrance  to  the  Great  Hittite  Fortress  at 
Boghaz-Keui,  Showing  Cyclopean  Character  of  the  Con- 
struction and  the  Lion  Sphinxes  Guarding  the  Entrance; 

Dating  from  About  1500  B.C 36 

(Reproduced  from  Meyer,  Reich  und  Kultur  der  Chetiter,  (Berlin, 
1914).  Fig.  s. 

An  Ancient  Hittite  and  His  Modem  Armenian  Descendant     40 

(Reproduced  from  Breasted,  Ancient  Times,  Ginn  and  Company, 
1916.    Fig.  146.) 

19 


20  ILLUSTRATIONS 

Monolith  of  a  Hittite  Ruler  with  an  Inscription  in  Hittite 
Hieroglyphics,  Containing  a  Dedicatory  Record  of  the 
Ruler's  Achievements.  Found  Outside  of  Marash  to  the 
North  of  Killis  on  the  Bagdad  Railway  Route  in  Asia 
Minor,  This  is  the  Only  Hittite  Monument  in  this 
Country  and  is  Reproduced  from  a  Photograph  Kindly 
Furnished  for  this  Volume  by  Dr.  Edward  Robinson, 
Director  of  the  Metropolitan  Museum.  The  Stone  is  3 
Feet  6  Inches  High 40 

The  Great  Battle  of  Kadesh  on  the  Orontes,  Between  the 
Egyptians  and  Hittites,  which  Took  Place  c.  1295  B.C. 
The  Egyptian  Pharaoh,  in  His  Chariot,  Dominating 
the  Scene  is  Rameses  II,  Who  is  Represented  as  Per- 
sonally Directing  the  Battle.  Relief  on  a  Temple  Wall 
at  Luxor 46 

(Reproduced  from  Breasted,  The  Battle  of  Kadesh,  University  of 
Chicago  Decennial  Publications,  1903.) 

Primitive  Method  of  Irrigation  in  Mesopotamia  as  Still 
Carried  on  by  the  Natives.  The  Bucket  of  Skin  is 
Lowered  into  the  Water  and  is  then  Raised  by  a  Draft 
Animal — ^Horse,  Donkey  or  Bullock — Walking  Down 
the  Inclined  Plane,  and  the  Water  Distributed  Through 

the  Neighboring  Fields 65 

(Reproduced  from  the  Levant  Trade  Review,  September,  1914.) 

The  Portal  at  Nigdeh  (not  Far  from  Eregli  on  the  Bagdad 
Route),  Forming  Part  of  a  Medresseh  (Mohammedan 
School)  and  Dating  from  c.  1223  A.D.    Specimen  of  the 
Art  and  Architecture  of  the  Selyuk  Turks  in  Asia  Minor.    65 
(Reproduced  from  Garstang,  Plate  XXXII.) 

View  of  Angora,  the  Ancient  Ancyra,  the  Scene  of  Many 
Battles  in  the  History  of  Asia  Minor,  and  the  Terminus 

of  the  Anatolian  Railway 82 

(Reproduced  from  Nettancourt-Vaubecourt,  Plate  VII.) 


ILLUSTRATIONS  21 

Konia,  the  Ancient  Iconium,  the  Seat  of  Residence  of  the 
Selyuk  Sultans  and  One  of  the  Main  Stations  on  the 
Bagdad  Railway 82 

(Reproduced  from  the  Levant  Trade  Review,  March,  1915.) 

Bridge  on  the  Bagdad  Railway  Route  over  the  Euphrates 
at  Jerablus,  the  Site  of  the  Ancient  Hittite  City  of 
Carchemish.  The  Bridge  has  a  Length  of  850  Yards 
and  Its  Constructive  Steel  and  Iron  parts  have  a  Total 
Weight  of  3400  tons no 

(Reproduced  from  the  Levant  Trade  Review,  June,  1915.) 

The  Terminal  Station  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  at  Haidar- 
Pasha,  Opposite  Constantinople.  This  is  the  Starting- 
point  of  the  Famous  Railway,  which  has  Now  Been 
Completed  Except  for  Two  Sections  Covering  About 
265  Miles.  The  Length  of  the  Railway  from  Constan- 
tinople to  Bagdad  is  1512  Miles no 

(Reproduced  from  the  Levant  Trade  Review,  March,  1915.) 

Map  of  Asia  Minor,  Mesopotamia,  Palestine,  Syria,  Arabia 
and  Egypt,  Showing  Route  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  and 
Other  Railroads  in  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  Palestine  and 
Arabia,  the  Ancient  Trade  Routes  and  the  Route  of 
Alexander  the  Great 160 


THE  WAR  AND  THE 
BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  WAR  IN  THE  EAST 


History  is  being  made  to-day  through  the  war  in 
lands  replete  with  historic  associations,  that  have 
witnessed  the  rise  and  decay  of  many  a  civilization. 
The  conflict  raging  in  three  continents  and  shared  in 
by  the  fourth  sees  armies  taking  possession  of  the 
valley  of  the  Nile,  whose  pyramids  were  built  5000 
years  ago.  Passing  over  a  route  identical  in  part 
with  that  of  the  traditional  Exodus,  the  march  of  the 
English  troops  toward  Jerusalem  suggests  a  repe- 
tition of  the  Crusades  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Cross  and 
Crescent  once  more  lock  arms  at  sites  that  have 
acquired  a  sacred  significance  in  the  traditions  of 
three  religions.  Further  East,  Russian  armies  are 
following  the  route  of  the  Ten  Thousand  ^  on  the 
eastern  border  of  Asia  Minor,  and  are  moving  in 
Persia  along  some  of  the  old  routes  on  which  the 
hosts  of  Cyrus  passed  in  their  descent  upon  the 
Euphrates  Valley,  and  which  two  centuries  later 
witnessed  the  remarkable  invasion  of  the  old  East 

^Trebizond  at  the  southeastern  corner  of  the  Black  Sea, 
captured  by  the  Russians  in  the  early  campaigns  of  the  war, 
is  the  point  where  the  Greeks  on  their  retreat  from  Babylonia 
(401  B.C.)   at  last  reached  the  seashore. 

23 


24      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

by  the  young  Lochinvar,  come  out  of  the  West.  The 
imagination  is  stirred  by  the  exploits  of  Enghsh 
armies  landing  at  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
moving  along  the  Tigris  across  the  mounds,  which 
have  in  part  yielded  but  in  large  part  still  cover 
the  remains  of  the  civilization  that  arose  in  the 
Euphrates  Valley  thousands  of  years  ago  and  which, 
spreading  northwards,  became  the  rival  of  Egyptian 
achievements. 

Can  any  romance  be  stranger  than  the  streets 
of  Bagdad,  only  sixty  miles  distant  from  the  ruins 
of  ancient  Babylon,  with  memories  of  past  glory 
reaching  back  to  Harun  al-Rashid,  resounding  to 
the  steps  of  European  soldiery,  and  Mosul,  opposite 
which  lies  all  that  remains  of  Nineveh  "  the  great 
city,"  once  mistress  of  the  world,  at  the  mercy  of 
a  European  power!  What  does  it  all  mean?  It 
is  reported  that  on  the  top  of  the  remains  of  one  of 
the  ancient  towers  that  formed  a  feature  of  the 
temples  of  Babylonia  a  "  wireless  "  station  has  been 
installed  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  This  par- 
ticular tower  is  the  one,  curiously  enough,  which 
tradition  associates  with  the  famous  Tower  of  Babel. 
Are  we  perhaps  to  see  in  the  use  to  which  this  senti- 
nel of  a  hoary  antiquity  has  been  converted  an 
omen  of  the  conquest  of  the  East  by  the  aggressive 
West?  Or  is  it  a  symbol  of  the  resuscitation  of 
the  East  through  the  infusion  of  the  progressive 
spirit  of  the  West?  Are  the  dry  bones  scattered 
through  the  valley  as  in  the  vision  of  Ezekiel,^  once 
more  to  be  knit  together  with  sinews  and  to  be 
covered  with  new  flesh? 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Arabia  the  standard  of  re- 

'Ezekiel,  Chap.  37. 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  EAST  25 

volt  has  been  unfurled.^  The  cry  has  been  raised 
to  reclaim  the  land  in  which  Mohammed  preached 
his  new  religion  in  the  early  part  of  the  seventh 
century  of  our  era  for  the  people  to  which  Moham- 
med belonged.  Are  we  to  witness  perhaps  a  re- 
vival of  the  spirit  which  once  created  mighty  forces 
to  spread  the  Koran  with  the  help  of  the  sword 
throughout  the  world?  Up  to  the  present,  to  be 
sure,  the  "  revolt "  in  Arabia  hardly  merits  so  digni- 
fied a  name.  The  accounts  of  it  sound  more  like  a 
score  of  opera  boufife  than  a  serious  performance, 
but  the  anomaly  presented  for  many  centuries  of  a 
religion  so  essentially  a  product  of  the  Semitic  mind 
and  an  expression  more  particularly  of  the  Arabic 
spirit  as  Islam  controlled  by  a  power  of  non-Arabic 
origin  cannot  endure  for  all  times.  To  have  the 
Sheikh  el-Islam,  the  "  chief  of  the  church,"  at  Con- 
stantinople, merely  because  Constantinople  became 
the  centre  of  a  Turkish  Empire  four  centuries  ago, 
and  a  purely  nominal  head  at  that  under  the  sur- 
veillance of  a  Young  Turk  cabinet,  suspected  of  infi- 
delity and  acting  at  the  dictation  of  German  officials, 
is  indeed  ludicrous.  But  England  in  encouraging 
the  demand  of  Arabia  for  the  Arabs — for  she  is  be- 
hind this  revolt — may  be  stirring  up  a  spirit  which 
it  will  be  hard  for  her  to  control,  for  the  spirit  of 
Islam  is  still  the  spirit  of  fanaticism  that  sees  only 
the  doings  of  Iblis  in  a  world  that  does  not  acknowl- 
edge Mohammed  as  the  apostle  of  Allah.  "  Die  ich 
rief,  die  Geister,  werd'  ich  nun  nicht  los,"  says 
Goethe.    The  Near  East  is  still  largely  the  Moham- 

^  See  Snouck  Hurgronje's  vivid  account  "The  Revolt 
in  Arabia,"  with  a  foreword  by  Richard  J.  H.  Gottheil  (New 
York,  1917). 


26  THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

medan  East,  capable  of  acting  in  accord  if  a  great 
leader  should  arise,  who  will  succeed  in  uniting  the 
followers  of  Orthodox  Sunna  ("  tradition ")  with 
the  Shiites  ^  for  a  great  common  cause.  Islam  does 
not  spell  Progress.  If  reinforced,  it  may  lead  to  a 
revival  of  a  Near  East  that  will  once  more  be  the 
antagonist  of  western  culture,  rather  than  a  minor 
partner.  The  revival  of  the  East  is  thus  fraught 
with  various  possibilities  that  may  take  a  turn  for 
good  or  evil  according  to  the  throw  of  the  dice 
on  the  table  of  fate.  Or  shall  we  accept  the  more 
comforting  western  belief  that  we  can  control  the 
dice,  and  by  wise  counsels  direct  the  course  of  events 
into  the  right  channels  ?  Which  shall  it  be,  the  optimis- 
tic creed  of  the  West,  "  Life  and  death,  the  blessing 
and  the  curse,  have  I  placed  before  thee,  choose 
thou  life"  (Deuteronomy  30,  19),  or  the  fatal- 
ism of  the  disillusioned  East,  which  declares  that 
"  Allah  is  the  only  knowing  one  "  ? 

II 

The  key  to  the  situation,  however,  lies  not  in 
Egypt  nor  in  Arabia,  neither  in  Palestine  nor  in 
Mesopotamia,  but  in  the  region  of  Asia  Minor — 
along  the  great  highway  leading  from  Constantinople 
to  Bagdad.  That  region  has  from  the  most  ancient 
times  determined  the  fate  of  the  Near  East.  Its 
role  in  the  distant  past  has  ever  been  to  threaten 
the  existence  of  civilizations  and  powers  that  arose 

*  Islam,  apart  from  numerous  sects,  is  divided  into  two 
great  divisions  formed  by  those  who  follow  the  "  sunna  "  or 
Orthodox  tradition,  as  against  those  who  set  up  the  claim  that 
AH  was  the  direct  successor  of  Mohammed.  The  latter  are 
known  as  "Shiites"  ("partisans"). 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  EAST  27 

in  the  valley  of  the  Nile  and  in  the  valley  of  the 
Euphrates,  as  in  the  intervening  lands  of  Palestine 
and  Arabia.  Egypt,  Babylonia  and  Assyria  ex- 
hausted their  vitality  in  warding  off  the  menace 
of  the  hordes  that  held  the  region.  Hebrew  Prophets 
announced  the  doom  of  the  world  through  the  com- 
ing of  nations  from  the  north — meaning  Asia  Minor. 
Cyrus  and  Alexander  began  their  conquests  of  the 
old-time  world  by  first  securing  a  grasp  on  Asia 
Minor.  With  that  in  their  hands,  Babylonia,  Pales- 
tine and  Egypt  fell  easily  into  their  lap.  The 
Romans  kept  their  grasp  on  the  East  as  long  as 
they  held  the  routes  through  the  mountain  ridges 
of  central  Asia  Minor.  Islam  failed  in  its  world 
conquest  because  it  could  not  hold  this  wild  region 
in  check,  and  the  union  of  the  Arabs  broke  up  into 
rival  caliphates.  Decisive  battles  of  the  Crusades 
took  place  along  these  historic  routes.  A  kingdom 
of  Jerusalem  was  destined  to  failure  from  the  start 
because  it  lay  exposed  to  attacks  from  the  North. 
The  Turkish  Empire  was  founded  with  the  con- 
quest of  Constantinople  in  1453,  because  through 
that  event  the  control  of  the  highway  leading  to 
the  Persian  Gulf  was  established.  As  long  as  that 
empire  was  able  to  maintain  the  two  poles  of  the 
electric  wire  stretching  from  Constantinople  to 
Bagdad,  her  dominant  position  remained  unchal- 
lenged; her  definite  decline  begins  with  a  break 
in  the  current. 

The  conquest  of  that  highway  by  Ottoman  Turks 
meant  the  final  triumph  of  Crescent  over  Cross,  for 
it  erected  a  barrier,  shutting  oflF  Christian  Europe 
from  access  to  the  entire  East.  A  new  route  to 
India  had  to  be  found,  and  so  in  1492  Columbus,  sail- 


28  THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

ing  from  Spain  with  this  end  in  view,  discovered 
a  new  continent. 

In  our  own  days  we  are  witnessing  what  prom- 
ised to  be  the  reopening  of  the  old  historic  highway 
— the  bridge  uniting  Europe  to  Asia — to  Western 
control,  through  the  project  of  a  great  railway 
stretching  alo^ng  a  distance  of  nearly  2000  miles  from 
a  point  opposite  Constantinople  to  Bagdad,  and 
thence  to  Basra  and  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  That  proj- 
ect, which  was  well  under  way  at  the  time  of  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  is  thus  marked  through  its  his- 
torical background  as  one  of  the  most  momentous 
enterprises  of  our  age — ^more  momentous  because  of 
the  issue  involved  than  the  opening  up  of  the  two 
other  world  highways,  the  Suez  and  Panama  canals. 

The  creation  of  a  railway  from  Constantinople 
to  Bagdad  under  European  control  is  at  once  a 
symptom  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Turkish  Empire 
which  has  become  a  mere  shadow  of  its  former  wide 
extension,  and  a  significant  token  of  the  new  in- 
vasion of  the  East  by  the  spirit  of  Western  enter- 
prise. Passing  along  a  highway  over  which  armies 
have  marched  forward  and  backward  ever  since 
the  days  of  antiquity,  the  railway  is  also  a  link 
connecting  the  present  with  the  remote  past. 

More  than  this  a  project,  which,  on  the  surface, 
would  appear  to  be  solely  commercial,  assumes  a 
romantic  aspect  through  the  struggle  that  the  rail- 
way aroused  for  the  control  of  a  region  that  marked 
the  ambition  of  all  the  great  empires  of  ancient 
and  mediaeval  times.  The  rivalry  between  Ger- 
many, England,  France  and  Russia,  centering  so 
largely  during  the  past  decade  around  the  Bagdad 
Railway,    is    merely    the     renewal    under    changed 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  EAST  29 

conditions  of  a  conflict  that  began  thousands  of 
years  ago.  The  modern  world  fights  for  this  region 
as  the  ancient  world  did,  with  the  railroad  as  the 
new  symbol  of  a  possession  stronger  and  firmer  than 
the  garrisons  and  outposts  of  antiquity  and  the  for- 
tresses of  the  Roman  and  mediaeval  periods.  The 
importance  of  Constantinople  lies  in  its  position 
as  the  starting-point  of  the  great  highway  that  has 
as  its  natural  outlets  the  Bay  of  Alexandretta  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  Persian  Gulf  on  the  other. 
The  historical  role  of  this  highway  gives  to  the 
Bagdad  Railway  a  political  import  far  transcending 
its  aspect  as  one  of  the  great  commercial  enterprises 
of  our  days.  Backed  as  the  project  was  by  the 
German  government,  steadily  growing  in  power  and 
aggressiveness  since  the  establishment  of  the  united 
German  Empire,  it  added  to  the  already  complicated 
Eastern  Question  an  aggravating  factor  that  con- 
tributed largely  to  the  outbreak  of  the  great  war. 
The  present  struggle  for  supremacy  among  Euro- 
pean powers  resolves  itself  in  its  ultimate  analysis 
into  a  rivalry  for  the  control  of  the  East  as  an 
adjunct  to  commercial  expansion.  The  "  trend 
towards  the  East "  ^  did  not  originate  with  modern 
Germany.  It  began  with  Greece,  was  taken  up  by 
ancient  Rome  and  has  actuated  every  Western 
power  with  ambitions  to  extend  its  commerce  and 
its  sphere  of  influence — Spain,  Holland,  England  and 
France,  and  in  days  nearer  to  us  Russia  and  Ger- 
many, Austria  and  Italy.  Through  a  curious  com- 
bination of  circumstances,  superinduced  by  the  grad- 
ual weakening  of  the  once  dominant  Turkish  Em- 

°  "  Drang  nach  Osten  " — a  favorite  phrase  among  German 
political  and  economic  publicists. 


30      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

pire,  the  struggle  has  shaped  itself  into  its  present 
aspect  for  a  control  of  the  great  highway  that  is 
the  key  to  the  East — the  ncrer  and  the  farther  East. 

A  survey  of  the  history  of  Asia  Minor,  as  a 
resultant  of  the  geographical  contour  of  the  region, 
furnishes  the  illustration  to  the  thesis  that  the  most 
recent  events  are  merely  the  repetition  on  a  larger 
scale  of  such  as  took  place  thousands  of  years  ago, 
and  at  frequent  intervals  since.  The  weapons  have 
changed,  new  contestants  have  arisen  to  take  the 
place  of  civilizations  that  after  serving  their  day 
faded  out  of  sight,  but  the  issue  has  ever  remained 
the  same.  We  are  confronted  by  that  issue  to-day 
— the  control  of  the  highway  that  leads  to  the  East. 
Through  the  war  archaeological  investigations  and  his- 
torical researches  have  been  removed  from  their 
academic  isolation  to  furnish  the  explanation  for  the 
political  import  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  project. 
The  study  of  the  remote  past,  so  energetically  pur- 
sued by  European  and  American  scholars  during 
the  past  decades,  is  brought  into  the  foreground 
through  the  stirring  events  of  our  days  to  illumine 
the  bearings  of  the  historic  highway  of  Asia  Minor 
on  the  issues  at  stake  in  the  present  world  conflict. 
The  decisive  battlefields  for  the  triumph  of  democ- 
racy are  in  the  West,  but  the  decision  for  supremacy 
among  European  nations  lies  in  the  East.  The 
Bagdad  Railway  is  the  most  recent  act  in  a  drama 
the  beginnings  of  which  lie  in  the  remote  past. 

To  understand  the  Bagdad  Railway  project, 
therefore,  we  must  turn  to  the  role  that  Asia  Minor 
has  played  in  history.  That  history  reveals  to  us 
why  Asia  Minor  was  ever,  in  the  past,  as  she  is  to- 
day, the  determining  element  in  bringing  about  the 
alternate  rise  and  decline  of  the  East. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR 


Asia  Minor  is  the  Hinterland  to  Syria,  Palestine 
and  Egypt  on  the  one  side,  and  to  Mesopotamia  on  the 
other.  With  an  area  of  about  206,378  square  miles  ^ 
(a  little  larger  than  France  and  a  little  smaller  than 
Germany)  its  distinctive  features  are  (i)  a  series 
of  high  plateaus  in  the  interior,  sloping  from  2000 
feet  at  the  western  edge  to  over  4000  feet  towards 
the  eastern  border,  with  (2)  several  mountain  ranges 
traversing  the  region  longitudinally,  rising  in  the  north 
to  over  8000  feet  and  in  the  south  to  over  10,000  feet, 
(3)  a  deeply  indented  western  coast  line  with  a  fringe 
of  protecting  islands  and  with  deep  gulfs  affording 
plenty  of  harbors.  In  contrast,  the  bleak  north  coast 
on  the  Black  Sea  has  few  harbors  and  no  islands, 
while  the  southern  coast  is  marked  by  a  broad  bay 
and  a  deep  gulf  and  a  number  of  land-locked  har- 
bors. The  rivers,  though  numerous,  are  of  no  great 
importance,  and  only  a  few  are  navigable  for  a  short 
distance  from  their  mouths.  On  the  plateaus, 
broken  by  broad  valleys  in  the  west,  the  winters  are 
long  and  cold,  and  the  summers  hot.  The  coast 
climate  varies  from  cold  winters  and  humid  sum- 
mer vegetation  on  the  Black  Sea  to  a  moderate  cli- 

^  Its  greatest  length  is  720  miles  along  the  northern  edge 
and  at  the  south  edge  650  miles.  The  breadth  varies  from  300 
to  420  miles. 

31 


32      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

mate  on  the  west  coast,  the  summer  heat  being 
tempered  by  an  almost  daily  north  wind  blowing 
off  the  sea,  and  reaching  to  extreme  summer  heat 
and  mild  winters  on  the  south  coast.  Along  the 
course  of  the  rivers,  vegetation  is  rich,  aided  by 
alluvial  deposits  to  the  soil,  brought  down  by  the 
streams  as  they  pass  through  mountain  gorges.  The 
mineral  wealth  of  Asia  Minor  is  very  great,  and  it 
would  appear  that  iron  was  introduced  as  early  as 
the  second  millenium  before  our  era  into  the  ancient 
East,  through  the  working  of  the  ore  in  the  north- 
eastern corner  of  Asia  Minor. 

The  contrast  presented  by  the  coast  land  to  that 
of  the  interior  is  paralleled  by  the  totally  different 
aspect  of  the  earliest  settlements  along  the  ^gean 
Sea  from  the  conditions  that  led  to  the  rise  of 
powerful  states  in  the  interior.  The  western  coast 
of  Asia  Minor  appears  to  have  been  settled  in  very 
early  days  through  ^gean  traders  coming  probably 
from  Crete  where,  as  the  remarkable  excavations  of 
the  last  two  decades  have  shown,  a  high  degree  of 
civilization,  more  commonly  spoken  of  as  Minoan, 
was  developed  between  c.  3000  and  2500  B.C.  It 
reached  its  height  about  1600  B.C.,  but  long  ere  this  sent 
its  offshoots  to  the  Grecian  mainland,  notably  to 
Argos.  The  great  castles  and  palaces  of  Mycense 
and  Tiryns,  excavated  by  Schlieman,  are  the  works 
of  these  ^geans  coming  from  Crete,  and  there  are 
traces  of  such  settlements  and  influences  elsewhere. 
The  proto-Greek  civilization,  commonly  spoken  of 
as  Mycenean,  thus  turns  out  to  be  of  Cretan  origin. 
Similarly,  these  ^geans  came  to  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor,  and  in  time  a  powerful  kingdom  with  Troy 


^ 

^w 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  33 

as  a  centre  was  established  in  the  northwestern 
corner,  reaching  its  height  between  c.  1500  and  1200 
B.c.^  The  Homeric  poems,  commemorating  the  con- 
flicts between  ^geans  and  Greeks,  are  thus  brought 
nearer  to  us  by  the  spade  of  the  archselogist.  These 
^geans  belonged  to  the  Indo-European  stock,  and, 
in  passing,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Philistines  who 
as  traders  settled  on  the  Palestinian  coast  (and  gave 
their  name  to  the  country)  also  came  from  Crete, 
and  represent,  therefore,  a  part  of  a  general  move- 
ment of  the  spread  of  ^gean  civilization,  though 
confined  to  coast  lands.  Whether  the  earliest  set- 
tlers of  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor  belonged  to  this 
sanie  general  stock,  designated  by  the  unsatisfactory 
term  "  Aryan,"  is  not  certain,  though  possible,  but 
in  any  case  these  settlers  appear  to  have  come  from 
the  steppes  of  southern  Russia  across  the  Caucasus 
Mountains.  From  this  centre  streams  of  migration 
radiated  m  various  directions,  some  passing  to  the 
southeast  and  eventually  reaching  India  where  they 
developed  the  old  Hindu  civilization;  others  passed 
a'-ound  the  Black  Sea  on  the  north  and  moved  along 
the  Danube  into  central  Europe,  and  still  others 
entered  Asia  Minor  somewhere  near  its  northeastern 
border.  Traces  of  very  ancient  routes  along  this 
southern  coast  of  the  Black  Sea  and  running  into  the 
interior  ^  show  how  early  the  settlement  of  the  in- 
terior of  Asia  Minor  must  have  begun. 

*  The  so-called  sixth  city  of  Schlieman's  excavations.  See 
Walter  Leaf,  Troy,  pp.  85-101  and  the  map. 

*  See  Ramsay's  invaluable  work,  "  The  Historical  Geog- 
raphy of  Asia  Minor"  (London,  1890),  chapters  I-VII,  for 
a  full  discussion  of  these  old  routes. 

3 


34     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

II 

A  region  like  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor  broken  up 
by  mountain  ranges,  with  no  large  river  as  an 
avenue  of  transportation,  is  not  conducive  to  the 
creation  of  a  single  state,  uniting  groups  of  popula- 
tion through  common  interests.  Rivalry  rather  than 
permanent  union  would  represent  the  natural  tend- 
ency among  the  combinations  that  would  be  formed 
by  the  hordes  moving  from  time  immemorial  across 
the  Caucasus  and  from  lands  lying  beyond  to  the 
north  and  northeast.  An  indigenous  civilization 
arising  under  such  conditions  would  be  marked  by 
a  hardiness  reflecting  the  traits  of  the  region.  The 
break-up  of  the  population  through  natural  barriers 
separating  the  various  groups  would  tend  to  the 
unfolding  of  strength,  in  order  to  secure  protection 
from  attack  and  to  safeguard  an  independent  exist- 
ence. Such  peoples  will  build  huge  fortified  castles 
and  will  create  strong  armies,  actuated  by  the  nat- 
ural ambition  to  put  their  strength  to  a  test.  Asia 
Minor  is  thus  adapted  to  develop  powers  marked 
by  militarism. 

Excavation  and  exploration  in  the  interior  of 
Asia  Minor  during  the  last  thirty  years  have,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  revealed  the  existence  of  powerful 
military  states  organized  by  groups  known  as  Hit- 
tites,  and  whose  history  reverts  to  the  border  of  the 
third  millennium  before  this  era.  Until  archaeology  had 
thus  opened  up  the  early  history  of  Asia  Minor, 
nothing  was  known  of  these  Hittites  beyond  what 
could  be  gleaned  from  incidental  notices  in  the  Old 
Testament,  where  they  appear  chiefly  as  one  of  the 
groups  like  the  Amorites,  Perizzites  and  Canaanites 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  35 

with  whom  the  Hebrews  were  forbidden  to  marry. 
Then,  as  Egyptian  and  Babylonian  monuments  re- 
leased their  secrets,  references  to  the  Khatti,  whom 
scholars  at  first  hesitatingly  identified  with  the 
Hittites  of  the  Old  Testament,  began  to  multiply  in 
the  records  of  Egyptian  and  Assyrian  rulers.  Grad- 
ually, it  became  evident  that  these  Hittites  must  have 
been  the  most  serious  menace  that  the  two  great 
civilizations  of  the  Near  East  had  to  encounter. 
Hittites  loomed  up  larger  and  larger,  as  the  written 
and  pictorial  material  increased,  but  the  full  force 
of  their  position  and  achievements  was  not  recog- 
nized until,  through  more  thorough  exploration, 
Hittite  monuments  and  Hittite  remains  turned  up 
in  various  parts  of  Asia  Minor,  dating  back  to  the 
second  millennium  before  this  era. 

The  character  of  these  monuments  and  remains 
scattered  throughout  Asia  Minor  and  northern  Syria 
is  so  marked  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  their 
belonging  to  the  same  civilization.  Rock  sculptures, 
stone  reliefs  and  inscribed  stones  extend  east  to  west 
from  Sipylos,  not  far  from  Smyrna,  to  Malatia  on  the 
Euphrates,  and  north  to  south  from  Boghaz- 
Keui  to  Hama  on  the  Orontes,  all  showing  the 
same  characteristics.  Great  fortresses  and  palaces 
of  elaborate  construction  have  been  found  at  Boghaz- 
Keui  and  Eyuk  in  northern  Asia  Minor  and  in  Sakje- 
Geuzi  and  Sendjerli  in  the  southeast  beyond  the 
Taurus  range.  These  sites  represent  some  of  the 
walled  towns  of  the  Hittites,  of  which  there  were 
many,  scattered  throughout  the  region  at  strategical 
points  near  the  mountain  passes  and  elsewhere  along 
the  main  routes.  The  scale  of  the  constructions  and 
of  the  rock  sculptures  illustrate  the  power  developed 


36     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

by  the  Hittites  in  the  hey-day  of  their  glory,  which 
extends  from  c.  1500  to  1000  B.C.  The  entrance  to 
the  fort  was  through  enormous  gates  flanked  by  lions 
or  sphinxes.  The  city  walls  and  the  defences  were 
constructed  of  large  stones  built  in  the  most  solid 
masonry.  At  Eyuk,  some  20  miles  to  the  north 
of  Boghaz-Keui,  on  either  side  of  the  gateway,  there 
is  a  long  series  of  huge  blocks  on  which  scenes  of  a 
religious  character,  processions  of  priests  and  musi- 
cians, paying  homage  to  a  god  and  goddess,  were 
sculptured  in  relief.  Elsewhere  the  rocks  portray  vivid 
scenes  of  stag  and  lion  hunts  which  were  favorite  sports 
of  the  Hittite  rulers. 

Finally,  there  are  a  large  number  of  inscriptions 
in  the  peculiar  Hittite  hieroglyphic  characters, 
accompanying  the  sculptures,  and  the  many  in- 
scribed stones  containing  the  explanation  of  the 
scenes  or  embodying  votive  dedications.  By  the  side 
of  these  inscribed  lapidary  monuments,  excavations 
at  Boghaz-Keui  conducted  by  the  late  Hugo  Winck- 
ler  in  1906-1907  have  brought  to  light,  to  cap  the 
surprise  of  scholars,  thousands  of  clay  tablets,  like 
those  found  in  Babylonian  and  Assyrian  mounds, 
covered  with  cuneiform  characters,  but  representing 
not  the  Sumerian  (non-Semitic)  or  Akkadian  (Semi- 
tic) language  of  the  Euphrates  Valley,  but  Hittite — 
the  same  language  as  that  of  the  hieroglyphic  inscrip- 
tions, transliterated  into  cuneiform.*  This  proof  of 
the  adoption  of  the  cuneiform  script  for  writing 
Hittite,  because  more  convenient  and  simpler  for 
correspondence  and  business  documents — and  that 

*  A  parallel  would  be  to  come  across  Egyptian  inscriptions 
written  not  with  any  of  the  varieties  of  the  Egyptian  script, 
but  with  Greek  letters. 


HITTITE    ROCK    SCULPTURE    AT    IVKIZ   U  .    KKM)   H.C.) 


RU1N>     lii       nil.     INIKAMK      lO     A     HITTlll-;     KOKTRKss     AT 
BOUHA/KEUI    (C.   1500  B.C.) 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  37 

as  early  at  least  as  1500  b.c — is  one  of  the  most 
notable  results  of  archaeological  activity  in  Asia 
Minor.  It  points  to  the  intercourse  that  must  have 
existed  between  Asia  Minor  and  the  Euphrates  Val- 
ley in  the  second  millenium  before  this  era. 

Although  the  Hittite  hieroglyphics  have  not  as  yet 
been  deciphered,  the  character  of  the  language  spoken 
by  the  Hittites  has  been  established.  It  turns  out 
to  belong  to  the  "  Aryan  "  or  more  properly  the 
Indo-European  stock — a  somewhat  surprising  dis- 
covery, and  yet  in  keeping  with  the  most  plausible 
hypothesis  of  the  origin  of  the  Hittites  from  the 
steppes  of  southern  Russia  as  the  starting-point  of 
successive  waves  of  Aryan  migration  in  various 
directions. 

Looking,  however,  at  the  types  of  Hittite  as 
pictured  on  their  sculptures,  one  cannot  escape  the 
comparison  with  Mongoloid  types,  and  this  impres- 
sian  is  confirmed  by  the  representation  of  Hittites 
on  Egyptian  monuments  which  give  us  distinctly  the 
high  cheek-bones  and  retreating  forehead,  character- 
istic of  the  Tartar  races.  To  these  features  is  to 
be  added  the  pig-tail,^  depicted  on  Egyptian  monu- 
ments and  so  consistently  portrayed  on  Hittite 
sculptures.  By  the  side  of  this  type,  however,  we 
find  also  on  the  Egyptian  monuments,  portraying 
scenes  and  expeditions  in  Asia  Minor,  another  which 
is  more  Indo-European  in  character,  and  we  en- 
counter this  type  also  in  some  of  the  figures  in  the 
religious  processions  and  in  the  ceremonial  designs 
on  tombstones  throughout  the  Hittite  region.  Such 
indications  point  again  to  the  supposition  which,  on 

*  The  pig-tail  is,  however,  not  confined  to  the  Tartars  and 
Chinese. 


38     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

a  priori  grounds,  is  plausible  that  what  we  call  the 
Hittite  civilization  is  the  result  of  a  commingling 
of  different  ethnic  groups.  Culture  seems  to  be  the 
spark  that  ensues  when  two  different  elements  meet 
and  combine,  though  in  time  one  of  the  elements 
predominates. 

Ill 

It  will  be  evident  from  this  survey  that  the  term 
Hittite  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  very  general  one  to 
mark  a  type  of  civilization  in  which  the  Hittite  be- 
came the  predominating  element,  but  in  which,  as  a 
product  of  the  mixture  of  Hittites  with  other  ethnic 
elements,  others  than  Hittites  participate.  It  is 
natural,  therefore,  to  find  various  centres  of  Hittite 
culture.  We  find  several  Hittite  states  of  consider- 
able power  in  northern  Syria,  while  further  north, 
Boghaz-Keui  became  the  capital  of  a  Hittite  state, 
which  in  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century  B.C. 
acquired  a  commanding  position  over  a  large  part  of 
Asia  Minor,  including  northern  Syria. 

Now  the  historical  significance  of  these  Hittite 
states  lies  entirely  in  their  geographical  position, 
which  made  them  a  menace  to  Egypt  on  the  one 
hand  and  to  Babylonia  on  the  other,  while  Palestine 
as  the  unfortunate  buffer  state  between  these  two 
civilizations  was  even  more  at  the  mercy  of  the  war- 
like Hittites.  The  early  history  of  Asia  Minor  is 
linked  to  the  fortunes  of  these  three  lands.  The  key 
to  the  understanding  of  the  political  development  of 
the  ancient  East,  accompanying  the  rise  of  a  high 
order  of  civilization  in  the  two  fertile  valleys — the 
Nile  and  the  Euphrates — lies  in  an  appreciation  of 
the  fact  that  Egypt  and  Babylonia  could  only  main- 
tain themselves  by  successfully  holding  in  check  the 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  39 

rugged  mountaineers  of  Asia  Minor.  Attracted  by 
the  allurements  of  a  far  higher  culture  than  their 
own,  the  Hittites  would  be  tempted,  as  their  strength 
increased  to  break  through  their  natural  barriers  and 
to  seek  the  plains  of  Mesopotamia  and  the  lowlands 
of  Egypt,  with  Palestine  as  a  natural  passageway 
too  insignificant  ever  to  unfold  any  considerable 
power  of  her  own.  Once  the  mountain  passes  of  the 
Anti-Taurus  and  Amanus  ranges  were  crossed,  there 
was  nothing  to  prevent  the  rugged  mountaineer 
forces  from  marching  along  to  the  Mediterranean 
coast,  to  Palestine  and  Egypt,  or  eastwards  to  the 
Euphrates — the  avenue  to  both  Babylonia  in  the 
south  and  to  Assyria  towards  the  north.  Assyria 
could  also  be  reached  by  direct  routes  from  eastern 
Asia  Minor,  following  river  courses  and  through 
mountain  passes  to  Diarbekr  and  thence  along  the 
Tigris.  That  this  was  the  actual  part  played  by 
the  Hittite  groups  from  very  early  days  down  to 
their  final  dissolution  at  the  close  of  the  eighth 
century  before  this  era,  when  new  forces  made  their 
appearance  in  Asia  Minor,  is  shown  by  Egyptian  and 
Babylonian  and  Assyrian  records  stretching  from 
before  2000  B.C.  to  the  fall  of  Assyria  herself  in  606  B.C. 
It  is  surprising  to  find  that  as  early  as  1900  B.C. 
Hittites  actually  invaded  the  Euphrates  Valley. 
We  have  the  official  record  of  a  Hittite  occupying 
at  this  time  the  throne  of  Babylon.  The  Hittite  occupa- 
tion did  not  last  long,  but  the  fact  of  its  having  been 
accomplished  for  a  short  period  shows  the  power  which 
these  doughty  warriors  must  have  acquired  by  the 
beginning  of  the  second  millenium.  The  danger 
of  an  attack  from  the  region  to  the  north  and  north- 
,west  of  the  Euphrates  Valley  must  have  been  real- 


40      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

ized  by  the  Babylonian  rulers,  for  we  find  them 
establishing  an  outpost  against  the  Hittites  as  early 
as  2400  B.C.  beyond  the  Anti-Taurus  range  in  what  is 
now  known  as  Cappadocia.  On  this  supposition  we 
can  account  for  the  discovery  of  numerous  cuneiform 
tablets  near  Csesarea.  The  contents  of  these  tablets 
are  of  a  business  nature.  They  deal  with  commer- 
cial transactions,  and  the  language  is  a  kind  of 
patois,  Babylonian  mixed  with  foreign  words  that 
will  probably  turn  out  to  be  Hittite.  Since  they 
are  dated  after  the  fashion  of  Babylonian  documents, 
we  are  in  a  position  to  determine  their  age  as  ranging 
from  about  2400  to  2000  B.C.  The  proof  which  they 
furnish  of  active  business  transactions  between  the 
Euphrates  Valley  and  Asia  Minor  is  of  the  greatest 
value  in  illustration  of  trade  routes  that  must  have 
been  established  through  the  heart  of  Asia  Minor 
at  this  early  period.  Trade  and  war  are  close  bed- 
fellows in  antiquity,  as  they  are  in  modern  days. 
Trade  in  this  instance  must  have  been  incidental  to 
the  garrison  established  by  Babylonian  rulers  at  a 
strategic  point  far  north,  to  ward  off  an  advance 
of  Hittites  across  the  mountain  passes  of  the  Anti- 
Taurus  and  the  Amanus  ranges  in  the  direction  of 
the  Euphrates  Valley — precisely  the  menace  that 
overwhelmed  the  Euphrates  Valley  some  centuries 
later.  The  Euphrates  Valley  could  not  be  held  with- 
out the  Hinterland,  which  in  itself  is  the  continuation 
of  the  "  Fertile  Crescent "  that  starts  at  the  Persian 
Gulf  and  stretches  in  a  semi-circle  around  a  desert 
region  to  the  Mediterranean.  We  accordingly  find 
a  great  conqueror  like  Sargon  I  (c.  2700  B.C.),  under 
whom  the  Akkadians  (or  Semites)  gain  their  first  defi- 
nite triumph  over  the  Sumerians,  leading  his  armies 


AN   ANCIENT    HITTITE   AND    HIS 
MODERN    ARMENIAN    DESCENDANT 


MONOLITH  OF  A  HITTITE  RULER  WITH  INSCRIPTION 
(METROPOLITAN  MUSEUM) 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  41 

northward  and  obtaining  a  firm  hold  to  the  shores  of 
the  Mediterranean.  Sargon's  predecessors  were  satis- 
fied with  being  kings  of  Sumer  and  Akkad,"  com- 
prising the  Euphrates  Valley,  but  he  and  his  suc- 
cessors aspire  to  the  grandiloquent  title  of  "  King 
of  the  Four  Regions."  It  was,  however,  military 
necessity  rather  than  an  original  greed  of  conquest 
that  led  these  early  rulers  to  become  conquerors  and 
to  convert  their  empire  into  a  military  power. 

Under  such  conditions,  the  destiny  of  Babylonia 
lay  inevitably  in  the  direction  of  becoming  a  strong 
military  state,  with  its  chief  aim  to  secure  control  of 
as  large  a  territory  as  possible  to  the  north  and 
northwest,  so  as  to  maintain  itself  against  encroach- 
ments of  Hittite  groups  from  these  directions.  When 
Babylonia  waxed  strong,  the  Ilittites  were  kept  in 
suppression,  when  it  grew  weaker,  we  find  the  Hit- 
tites  acquiring  greater  strength.  A  period  of  decline 
set  in  in  the  Euphrates  Valley  at  the  end  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century,  when  the  control  passes  for  five  cen- 
turies into  the  hands  of  a  people  known  as  the 
Cassites  and  whose  origin  is  still  doubtful. 

The  weakness  of  Babylonia  furnishes  the  favor- 
able opportunity  for  the  unfolding  of  greater  strength 
in  Assyria  to  the  north.  The  admixture  of  Hittite 
elements  in  the  population  of  Assyria  stamped  As- 
syria as  more  naturally  warlike  from  the  start  than 
Babylonia,  but  her  rulers  likewise  had  to  fortify 
themselves  against  invasions  from  Asia  Minor  along 
routes  that  led  along  the  eastern  extremity  of  that 
region,  identical  in  part  with  the  march  of  the  Rus- 

'  Sumer  is  the  designation  of  the  southern  part  of  the 
Valley,  Akkad,  to  which  the  Semitic  settlers  were  driven 
back  by  the  Sumerians,  the  designation  of  the  northern  part. 


42      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

sian  army  in  the  present  war  from  Trebizond  to 
Erzerum  southwards  in  the  direction  of  Mosul — 
opposite  which  lay  Nineveh,  the  later  capital  of 
Assyria,  and  a  little  to  the  south  Ashur,  the  older 
capital.  Assyria  was  unable,  however,  to  prevent 
the  rise  of  a  powerful  Hittite  kingdom  in  northern 
Asia  Minor  with  its  centre  at  Boghaz-Keui,  c.  1500 
B.C.,  and  which  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  dominant 
position  over  Hittite  centres  and  settlements  through- 
out eastern  and  central  Asia  Minor  and  beyond  the 
Anti-Taurus  range  in  northern  Syria,  close  to  the 
borders  of  Mesopotamia. 

IV 
Turning  to  Egypt,  we  find  this  region  during  the 
first  period  of  her  most  ancient  history,  the  so-called 
Pyramid  Age,  extending  from  about  3000  to  2500 
B.C.,  marked  by  high  achievements  in  art,  notably  the 
building  of  the  great  pyramids  on  the  outskirts  of  the 
capital,  Memphis.  Egypt  like  Babylonia  was  a  cultural 
power,  and  as  such  advanced  through  peaceable  prog- 
ress rather  than  by  the  force  of  arms.  Civilizations 
that  arise  in  valleys  and  in  islands  do  not  develop 
military  strength,  except  for  purposes  of  defence ; 
they  are  essentially  pacific.  The  centre  of  the  Egyp- 
tian kingdom  was  in  the  north.  There  were,  to  be 
sure,  encounters  with  the  south,  as  a  natural  result 
of  the  extension  of  Egyptian  culture,  but  there  were 
no  attempts  at  conquest  beyond  the  natural  borders. 
It  was  not  till  the  close  of  the  Feudal  Age  (c.  2500  to 
1800  B.C.),  that  we  find  standing  armies  organized, 
though  on  a  moderate  scale,  with  the  help  of  which 
Nubia  was  conquered  and  Palestine,  as  the  coastland 
immediately  adjoining  Egypt  and  a  natural  bulwark, 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  43 

brought  under  the  control  of  the  Pharaohs.  An 
entirely  different  aspect  is  assumed  by  Egyptian  his- 
tory with  a  new  line  of  rulers,  marked  by  extraordi- 
nary energy,  who  come  upon  the  scene  about  1600 
B.C.  A  new  capital  is  established  at  Thebes,  about 
400  miles  to  the  south  of  Memphis.  The  change  is 
significant  as  indicative  of  the  larger  extent  of  the 
empire,  which  brought  with  it  a  transfer  of  the  seat 
of  government  nearer  to  the  centre  of  the  dominion. 
No  doubt  a  contributing  factor  also  in  the  change 
was  the  need  of  a  powerful  bulwark  closer  to  the 
southern  frontier,  which  at  all  times  needed  to  be 
protected  against  attacks  from  the  population  in 
central  Africa.  What  led  to  the  decline  of  the 
Pharaohs  of  the  Feudal  Age,  so  named  because  of 
the  position  which  the  nobles,  owning  large  estates 
under  royal  agents,  acquired,  is  still  a  mystery. 
The  age  was  marked  by  progress  in  literature,  lead- 
ing to  collections  of  papyrus  rolls  that  assumed  the 
dimensions  of  libraries,  as  well  as  by  an  advance 
in  ethical  standards.  Was  it  perhaps  a  long  period 
of  intellectual  development  that  softened  the  virile 
qualities  of  the  Egyptians  so  that  they  fell  an  easy 
prey  to  foreigners  who  seized  the  throne? 

These  are  the  so-called  Hyksos  or  "  shepherd " 
kings,  a  traditional  designation  whose  identification  is 
still  a  matter  of  dispute  among  Egyptologists.  The  des- 
ignation points  to  an  identification  of  these  invaders 
with  the  Semitic  nomads  from  Arabia  and  Palestine 
who  at  frequent  intervals  passed  into  Egypt, 
attracted  by  the  higher  civilization,  just  as  the  Eu- 
phrates Valley  proved  a  magnet  for  Bedouin  groups 
coming  into  Babylonia  by  way  of  the  Euphrates. 
The  movement  of  some  of  the  Hebrew  groups  into 


44      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAH. WAY 

Egypt  as  depicted  by  the  traditional  narratives  of 
Genesis  furnishes  an  illustration  of  such  an  invasion, 
prompted  in  part  also  by  economic  conditions. 
Large  settlements  of  these  Semitic  nomads  were 
made  in  the  outlying  districts  of  Egypt  bordering  on 
and  near  the  Red  Sea.  It  is,  however,  on  the  face 
improbable  that  such  loosely  organized  bands,  not  par- 
ticularly warlike  and  occupying  a  grade  of  culture  only 
some  degrees  removed  from  primitive  conditions, 
should  have  been  capable  of  taking  hold  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  Egypt.  Some  stronger  factor  must  be 
assumed  that  may  have  utilized  these  nomads  in  a 
serious  attack  on  Egypt.  Recalling  that  as  early  as 
1900  B.C.  the  Hittites  invaded  Babylonia,  and  that 
Biblical  tradition  reports  the  presence  of  Hittites  in 
southern  Palestine  at  this  same  early  date,  it  is  a 
reasonable  conjecture  that  the  leaders  of  the  in- 
vasion were  the  powerful  Hittites,  who  in  alliance 
with  the  nomads  wrested  the  throne  of  Egypt  from 
the  native  rulers  and  occupied  it  for  a  time  until  they 
were  once  more  replaced  by  a  native  dynasty.^ 

However  this  may  be,  we  soon  find  the  Pharaohs 
of  the  new  empire  turning  their  faces  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Asia,  and  under  Thutmose  HI  (c.  1500-1450 
B.C.)  these  efforts  at  bringing  Palestine  and  the 
Mediterranean  coast  and  northern  Syria  well  into 
the  interior  of  Asia  Minor  under  subjection  reached 
their  culmination.  The  motive,  however,  which 
originally  prompted  this  military  policy,  was  not 
greed  of  conquest  but  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
the  Egyptian  empire  unimpaired  in  her  strength — 
the  same  condition,  therefore,  that  changed  Baby- 

'  See  Garstang,  Land  of  the  Hittites,  p.  324,  who  agrees 
in  associating  the  Hyksos  with  Hittite  influences. 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  45 

Ionia  from  a  naturally  pacific  to  a  military  power. 
The  land  of  the  Nile  could  not  be  held  without  keep- 
ing in  check  the  constant  menace  of  an  invasion 
from  the  north.  The  coast  cities  along  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  the  interior  of  Palestine  had  to  be  con- 
verted into  Egyptian  garrisons  under  the  control  of 
governors  subject  to  the  Pharaohs.  Palestine  and 
Syria  thus  became  vassal  states  of  Egypt,  and  this 
step  was  necessarily  followed  by  an  extension  of  mili- 
tary activities  northward  and  eastward  into  the  strong- 
holds of  the  Hittites.  Success  brought  with  it  the  en- 
largement of  ambitions,  and  under  Thutmose  III  Egypt 
definitely  enters  upon  a  career  of  military  conquest. 

It  is  not  accidental  that  this  new  epoch  of  mili- 
tary activity  in  Egyptian  history  is  coincident  with 
the  period  when  the  Hittites  reached  the  height  of 
their  power  under  the  kingdom  which  had  its  centre 
in  Boghaz-Keui.  The  great  strength  developed  by 
the  Hittites  had  to  be  counterbalanced  by  the  put- 
ting forth  of  the  strongest  effort  on  the  part  of 
Egypt.  This  was  all  the  more  important  because 
Babylonia  under  the  rule  of  the  Cassites  was  unable 
to  hold  the  Hittites  in  check,  and  Assyria  in  the 
north  had  not  developed  sufficient  strength  to  do  so. 
In  the  century  following  upon  Thutmose  III,  we 
find  Assyrian  kings  taking  up  the  challenge  and 
Shalmaneser  I  succeeds  (c.  1300  B.C.)  in  sweeping 
the  Hittites  back  from  the  Euphrates.  In  this 
period  we  encounter  also  the  first  alliances  between 
Egypt  and  Babylonia,  reinforced  by  intermarriages 
between  the  two  courts,  in  order  to  present  a  united 
front  against  the  Hittite  forces. 

The  reign  of  Amenhotep  IV,  or  Ikhnaton,  famous 
in  Egyptian  history  as  a  religious  reformer,  gave  the 


46      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Hittites  a  breathing  spell,  for  this  remarkable  ruler 
was  more  interested  in  reforms  of  the  cult,  in  the 
encouragement  of  the  new  art,^  and  in  other  internal 
problems  than  in  extending  the  sway  of  Egypt.  A 
new  line  of  kings  succeeded  Ikhnaton  that  took  up 
the  former  military  policy,  and  under  Rameses  II 
the  crisis  in  the  test  of  strength  with  the  Hittites 
came.  The  Hittite  ruler  Mursil  and  the  Egyptian 
Pharaoh  locked  arms  at  Kadesh  on  the  Orontes 
(c.  1295  B.C.).  The  battle  proved  to  be  one  of  the 
decisive  events  in  ancient  history.  All  portions  of 
Asia  Minor  were  represented  in  the  tremendous  force 
that  Mursil  had  gathered  for  the  encounter.  Rameses 
II,  who  gives  us  a  detailed  account  of  the  battle, 
illustrated  by  numerous  pictured  representations, 
on  the  temple  walls  at  Abu  Simbel,  at  Abydos,  at 
Luxor  and  Karnak,  recounts  how  at  first  the  battle 
went  favorably  for  the  Hittites.  The  king  confesses 
that  at  one  stage  in  the  encounter  he  was  in  danger 
of  being  captured.  In  the  end,  however,  the  Egyp- 
tians secured  the  advantage  and,  if  we  may  trust 
the  Egyptian  chronicler,  the  Hittites  were  driven  off 
the  field.  Had  the  fortune  of  battle  gone  against 
the  Egyptians,  a  Hittite  invasion  of  Egypt  would 
have  been  inevitable  and  the  course  of  Egyptian 
history  would  have  been  radically  changed.  As  it 
was,  the  battle  of  Kadesh  merely  marked  the  zenith 
of  Hittite  power,  and  Egypt  could  hereafter  breathe 
more  freely.  Her  safety,  however,  was  always  de- 
pendent upon  her  holding  as  a  minimum  foreign  pos- 
session southern  Syria  to  act  as  a  bulwark  against 
Hittite  advance.  The  Hittites  under  Mursil  again 
undertook   an    offensive    against    Egypt,    aided    by 

*  See  on  this  reformer  the  note  on  p.  156. 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  47 

Amorites  and  other  groups  of  Palestine.  The  tide 
of  war  flowed  and  ebbed  until  c.  1280  B.C.,  when  an 
offensive  and  defensive  treaty  between  Hattusil,  the 
Hittite  ruler  of  Boghaz-Keui,  and  Rameses  II  was 
drawn  up,  of  which  by  a  fortunate  chance  we  now  have 
both  the  Egyptian  and  the  Hittite  accounts.  On  the 
temple  walls  of  Karnak  Rameses  records  the  fact  of  the 
reception  of  the  Hittite  treaty  sent  by  Hattusil  on  a 
silver  tablet.  Some  years  later,  c.  1266  B.C.,  to  further 
mark  the  friendship  now  existing  between  the  two 
empires,  a  Hittite  princess  was  added  to  the  harem 
of  Rameses.  She  was  escorted  to  Egypt  by  her 
royal  father,  accompanied  by  a  retinue  worthy  of  so 
extraordinary  an  occasion.  Thus  Hittites  and 
Egyptians  actually  met  in  the  Valley  of  the  Nile. 

One  is  reminded  of  the  jealousies  and  suspicions 
of  modern  powers  when  one  reads  on  cuneiform 
documents  of  an  inquiry  directed  by  the  king  of 
Babylonia  to  Hattusil  as  to  the  meaning  of  this 
alliance  between  Egyptians  and  Hittites.  Was  this 
ancient  "  Entente  Cordiale  "  aimed  against  the  Baby- 
lonian Empire?  Hattusil's  answer  is  as  diplomati- 
cally correct  and  non-committal  as  possible.  "  The 
King  of  Egypt  and  I  have  made  an  alliance  and  have 
become  brothers.  Brothers  we  are  and  will  be 
against  any  common  enemy."  The  implication, 
however,  is  clear,  and  Hattusil  made  use  of  the  situ- 
ation to  exert  pressure  upon  Babylonia.  Thus  the 
game  of  diplomacy  was  played  thousands  of 
years  ago. 

The  power  of  Egypt  declined  with  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  dynasty  at  the  turn  of  the  thirteenth  cen- 
tury. The  succeeding  dynasties  were  occupied  with 
protecting  themselves  against  encroachments  from 


48     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

the  south.  Even  their  hold  on  Palestine  and  the 
Phcenician  coast  was  relaxed  so  as  to  permit  of  the 
establishment  of  an  independent  state  by  the 
Hebrews  in  the  interior,  and  by  the  Philistines  and 
Phoenicians  on  the  coast.  We  hear  no  more  of 
Egyptian  encounters  with  Hittites  to  whom  freer 
scope  was  thus  given  by  the  decline  of  the  military 
strength  of  the  Empire  of  the  Nile. 

A  steady  stream  of  hordes  passing  into  Asia 
Minor  brought  new  groups  into  the  fields  that  estab- 
lished independent  states  in  the  mountain  recesses 
and  beyond  in  northern  Syria.  These  come  into  con- 
flict more  particularly  with  Assyria,  whose  rulers 
from  the  twelfth  century  on  find  themselves  obliged 
to  undertake  expedition  after  expedition  against  one 
group  or  the  other.  Now  it  is  a  group  known  as  the 
Muski  who  hold  a  dominant  position  over  the  south- 
ern portions  of  Asia  Minor,  now  the  Phrygian  King- 
dom, founded  probably  by  "  ^geans "  who  passed 
into  the  interior  during  the  period  of  Hittite  decline 
and  who  dominated  a  large  portion  of  the  west- 
ern plateau,  and  some  centuries  later,  newcomers 
across  the  Caucasus,  known  as  the  Cimmerians,  who 
overran  Asia  Minor  and  put  an  end  to  Phrygian 
independence,  and  against  whom  the  Assyrian  rulers 
were  obliged  to  lead  their  forces  in  order  to  maintain 
their  own  position.  Tiglathpileser  I  (c.  1130-1100 
B.C.)  of  Assyria  is  one  of  the  names  that  looms  up 
large  in  this  efifort  to  keep  the  hordes  and  groups 
of  Asia  Minor  in  check,  but  though  successful  in 
part,  his  successors  are  unable  to  prevent  the  rise 
of  a  powerful  Hittite  state  in  northern  Syria  with 
Carchemish  on  the  Euphrates  as  the  centre,  that 
maintains  itself  till  717  B.C.  when  it  is  finally  over- 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  49 

come  by  Sargon  II  of  Assyria.  With  this  decisive 
event,  the  way  was  open  to  Assyria  for  the  complete 
control  of  the  lands  around  the  Mediterranean. 
Palestine,  the  Phoenician  coast,  northern  Arabia  and 
Egypt  fall  into  Assyria's  hands.  Ashurbanapal,  the 
"  Grande  Monarque  "  of  Assyria  (668-626  B.C.),  under 
whom  the  Assyrian  Empire  reaches  its  climax,  receives 
the  homage  of  the  Lydians,  who  had  established 
an  independent  kingdom  in  Asia  Minor  after  the 
overthrow  of  the  Hittites  and  the  Phrygians.  The 
removal  of  the  Asia  Minor  menace  was  the  con- 
dition needed  to  make  Nineveh  the  mistress  of  the 
ancient  world. 

V 

The  earliest  history  of  Asia  Minor  thus  fore- 
shadows the  role  which  the  control  of  the  highway 
leading  from  Constantinople  to  Bagdad  was  destined 
to  play  in  subsequent  ages  down  to  our  own  days. 
Asia  Minor  as  the  Hinterland  to  Egypt  and  Meso- 
potamia forced  these  empires  to  become  military 
powers  in  order  to  secure  their  position  against  attacks 
from  the  north  to  which  they  were  exposed,  though 
what  was  originally  a  matter  of  necessity  became 
through  the  allurements  of  conquest  a  growing  ambi- 
tion.    L'appctit  vient  en  mangcant. 

The  position  of  Babylon,  as  the  capital  of  the 
united  Euphrates  states,  on  the  Euphrates,  at  a  point 
where  it  runs  closest  to  the  Tigris,  was  chosen 
because  the  Euphrates  was  the  natural  avenue  along 
which  the  hordes  of  Asia  Minor  after  having  passed 
through  the  Cilician  gates  and  the  Amanus  range 
would  swoop  down  upon  the  Mesopotamian  plain. 
The  continuity  of  the  historical  relationship  of  Meso- 
potamia to  Asia  Minor  is  well  illustrated  by  the  per- 
4 


50      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

sistency  of  the  site,  constituting  the  natural  centre 
of  the  Euphrates  Valley.  Seleucia  (founded  by 
Seleucus  I  in  312  B.C.),  the  capital  in  the  days  of 
Greek  occupancy,  Ctesiphon  in  the  later  Parthian 
period  (founded  c.  129  B.C.)  and  Bagdad  in  Arabian 
times  (founded  about  763  a.d.)  are  all  within  seventy 
miles  from  Babylon.  The  only  significant  change 
brought  about  by  time  and  different  circum- 
stances is  the  transfer  of  the  capital  of  the  region 
from  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates  to  that  of  the 
Tigris.®  This  was  due  to  the  growth  of  commerce 
which  made  for  a  position  on  the  Tigris  as  the  avenue 
of  commerce "  from  the  Persian  Gulf  up  to  the 
northern  confines  of  Assyria.  Seleucia  was  selected 
as  the  most  favorable  site  on  the  Tigris,  where  that 
river  runs  closest  to  the  Euphrates,  so  that  the  capital 
might  serve  the  same  purpose  as  ancient  Babylon 
did  in  being  at  a  strategic  point  to  ward  off  an  attack 
from  Asia  Minor,  while  the  change  from  Seleucia  to 
Bagdad — only  15  miles  apart — appears  to  have  been 
due  to  a  deviation  in  the  course  of  the  Euphrates 
which  brought  it  nearest  to  the  Tigris,  at  some  re- 
move from  Seleucia.  The  choice  of  Nineveh  as  the 
capital  of  Assyria  was  similarly  dictated  by  strategic 
considerations  to  offset  the  Asia  Minor  menace." 

°  Seleucia,  50  miles  north  of  Babylon,  lies  on  the  western 
bank  of  the  Tigris,  Ctesiphon  directly  opposite  on  the  eastern 
bank,  and  Bagdad,  15  miles  further  north,  originally  on  the 
western  bank,  but  now  and  for  centuries  chiefly  on  the 
eastern  bank. 

^^  The  Euphrates  is  only  navigable  in  parts,  and  as  it 
approaches  the  Persian  Gulf  loses  itself  in  swamp  and  marshes. 

"The  older  capital  at  Ashur  (represented  by  the  mound 
Kaleh  Shergat)  is  only  some  40  miles  further  south. 


i 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  51 

It  lay  at  the  northern  limit  of  navigation  on  the 
Tigris,  which  forms  the  avenue  of  approach  to  Mesopo- 
tamia from  the  eastern  end  of  Asia  Minor  along  the 
routes  from  Sinope  and  Trebizond  that  converge  at 
Diarbekr,  near  the  source  of  both  the  Tigris  and  Eu- 
phrates. For  Assyria,  lying  to  the  north  at  the  out- 
skirts of  the  Anti-Taurus  range,  the  danger  lay  in  a 
direct  attack  from  the  region  of  Diarbekr.  We  find 
the  Assyrian  rulers  establishing  an  outpost  at  or  near 
this  point,  and  placing  monuments  of  themselves  there 
with  records  of  their  achievements,  in  order  to  inspire 
terror  among  their  inveterate  enemies  in  the  strong- 
holds of  northern  and  eastern  Asia  Minor.  The 
history  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria  thus  moves  along 
the  centuries  under  the  shadow  of  this  menace  from 
Asia  Minor. 

For  Egypt,  the  possession  of  Palestine  formed 
the  natural  bulwark  against  the  north.  We  have 
seen  that  already  towards  the  close  of  the  Feudal 
Age,  efforts  were  directed  towards  this  end  which 
culminated  in  the  fifteenth  century  B.C.,  in  placing 
officials  under  Egyptian  suzerainty  in  the  important 
towns  of  Palestine,  Gaza,  Byblos,  Sidon  and  Jerusa- 
lem. All  these  towns  attain  their  rank  because  of 
their  strategic  location.  In  the  reports  which  these 
governors  send  to  the  Pharaohs  of  existing  con- 
ditions, the  Hittites  are  portrayed  threatening  the 
Egyptian  control  of  Palestine  and  the  coast.  These 
troublesome  groups  appear  to  have  overrun  Pales- 
tine, coming  down  from  their  mountain  strongholds 
across  the  great  highway  of  Asia  Minor  that  led  to 
the  plains  of  northern  Syria  through  the  passage 
of  the  Cilician  gates.  They  intermingle  freely  with 
the   native   population — with   the   Amorites   in   the 


52      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

north,  and  with  the  Canaanitish  settlers  and  the 
semi-nomadic  groups  further  south.  The  Hebrew 
tradition  of  Hittites  as  far  south  as  Hebron  ^^  at  the 
time  when  the  Hebrews  first  make  their  appearance 
in  the  land  reflects  this  state  of  affairs.  The  same 
tradition  represents  Esau  as  marrying  Hittite 
women. ^^  True  to  their  warlike  character,  we  find 
Hittites  forming  a  contingent  in  the  Hebrew  armies 
of  later  days.  Hebrew  chroniclers  take  it  as  per- 
fectly natural  that  among  David's  followers  there 
should  be  Hittites,  like  Ahimelech  ^*  and  the  unfor- 
tunate Uriah,^^  whose  wife  Bathsheba  arouses 
David's  passion  and  on  whom  the  king  practises 
a  dastardly  deception  in  order  to  secure  posses- 
sion of  the  woman.  Solomon,  the  offspring  of  the 
marriage,  may  thus  himself  have  been  half-Hittite. 
This  close  association  between  Hebrew  and  Hittites, 
as  also  with  the  Amorites,  must  have  continued  on 
a  considerable  scale  so  that  centuries  afterwards  the 
prophet  Ezekiel,  rebuking  the  people  for  their 
boasted  superiority,  could  say  of  Jerusalem  "  the 
Amorite  was  thy  father  and  the  Hittite  thy  mother."  ^® 
Biblical  writers  find  it  necessary  to  issue  a  warning 
against  intermarriages  with  Hittites.^^  In  the  enu- 
meration of  the  nations  of  Palestine  whom  the 
Hebrews  found  in  possession,  whom  they  are  called 
upon  to   exterminate,   but   whom   they   never  suc- 

"  See  note  to  p.  52  at  the  end  of  the  volume. 
"  Genesis  26,  34. 

"  I   Samuel  26,   6.     It  is  presumably  his   son  Abiathar, 
who  is  one  of  David's  priests    (I   Samuel  30,  7), 
"II   Samuel,  Chapters  11-12. 
"  Ezekiel,  16,  3. 
"  Deuteronomy,  7,  3. 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  53 

ceeded  in  entirely  driving  out,  the  Hittites  are  in- 
variably included.  The  Jebusites  who  hold  the 
heights  of  Jerusalem  till  the  days  of  David  appear 
to  have  been  Hittites ;  and  it  is  significant  that  the 
rise  of  the  Hebrews  to  power  under  David  and  Solo- 
mon (c.  1000-950  B.C.)  coincides  with  the  decline  of 
Hittite  power  in  Asia  Minor  through  the  constant 
encounters  with  the  well-organized  armies  of  the 
Assyrians.  While  still  maintaining  their  indepen- 
dent existence  for  another  two  cenuries,  they  were 
no  longer  strong  enough  to  take  the  offensive  nor  to 
prevent  other  hordes  from  passing  into  Asia  Minor, 
and  so  the  opportunity  came  for  the  Hebrews  to 
create  a  kingdom  out  of  tribes  that  had  hitherto  been 
joined  in  a  loose  confederacy. 

VI 

Passing  down  the  ages  we  find  the  Assyrian 
power,  exhausted  by  incessant  warfare,  succumbing 
to  a  combination  formed  against  her  by  Asia  Minor 
hordes,  abetted  by  Babylonia,  that  saw  in  the  down- 
fall of  Assyria  the  possibility  of  a  renewal  of  her 
own  independence.  Nineveh  fell  in  606  B.C.  and 
the  Neo-Babylonian  Empire  enjoyed  a  short  but 
illustrious  respite.  Nebopolassar  (625-604  B.C.)  who 
begins  his  career  as  a  governor  of  Babylonia  under 
Assyrian  suzerainty,  makes  himself  independent 
and  hands  the  throne  to  his  son,  the  famous  Nebu- 
chadnezzar (604-561  B.C.)  who  is  fired  with  the 
ambition  to  make  himself,  in  imitation  of  the  Assyr- 
ian rulers,  the  master  of  the  ancient  world.  Less 
than  forty  years  after  Nebuchadnezzar's  death, 
however,  a  new  aspirant  to  world-conquest  appears 


54     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

in  Cyrus  who,  coming  from  Persia,  puts  an  end  to 
the  Neo-Babylonian  kingdom  in  539  B.C. 

It  is  significant  that  Cyrus  begins  his  career  by 
an  expedition  to  Asia  Minor.  The  powerful  king- 
dom in  the  sixth  century  in  that  region  was  Lydia, 
which  succeeded  to  Phrygia  and  held  a  considerable 
part  of  Asia  Minor.  The  final  overthrow  of  the 
Hittites  by  Sargon  at  the  close  of  the  eighth  cen- 
tury gave  the  opportunity  for  other  groups  to  secure 
a  dominant  position  in  Asia  Minor.  The  Lydians 
were  an  Aryan  people  and  possibly,  like  the  Phry- 
gians allied  to  the  ^geans,  some  of  whom  appear 
to  have  passed  inwards  from  the  coast.  Cyrus, 
with  the  instinct  of  a  great  general,  realizes  that  the 
conquest  of  the  Hinterland  was  a  necessary  con- 
dition to  the  establishment  of  an  empire  in  the  East. 
Accordingly,  he  proceeds  to  Asia  Minor  and  obtains 
the  supremacy  over  this  region  by  the  defeat  of 
Croesus,  King  of  Lydia,  in  546  B.C.  His  armies  pass 
over  the  historic  highway  through  the  Cilician  gates, 
along  which  Ashurbanapal  had  led  his  soldiers. 
With  this  highway  safely  secured,  he  has  no  difficulty 
in  conquering  Babylonia,  which  indeed  yields  to  him 
without  a  struggle  in  539  B.C.  Palestine  also  falls 
into  his  hands,  and  his  successor  Cambyses  passes 
on  in  triumph  to  Egypt.  The  whole  ancient  world, 
or  at  least  all  of  it  that  seemed  worth  holding,  falls 
at  the  feet  of  the  Persian  rulers  who  pass  from  the 
interior  of  Asia  Minor  to  the  coast  and  cross  over 
to  Greece,  besides  taking  possession  of  important 
islands  of  the  ^gean  Sea  like  Cyprus.  At  the  end 
of  the  following  century  (401  b.c.)  the  younger 
Cyrus,  son  of  Darius  II,  likewise  passes  through 
Asia  Minor  and  seizes  the  Cilician  gates  as  a  pre- 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  55 

liminary  to  an  attempt  to  wrest  the  empire  of  the 
east  from  out  of  the  hands  of  his  elder  brother 
Artaxerxes  II.  Cyrus  was  slain  in  the  battle  of 
Cunaxa,  on  the  Euphrates,  and  soon  thereafter  the 
famous  retreat  of  the  "  Ten  Thousand  "  Greeks  in 
the  army  of  Cyrus  through  Asia  Minor  begins,  to 
end  successfully,  after  many  hardships,  at  Trebi- 
zond  on  the  Black  Sea. 

VII 

Two  centuries  later  the  Persian  Empire  is  threat- 
ened by  a  new  force  which  likewise  advances  from 
the  north.  A  new  epoch  in  the  world's  history 
begins  with  the  exploits  of  Alexander  the  Great 
(334-323  B.C.),  who,  after  subduing  Greece,  begins 
his  eastern  campaigns  at  the  northwestern  corner  of 
Asia  Minor.  On  the  river  Granicus  he  defeats  the 
Persian  army  that  attempted  to  impede  his  passage. 
He  passes  along  the  same  historic  highway,  on  a 
route  largely  identical  with  the  course  of  the  Bag- 
dad Railway,  and  emerging  through  the  Cilician 
gates  encounters  the  vast  force  which  Darius  had 
gathered  at  Issus.  There  he  wins  one  of  the  decisive 
battles  of  the  world's  history.  Master  of  Asia  Minor, 
Alexander  repeats  the  exploits  of  his  Persian  prede- 
cessors. Palestine  and  Egypt  acknowledge  his  rule. 
He  passes  on  to  Mesopotamia,  and  after  another 
sharp  and  victorious  encounter  with  an  army  of 
Darius  at  Arbela,  not  far  from  Nineveh,  the  land  of 
Assyria  and  Babylonia  is  added  to  his  Empire. 

The  possession  of  Asia  Minor  is  also  the  key  to 
India.  Alexander,  whose  ambition  passes  beyond 
the  dreams  of  former  conquerors,  marches  on  to  the 
river  Indus,  and  is  only  checked  in  his  progress  by 


56   THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

the  opposition  of  his  troops  against  a  further  advance. 
Still  occupied  with  schemes  of  further  conquest,  he 
dies  in  Babylon  by  a  strange  fate  in  the  huge  palace 
which  Nebuchadnezzar  had  erected  for  himself, 
with  its  terraced  gardens,  giving  the  impression  of 
"  hanging  gardens,"  that  were  hailed  as  one  of  the 
wonders  of  the  age. 

Dissensions  that  broke  out  among  Alexander's 
generals  after  his  death  led  to  a  division  of  the  vast 
empire.  Seleucus  (323-281  B.C.),  who  obtained 
Mesopotamia  as  his  share,  succeeded  in  bringing 
under  his  authority  the  entire  eastern  part  of  Alex- 
ander's Empire  as  far  as  the  Jaxartes  and  Indus. 
It  was  evident,  however,  that  Seleucus  could  not 
hold  Mesopotamia  without  the  Hinterland  to  the 
north  and  northwest,  and  so  we  find  him  and  his 
successors  striving  for  the  possession  of  Asia  Minor. 
At  Ipsus  in  Asia  Minor  a  decisive  victory  is  won  by 
Seleucus  in  301  over  his  antagonist  Antigonus,  and 
with  the  Hinterland  sufficiently  secured  to  prevent 
an  attack  from  this  region,  Syria  and  eventually 
Palestine  and  the  coast  towns  fall  under  the  Seleu- 
cid  dynasty.  Yet  it  was  again  from  the  north  that 
the  dominions  of  the  Seleucids  were  threatened.  In 
278  B.C.  the  Gauls  breaking  into  Asia  Minor  menaced 
the  "  Fertile  Crescent,"  as  the  Hittites  had  done  in 
their  day.  Antiochus  I  successfully  blocked  their 
advance  and  won  for  himself  the  title  of  soter,  i.e., 
"  savior."  It  is  significant  that  by  driving  the  enemy 
out  of  Asia  Minor,  he  is  supposed  to  have  saved  the 
East.  In  the  division  of  Alexander's  conquests 
Egypt  fell  to  the  share  of  Ptolemy  (323-283  B.C.) 
and  a  rivalry  naturally  ensued  between  the  Ptole- 
mies and  the  Seleucids.     The  former  felt  the  need 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  57 

of  holding  Palestine  as  a  bulwark,  precisely  as  in  the 
days  of  the  Pharaohs,  while  the  latter  could  content 
themselves  generally,  though  not  always,  with  acting 
on  the  defensive  against  Egypt,  with  the  northern 
and  eastern  part  of  the  "  Fertile  Crescent "  in  their 
control,  backed  by  the  Hinterland.  Palestine  became 
a  ball  tossed  now  to  the  Ptolemies,  now  to  the 
Seleucids,  until  in  the  days  of  Antiochus  III,  sur- 
named  the  Great  (223-187  B.C.),  the  Seleucids  se- 
cured a  more  permanent  possession  of  it,  and  proceed 
to  the  invasion  of  Egypt.  The  reign  of  this  Antiochus 
represents  both  the  climax  of  the  Seleucid  dynasty  and 
the  beginning  of  its  decline.  Once  more  the  die  is  cast 
in  Asia  Minor.  This  region  had  been  lost  to  the 
Seleucids  in  tlie  reign  of  Seleucid  II  (246-227  B.C.), 
partly  through  internal  dissension,  and  in  part 
through  the  rise  to  power  of  the  Pergamon  Kingdom 
in  the  northwestern  part  of  Asia  Minor  and  which 
under  its  ruler.  Attains  I  (241-197  B.C.),  had  become 
a  formidable  rival. 

The  decline  of  Greek  rule  in  the  East  thus  begins 
with  the  loosening  of  the  hold  upon  Asia  Minor,  as 
illustrated  more  particularly  by  the  rise  of  the  Per- 
gamon Kingdom.  The  Romans  with  a  shrewd 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  obtaining  a  foot- 
hold in  Asia  Minor  as  the  starting-point  for  the 
development  of  a  Provincia  Asia  allied  themselves 
with  the  new  kingdom.  Through  this  Roman  policy, 
the  rulers  of  Pergamon  added  to  their  dominions 
most  of  western  and  a  part  of  central  Asia  Minor.^^ 
The  capital,  Pergamon,  became  one  of  the  most 
magnificent  cities  of  the  East,  but  only  to  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  Romans  on  the  death  of  Attains  III 

"  Phrygia,  Lydia,  Pisidia,  Lycaonia  and  Pamphylia  become 
subject  to  Pergamon. 


58  THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

in  133  B.C.  This  marks  the  advent  of  Roman  suprem- 
acy in  the  East.  Pergamon  retained  its  position 
for  a  long  time  as  the  focusing  point  of  military  and 
commercial  routes  of  Asia  Minor,  traces  of  which 
are  still  to  be  seen.  From  holding  western  Asia 
Minor,  Roman  domination  gradually  spread  until 
under  Pompey  (64  B.C.)  the  entire  region  became  sub- 
ject to  Rome,  though  certain  provinces  were  permitted 
to  retain  a  nominal  independence. 

Since  Alexander's  days,  however,  Asia  Minor  had 
become  thoroughly  Hellenized  through  the  infusion 
of  Greek  civilization.  So  strong  was  this  impress 
as  to  efface  the  traces  of  the  old  Hittite  culture 
completely.  Only  the  ruins  of  buildings  and  the 
rock  sculptures  remained  to  tell  the  tale  of  the  earlier 
days.  Roman  influence  is  to  be  seen  in  the  building 
and  improvement  of  new  roads  through  the  country, 
and  in  the  erection  of  aqueducts  as  well  as  of  garri- 
sons with  strong  fortifications  at  strategic  points. 
The  Greek  spirit  made  for  culture,  the  Roman  for  the 
unfolding  of  strength,  but  through  both  commerce 
was  encouraged  and  followed  in  the  wake  of  the 
Greek  and  Roman  occupation.  Greek  settlements 
in  Asia  Minor  can  be  followed  by  traces  of  the  theatre 
which  formed  a  focus  of  Greek  intellectual  life.  The 
Romans,  true  to  their  genius,  added  the  amphi- 
theatre for  gladitorial  contests  of  strength. 

VIII 
Holding  Asia  Minor  firmly,  Rome  fell  heir  to  the 
ancient  civilizations  of  Egypt,  Palestine  and  Meso- 
potamia. Until  the  end  of  the  sixth  century  she 
remained  the  undisputed  mistress  of  the  East.  Her 
weakness  began  to  show  itself,  however,  by  the 
increasing  difficulties  she  encountered  in  holding  the 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  59 

pole  at  the  one  end  of  the  historic  highway — at  the 
Persian  Gulf.  She  reversed  the  position  that  had 
hitherto  prevailed,  for  the  Persians  strongly  en- 
trenched at  the  southern  end  of  the  highway,  stretch- 
ing from  Constantinople  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  were 
weak  in  their  hold  of  the  northern  end.  A  general 
of  Darius  Hystaspes  held  Byzantium  for  a  while, 
but  the  Greeks  succeeded,  c.  478  B.C.,  in  regaining  a 
hold  on  the  important  site,  the  foundation  of  which 
goes  back  to  the  seventh  century  B.C.  During  Greek 
supremacy  of  the  East,  the  same  conditions  pre- 
vailed. The  Seleucidian  rulers  were  always  strong 
in  their  control  of  the  region  of  the  Persian  Gulf, 
but  weakest  in  their  hold  of  the  other  pole.  Follow- 
ing the  example  set  by  Alexander,  his  successors 
devoted  themselves  to  the  maintenance  of  the  net- 
work of  canals  of  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris,  which 
constituted  one  of  the  greatest  achievements  of  the 
older  rulers  of  Babylonia. 

Babylonia  is  the  gift  of  the  two  rivers  of  Meso- 
potamia, as  Egypt  is  the  gift  of  the  Nile.  In  both 
regions  a  high  order  of  civilization  developed  as  a 
result  of  the  favorable  conditions  under  which  agri- 
culture could  be  carried  on  in  lowlands  through 
artificial  irrigation.  The  partnership  between  nature 
and  man  thus  produced  the  culture  and  wealth 
of  Mesopotamia.  Nature  provided  the  soil,  man 
directed  the  outflow  of  the  rivers  through  canals  and 
irrigation  ditches  into  the  fields,  changing  the  curse 
of  an  annual  deluge  into  the  blessings  of  the  fields. 
Under  Persian  and  Greek  rulers  this  system  of  irri- 
gation requiring  constant  supervision  was  main- 
tained, and  Babylonia  retained  her  position,  though 
under  foreign  rule.  Rome,  on  the  other  hand, 
strongly  entrenched  herself  at  the  northern  pole  of 


60      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  BAHiWAY 

the  current  stretching  across  Asia  Minor,  but  neg- 
lected the  other  pole.  Byzantium  as  the  capital  of 
the  Eastern  Roman  Empire,  changing  its  name  to 
Constantinople  in  330  a.d.,  became  a  mighty  bulwark, 
ensuring  Roman  control  of  the  highway  up  to  the 
Cilician  gates,  but  in  order  to  hold  the  plains  and 
regions  beyond — the  "  Fertile  Crescent  " — the  grasp 
on  the  other  pole  should  have  been  equally  firm. 
Her  failure  to  do  so  was  a  fatal  error.  Hinterland 
and  "  Fertile  Crescent  "  stand  and  fall  together.  An 
empire  in  the  East  requires  firm  possession  of  both 
as  the  condition  of  permanence.  The  force  of  the 
Roman  power,  so  tenacious  where  its  energy  was  at 
its  height,  appears  to  have  spent  itself  by  the  time  it 
had  reached  Mesopotamia. 

It  is  significant  that  Pompey  was  unable  to  sup- 
press the  Parthian  Empire,  founded  by  Mithridates  I 
(c.  170-138  B.C.),  which  succeeded  in  wresting  Baby- 
lonia from  Seleucidian  rulers;  and  though  this  Par- 
thian Empire  never  attained  to  the  position  of  the  old 
Persian  Empire,  of  which  it  claimed  to  be  the  con- 
tinuation, it  retained  possession  of  Mesopotamia 
against  Roman  attempts  to  seize  it,  though  finally 
obliged  in  the  days  of  Augustus  to  recognize  a  nom- 
inal Roman  suzerainty.  In  226  a.d.  the  Arsacid 
rulers  were  forced  to  submit  to  Ardashir  I,  a  descend- 
ant of  Sasan,  from  whom  these  rulers  derived  their 
designation  as  Sassanians.  This  new  power,  orig- 
inating in  Persia,  represents  a  genuine  revival  of  the 
national  Iranian  element.  It  maintained  itself  till 
the  middle  of  the  seventh  century  when  the  rise  of 
the  Arabs  put  an  end  to  it.  During  this  period  con- 
flicts between  the  Sassanian  rulers  and  the  Eastern 
Roman  Empire  took  place  almost  incessantly.  The 
prize  for  which  the  Sassanians  fought  was  northern 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  61 

Mesopotamia  (which  had  remained  in  Roman  hands) 
and  Asia  Minor.  The  tide  of  war  flowed  and  ebbed 
during  the  following  centuries  but  without  a  decisive 
issue,  because  neither  the  Emperors  of  Byzantium 
nor  the  Sassanians,  holding  southern  Mesopotamia, 
were  able  to  control  the  entire  stretch  of  the  highway 
across  Asia  Minor.  Finally,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
seventh  century  Chosroes  II  penetrated  as  far  as 
Chalcedon,  opposite  Constantinople,  and  by  virtue  of 
this  success,  was,  for  a  short  period,  master  of  the  East. 
During  the  rule  of  the  Parthians  and  Sassanians, 
moreover,  Mesopotamia  lost  much  of  her  former 
strength  and  prosperity  owing  to  the  state  of  neglect 
into  which  the  canal  system  had  been  allowed  to  fall. 
The  greater  interest  of  the  rulers  lay  in  the  region 
to  the  east  of  the  Tigris.  Although  they  continued 
to  reside  in  Ctesiphon,  on  the  Tigris,  the  chief  monu- 
ments of  their  reigns  are  to  be  found  in  Persia.  The 
Iranian  character  of  the  empire,  thus  emphasized, 
became  the  source  of  its  strength,  but  its  rise  to  a 
world  power  would  only  have  been  possible  had  the 
rulers  recognized  the  region  adjacent  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  as  the  prop  of  their  empire.  With  only  an 
indifferent  hold  on  this  region  and  allowing  it  to  fall 
into  decay,  they  could  not  avail  themselves  of  their 
temporary  success  in  controlling  Asia  Minor  up  to 
Constantinople,  A  few  years  after  Chosroes  II  had 
secured  Chalcedon,  the  counter  movement  began 
and  by  627  a.d.  the  Eastern  Emperor  Heraclius  had 
driven  the  Sassanians  back  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 

IX 

The  long-continued  struggle  between  Rome  and 
Persia  for  the  possession  of  Asia  Minor  as  the  key 
to  the  East  thus  ended  in  enfeebling  both  empires, 


62      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

and  making  room  for  a  force  of  an  entirely  different 
character  that  emerges  from  a  region  whence  one 
least  expected  it — Arabia.  Mohammed,  the  Apostle 
of  Allah  (c  570-632  A.D.),  founds  the  religion  of  Islam, 
and  inspiring  the  scattered  Arab  tribes  also  with  a 
national  ideal  unites  them  into  a  solid  mass.  Under 
remarkably  able  generals,  Arabic  armies  pour  forth 
out  of  Arabia  to  win  the  world  for  the  propagation 
of  the  gospel  of  their  prophet.  The  region  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  marks  their  first  conquest,  and  Con- 
stantinople at  the  other  end  their  goal.  Within  a 
year  of  Mohammed's  death,  the  Moslem  hosts  make 
their  appearance  in  southern  Mesopotamia  and  put 
an  end  to  the  Sassanian  Empire.  Palestine  and 
Eg)'pt  fall  into  their  hands.  The  necessity,  however, 
of  holding  the  Hinterland  also  in  order  to  maintain 
an  Arab  Empire  is  recognized  by  their  leaders. 
Under  the  banner  of  the  prophet,  Islam  forces  its 
way  through  Asia  Minor,  and  in  668  a.d.  Constanti- 
nople was  besieged  by  the  Arabs  and  again  in  the 
year  674.  Had  the  Arabs,  who  now  held  the  one 
pole  at  the  Persian  Gulf,  succeeded  in  capturing  and 
retaining  Constantinople  in  their  hands,  the  entire 
East  would  have  remained  at  their  mercy.  The 
check  which  they  received  in  France  through  Charles 
Martel  at  Tours  in  732  a.d.  is  generally  regarded  as 
marking  the  definite  limitation  to  Arabic  advance. 
It  had  this  result  merely  because  the  Arabs  failed 
to  keep  the  two  poles,  across  which  ran  the  highway 
the  possession  of  which  meant  the  sway  over  the 
East.  The  real  failure  of  Islam  was  in  the  East. 
The  Arabs  were  forced  back  from  the  gates  of  Con- 
stantinople, and  another  attempt  in  718  to  take 
Constantinople  was  successful  for  a  short  time  only. 
In  contrast  to  the  Romans  who  held  Constantinople 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  63 

at  the  one  end  of  the  chain  but  could  not  maintain 
the  other,  the  Arabs  held  the  region  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  but  not  the  other.  For  this  reason  the  build- 
ing up  of  a  great  united  Arabic  empire  commanding 
the  East  was  impossible.  Portions  of  Asia  Minor 
along  the  main  roads  were  in  their  possession,  but 
never  the  whole  of  it.  The  Eastern  Empire  kept 
its  hand  on  the  northwestern  end. 

The  conquests  of  the  Arabs  carried  out  with  such 
remarkable  rapidity  soon  split  up  into  groups.  In- 
stead of  a  central  authority  in  Mecca,  rival  caliphates 
arose  in  Mesopotamia,  Egypt  and  Spain.  The 
strongest  of  these  was  the  one  which  had  its  seat 
in  Bagdad  founded  by  the  Caliph  Mansur  in  763  a.d., 
close  by  the  site  of  Ctesiphon  and  not  far  from  ancient 
Babylon.  A  glorious  day  dawned  once  more  for 
this  time-honored  region  which  reached  its  high- 
noon  in  the  days  of  Harun  al-Rashid  (786-809  a.d.), 
but  again  we  note  the  fateful  verdict  of  history  that 
without  the  control  of  the  Hinterland,  sharply  defined 
limitations  are  prescribed  to  the  extension  of  any 
Mesopotamian  power.  The  caliphs  of  Bagdad  could 
not  regain  Egypt,  nor  could  they  always  quell  dis- 
turbances in  Syria.  Realizing  the  importance  of  Asia 
Minor  in  order  to  make  their  own  position  secure, 
the  Abbasid  rulers  of  Bagdad  made  frequent  expe- 
ditions in  that  direction.  In  the  year  833  a.d.,  it 
looked  as  though  the  ambition  to  hold  Constanti- 
nople would  be  finally  realized.  With  such  success 
had  the  caliph  Mamun  penetrated  into  the  heart  of 
Asia  Minor  that  the  Byzantine  Emperor  Theophilus 
sued  for  peace.  Mamun  refused  the  offer,  and  death 
alone  prevented  him  from  carrying  out  his  design  to 
seize  the  capital  of  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire. 
It  was  the  last  effort  of  the  kind.    In  another  cen- 


64     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

tury  a  new  force  came  to  the  front  in  Asia  Minor 
which,  while  it  postponed  the  downfall  of  the  East- 
ern Roman  Empire,  also  blocked  the  Arabic  advance. 
Nor  was  it  long  before  it  gathered  sufficient  strength 
to  threaten  both  the  Arabs  and  the  Emperors  at  Con- 
stantinople. These  new  aspirants  for  control  of  Asia 
Minor  with  the  ambition  to  secure  both  poles  of  the 
current  were  the  Turks. 

X 

Asia  Minor,  we  have  seen,  was  destined  by  her 
geographical  position  to  be  at  the  mercy  of  hordes 
pouring  into  the  region  from  time  immemorial  from 
Central  Asia.  Wave  after  wave  surges  across  the 
Caucasus  or  by  a  more  direct  route.  It  was  thus 
that  the  Hittites  came,  and  possibly  the  ^geans, 
the  Cimmerians  and  other  hordes,  while  the  Gauls 
came  across  the  Hellespont, — and  now  the  region  is 
threatened  by  two  other  motley  groups — the  Turks 
and  the  Mongols.  Into  the  ethnic  problem  sug- 
gested by  these  new  invaders  we  need  not  enter.  An 
ultimate  connection  between  the  two  seems  probable, 
but  as  they  come  upon  the  horizon  of  history  they 
appear  quite  distinct,  the  Turks  being  far  more  capa- 
ble of  assiinilating  the  culture  of  the  region  into 
which  they  came  or  were  driven,  than  the  Mongols, 
who  appear  more  in  the  light  of  raiders,  and  after 
accomplishing  their  purpose  pass  back  to  whence 
they  came.     The  Turks  are  the  first  to  appear. 

We  hear  of  them  towards  the  middle  of  the  sixth 
century  of  our  era  occupying  a  district  on  the  Oxus 
and  victorious  over  opponents.  In  the  following 
century  they  assist  the  Byzantine  Emperor  Herac- 
lius  (610-641  A.D.)  in  his  campaigns  against  the  Sas- 
sanian  empire.     Splitting  up  into  smaller  groups  their 


-^'O'^       - 

^■H-- 


'-**, 


PRIMITIVE    IRRIGATION    IN    MKM  H'O  lAM  lA 


THE    PORTAL    AT    NIGDEH.      SELVUK    ART.      (C.   J22T,  A.D.) 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  65 

trend  is  westward,  and  they  gradually  spread  over  a 
large  region.  A  branch  advances  into  Asia  Minor, 
driven  perhaps  by  waves  behind  it.  This  advance  guard 
becomes  known  as  the  Seljuk  Turks,  though  the  name 
does  not  appear  till  the  eleventh  century,  when  we 
find  them  firmly  established  in  Asia  Minor  and  in 
control  of  most  of  it,  as  far  east  as  Cappadocia  and 
south  to  Cilicia.  In  1071  they  defeat  the  Byzantine 
Emperor,  and  in  1080  take  Nicsea  which  brings  them 
close  to  the  Bosphorus. 

The  Seljuk  Turks  had  become  Moslems  as  had 
other  branches  of  the  Turks  when  coming  into  con- 
tact with  Arabs  and  Persians.  They  thus  added  to 
the  strength  of  Mohammedan  control  of  the  East. 
We  find  them  spreading  in  all  directions  until  by  the 
thirteenth  century  there  was  scarcely  any  part  of  the 
Nearer  East  in  which  Turks  were  not  to  be  found, 
serving  as  mercenaries  or  otherwise  engaged  in  the 
service  of  the  various  caliphates.  The  sultans  of 
Rum,  as  the  dominion  of  the  Seljuk  Turks  in  Asia 
Minor  came  to  be  called,  with  their  capital  at  Ico- 
nium  (modern  Konia)  were  patrons  of  art,  and 
remains  of  Seljuk  constructions  in  Asia  Minor  testify 
to  the  distinction  and  grace  acquired  by  this  branch  of 
the  Turkish  race  in  architecture  and  decoration. 

But  while  Turks  thus  commingled  with  the  sub- 
jects of  the  Arabic  caliphates,  they  never  formed  a 
union  with  them  and  contributed  rather  to  the  further 
splitting  up  of  Asia  Minor  and  the  region  of  the 
"  Fertile  Crescent  "  into  independent  sections.  The 
Abbasid  caliphs  were  left  in  possession  of  their 
authority,  though  the  Seljuk  Sultans  were  the  mas- 
ters of  the  situation.  They  held  Syria  and  threat- 
ened Egypt  at  various  times.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
5 


66     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Seljuk  Turks,  though  a  constant  menace  to  the 
Byzantine  Empire,  lacked  the  background  necessary 
to  the  establishment  of  a  strong  world  empire  in 
the  East.  The  control  of  Asia  Minor  by  the  Seljuk 
Turks,  moreover,  coincides  with  the  age  of  the 
Crusades,  which  begins  in  1096  and  continues  till 
1291,  when  the  last  of  the  strongholds  on  the  Phoe- 
nician coast  fell  into  Moslem  hands.  This  long- 
continued  attempt  on  the  part  of  Christian  Europe 
to  secure  possession  of  the  Land  illustrates  again 
the  thesis  suggested  by  the  history  of  Asia  Minor, 
that  without  this  region  no  grasp  on  the  Near  East 
can  be  effective. 

XI 

On  the  surface,  the  Crusades  were  undertaken 
to  rescue  the  Holy  Sepulchre  and  other  sites  sacred 
to  Christians  out  of  Moslem  hands,  but  their  deeper 
significance  lies  in  the  endeavor  that  they  represent 
to  save  the  Near  East  for  Christendom.  Despite  the 
split  between  Eastern  and  Western  Christendom, 
the  Western  Crusaders  in  reality  came  to  the  aid  of 
the  Byzantine  Empire,  and  while  the  Crusades  failed 
ultimately  in  their  purpose,  they,  like  the  coming 
of  the  Turks,  postponed  the  downfall  of  Constanti- 
nople for  two  centuries  and  more.  It  has  been  prop- 
erly pointed  out  that  the  Crusades  can  only  he  under- 
stood when  considered  as  a  part  of  Eastern  History,^" 
more  particularly  of  that  part  of  the  East  covered  by 
Asia  Minor  and  those  countries  for  which  it  forms 
the  Hinterland.  The  Crusades  represent  a  struggle 
for  possession  of  the  East,  precisely  of  the  same 
order  as  the  various  struggles  which  we  have  rapidly 

"  So  by  Stevenson  in  his  admirable  work,  The  Crusaders  in 
the  East  (Cambridge,  1907). 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  67 

set  forth  in  this  survey  of  the  salient  features  of  the 
history  of  the  highway  from  Constantinople  to  the 
Persian  Gulf.  The  religious  motive  underlying  the 
Crusades  does  not  offset  their  real  meaning  when 
viewed  from  the  broader  standpoint  of  human  his- 
tory as  largely  dominated  by  three  factors,  climate, 
geographical  position  and  economic  pressure,  or 
the  reaction  from  such  pressure.  The  recovery  of 
holy  sites  is  an  incidental  feature  of  the  Crusades. 
The  essential  feature  is  the  endeavor  to  secure  the 
Near  East  as  necessary  for  the  normal  development 
of  the  West  in  all  directions — in  commerce,  in  relig- 
ious thought,  in  cultural  stimulus,  in  art  and  even 
in  science. 

The  Crusades  are,  therefore,  a  part  of  the  "  trend 
towards  the  East  "  which  has  always  been  a  motive 
power  in  western  lands  and  has  in  our  own  days 
given  rise  to  the  Bagdad  Railway  as  its  latest  mani- 
festation. The  course  that  the  Crusades  take,  like- 
wise furnishes  another  illustration  of  the  impossibil- 
ity of  holding  Palestine — the  goal  of  the  religious 
hosts — without  the  Hinterland.  Strange  and  yet 
natural  that  the  first  battles  of  the  Crusades  should 
be  waged  in  Asia  Minor.  Nicaea  falls  into  their 
hands  in  June,  1097,  Antioch  in  June,  1098,  and 
Jerusalem  in  July,  1099.  A  Latin  Kingdom  was  estab- 
lished amidst  great  enthusiasm  with  Godfrey  of 
Bouillon  as  King.  It  lasted  amid  great  difficulties 
till  1 187,  when  Jerusalem  was  captured  by  Sultan 
Saladin.  The  surprise  is  that  it  endured  so  long, 
for  surrounded  as  the  Crusaders  were  by  enemies, 
no  power  could  possibly  be  established  in  Palestine 
with  Asia  Minor  still  held  largely  by  the  Seljuk 
Turks,  and  the  rest  of  it  broken  up  into  little  states. 


68      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

The  dissensions  among  the  Crusaders  were  no  doubt 
a  factor  in  leading  to  the  weakness  of  their  hold  on 
other  centres  like  Antioch  and  Edessa,  which  were 
made  the  capitals  of  little  principalities,  but  the  main 
reason  for  their  failure  was  the  lack  of  the  Hinterland. 
They  passed  through  Asia  Minor  but  never  held  it. 
A  Latin  control  was  effected  for  a  time  at  Con- 
stantinople from  1204  to  1261,  but  this  victory  over 
the  Greek  element  in  the  Byzantine  Empire  was  of 
little  avail,  with  the  highway  that  starts  opposite 
Constantinople  in  control  of  Moslem  groups,  or  at 
the  mercy  of  the  hordes  that  again  began  to  pour  into 
the  region  from  Central  Asia. 

The  Seljuk  Turks,  as  well  as  other  branches  that 
had  established  themselves  in  Syria,  Khorassan,  Kar- 
man,  Irak  and  up  to  Afghanistan  and  had  made  them- 
selves independent,  were  all  swept  away  by  the  surge 
of  a  Mongol  invasion  under  Jenghis  Khan  in  1219. 
History  repeats  itself  once  more  in  the  manner  in 
which  Jenghis  Khan  and  his  successors  overrun  Asia 
Minor,  and  then  obtain  possession  of  the  lands  lying 
beyond  the  Cilician  gates  and  the  Amanus  range. 
The  Bagdad  caliphate  falls  before  the  attack  of 
Hulagu  Khan,  the  brother  of  Jenghis,  in  1258. 
Syria  and  Palestine  yield  to  the  invader  two  years 
later  and  Egypt  is  threatened. 

XII 

The  tide  is  turned  through  a  fortunate  chance 
which  brings  another  branch  of  the  Turkish  race  to 
the  front.  In  1227  a  horde  of  several  thousand 
Turks  are  driven  from  their  settlements  in  Khoras- 
san through  the  pressure  of  the  Mongol  invasion. 
They  first  seek  refuge  near  Erzerum  and  afterwards 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  69 

pass  on  towards  Angora,  under  the  leadership  of 
Ertoghrul.  These  are  the  Ottoman,  or,  perhaps 
more  properly,  the  Osmanli  Turks  who  become  the 
founders  of  the  present  Turkish  Empire.  They 
take  their  name  from  Osman  or  Othman,'°  the  son 
of  Ertoghrul.  Ertoghrul  and  his  followers  come 
to  the  aid  of  the  Seljuk  Turks  and  near  Angora 
(1260  A.D.)  inflict  a  crushing  blow  on  Hulagu,  who 
in  view  of  the  menace  abandons  the  attempt  to 
advance  to  Egypt  and  hurries  back  to  the  north. 
The  Mongol  generals  left  in  command  in  Syria  are 
defeated  by  Sultan  Kutuz  of  Egypt  about  the  same 
time  that  the  forces  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Mongols 
under  Hulagu  are  pursued  to  the  Hellespont.  The 
danger  of  the  Mongolian  invasion  had  passed,  but 
it  is  again  significant  that  it  is  their  defeat  in  Asia 
Minor  which  decides  the  fate  of  the  East.  The 
victory  being  due  to  Ertoghrul,  he  receives  as  his 
reward  the  district  around  Eskishehr  (ancient  Dory- 
laeum)  in  the  northwest  of  Asia  Minor.  With  this 
as  a  starting-point,  the  power  of  the  Ottoman  Turks 
develops  under  Osman  (1289-1326)  and  his  succes- 
sors, Orkhan  (1326-1359),  Murad  I  (1359-1389),  and 
Bayezid  (1389-1403),  to  a  commanding  position  in 
the  East,  though  not  as  yet  dominant.  They  de- 
voted their  efforts  towards  obtaining  control  of  the 
region  in  northwestern  Asia  Minor  up  to  the  Bos- 
phorus.  In  1338  they  reach  Haidar  Pasha  directly 
opposite  Constantinople,  and  the  starting-point  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway.  It  should  always  be  remem- 
bered that  the  foothold  of  the  Turks  in  Europe  was 

^According  to  H.  A.  Gibbons,  The  Foundation  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  (New  York,  1916),  p.  6,  Osman  is  the  pro- 
nunciation in  Constantinople,  Othman  in  Asia  Minor. 


70      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

secured  through  the  court  quarrels  at  Constanti- 
nople, which  led  John  Cantacuzenus  who  had  himself 
proclaimed  Emperor,  to  call  in  the  aid  of  Orkhan 
against  Anna,  the  widow  of  Andronicus  III,  whose 
counsellor  Cantacuzenus  had  been.  This  was  in  1341. 
In  a  few  years  the  Ottomans  aid  in  capturing  Adria- 
nople,  which  becomes  the  capital  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  in  1367.  Thrace  falls  into  their  hands,  Mace- 
donia is  colonized  by  Moslems,  and  by  the  end  of 
the  fourteenth  century  they  hold  a  preponderant 
position  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  The  Balkan  ques- 
tion which  was  the  immediate  cause  for  the  war  of 
1914  thus  takes  its  rise  over  five  centuries  ago. 

The  victory  of  Murad  at  Kossovo  in  1389  puts  an 
end  to  Serbian  independence.  Under  Bayezid,  raids 
are  made  into  Hungary.  Constantinople  is  besieged 
in  1391  and  again  in  1395,  and  Bayezid  defeats  a  force 
composed  of  the  best  European  chivalry,  co-operating 
with  Sigismund  of  Hungary,  at  Nicopolis  in  Bulgaria 
in  1396.  Greece  is  invaded  in  the  following  year. 
But  while  the  Osmanli  were  thus  making  them- 
selves the  peers  of  the  Byzantine  Empire  in  Europe, 
they  were  neglecting  to  strengthen  thejuselves  in 
Asia  Minor.  Content  with  holding  a  small  section 
of  it,  the  remainder  was  split  up  into  a  large  num- 
ber of  independent  states  or  Emirates.-^  It  is  not 
until  the  reign  of  Bayezid  that  we  find  an  attempt 
made  to  put  an  end  to  this  condition  by  a  vigorous 
campaign  which,  beginning  in  1392,  lasted  for  several 
years  but  only  resulted  in  obtaining  possession  of  the 
northern  part  of  Asia  Minor.     Whether  due  to  the 

"  See  Appendix  B  to  Gibbons'  work,  Foundation  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  who  gives  a  full  list  of  such  states,  and  adds 
an  interesting  summary  of  the  results  of  his  investigation  of 
the  state  of  Asia  Minor  during  the  fourteenth  century. 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  71 

feeling  of  security  inspired  by  the  final  defeat  of  the 
Latin  Crusaders  in  1291,  or  to  a  reHance  on  the 
Moslemization  of  Asia  Minor  as  a  guarantee  against 
dangers  from  this  side,  the  policy  of  the  Ottoman 
Turks  in  striking  for  the  control  of  Eastern  Europe 
instead  of  making  themselves  masters  of  Asia  Minor 
was  a  fatal  error,  which  came  near  resulting  in  their 
complete  extinction  through  another  Mongol  in- 
vasion, as  terrific  in  its  onslaught  as  the  previous  one 
under  Jenghis  Khan. 

The  leader  was  Timur,  who  after  a  remarkable 
sweep  which  brought  a  wide  stretch  from  western 
India  to  Armenia  and  which  included  Persia,  Meso- 
potamia and  the  steppes  between  the  Black  and 
Caspian  seas  under  subjection,  between  1399  and 
1402  overran  Asia  Minor  and  made  Bayezid  his 
prisoner.  By  the  irony  of  fate  the  decisive  defeat 
of  Bayezid  took  place  at  Angora — the  strategic 
point  where  the  Ottomans  140  years  previous  had 
gained  their  first  victory  which  started  them  on  their 
career.  By  the  end  of  1402  when  Smyrna  fell  into 
his  hands,  Timur  had  established  his  position  as  the 
heir  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  He  is  hailed  by  Chris- 
tian Europe  as  the  savior  of  Europe  from  Moslem 
domination,  and  the  hope  is  expressed  by  Henry  IV 
of  England  that  he  may  by  conversion  to  Christian- 
ity become  the  champion  of  the  Cross.  But  Timur, 
like  Jenghis  Khan,  was  after  all  a  raider  rather  than 
an  invader.  The  Mongols,  in  contrast  to  the  Turks, 
left  no  indelible  impress  of  their  astonishingly  rapid 
conquests  beyond  the  work  of  destruction  in  their 
wake.  There  was  no  constructive  element  in  either 
of  the  Mongolian  invasions,  and  having  finished  his 
work  of  destruction  Timur  leaves  Asia  Minor  as 


72      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

suddenly  as  he  came,  and  dies  in  1405  while  on  his 
way  to  further  raids  upon  China. 

XIII 

Had  Timur  followed  up  his  defeat  of  Bayezid 
by  an  effort  at  organization,  the  empire  of  the  Otto- 
mans would  have  disappeared,  or  had  the  states  of 
Christian  Europe  availed  themselves  of  the  inter- 
regnum (1403-1413)  between  the  defeat  of  Bayezid 
and  the  revival  of  Ottoman  power  under  Moham- 
med I,  a  son  of  Bayezid  (1413-1421),  to  restore  the 
Eastern  Roman  Empire — now  reduced  to  a  pitiful 
extreme — the  history  of  the  world  might  have  taken 
a  different  turn.  Instead,  after  the  sudden  departure 
of  Timur,  the  Emperor  Manuel  Palaeologus  appeals 
to  Mohammed  I  who  had  established  himself  at 
Brusa,  for  aid  against  another  son  of  Bayezid,  who 
after  seizing  Adrianople  laid  siege  to  Constanti- 
nople. Mohammed  defeats  his  brother  Mussa  in 
1413,  and  before  his  death  succeeds  in  regaining  all 
the  territory  over  which  his  father  had  ruled — an 
amazing  renaissance,  indicative  of  the  recuperative 
powers  of  the  Turks.  The  Turkish  navy  was  organ- 
ized in  his  days  as  an  adjunct  to  the  army.  Moham- 
med I  carries  out  a  more  energetic  policy  in  strength- 
ening his  hold  on  Asia  Minor.  His  son  and  succes- 
sor Murad  II  (1421-1451)-^  continues  this  policy, 
and  it  is  not  until  he  knows  the  Hinterland  to  be 
secure  that  he  felt  free  to  direct  in  person  the  further 
conquest  of  Europe.  Salonica  is  taken  in  1428,  fur- 
ther advances  are  made  into  Servia  and  Hungary  but 
are  checked  by  troubles  that  had  broken  out  in  Asia 

"  Murad  II  abdicated  in  1444  in  favor  of  his  son  (then 
only  14  years  old),  but  was  forced  by  turbulent  conditions  to 
resume  his  throne. 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  73 

Minor.  After  his  son  Mohammed  II  (1451-1481) 
had  finally  succeeded  in  quelling  the  revolts  that  were 
constantly  breaking  out,  the  final  act  in  the  drama 
of  the  contest  between  Cross  and  Crescent  that  had 
been  going  on  for  centuries  was  staged  by  the  tak- 
ing of  Constantinople  on  the  20th  of  May,  1453.  The 
last  Byzantine  Emperor,  Constantine  Palaeologus, 
fell  among  the  defenders  of  the  last  bulwark. 

The  taking  of  Constantinople  is  one  of  the  de- 
cisive events  in  history,  because  it  symbolizes  the 
final  triumph  of  the  Crescent  in  the  East.  The  dura- 
bility of  this  triumph  is  illustrated  by  the  futility 
of  all  efforts  during  the  succeeding  centuries  down 
to  our  days  to  change  the  aspect  of  the  Near  East 
as  a  Mohammedan  possession,  which  even  the  ener- 
getic missionary  efforts  of  the  various  bodies  of  the 
Christian  church,  praiseworthy  and  useful  as  they 
have  been  in  promoting  education,  have  been  unable 
to  affect  to  any  material  extent.  The  reason  for 
this  is  once  more  to  be  sought  in  the  possession 
of  the  highway  stretching  across  Asia  Minor  which, 
after  the  definite  control  of  the  one  end  by  the  Otto- 
mans, was  gradually  made  equally  firm  at  the  other 
end — at  the  Persian  Gulf.  Before  Mohammed  II 
passed  away,  Asia  Minor  had  been  completely  sub- 
jugated, and  under  his  successor,  Selim  I  (1512- 
1520),  Persia,  Hindustan,  Egypt,  Syria  and  the  coast- 
line of  Arabia  became  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire, 
The  control  of  the  Hinterland  made  the  Ottoman 
Sultans  masters  of  the  East — precisely  as  this  con- 
trol had  been  a  decisive  factor  ever  since  the  days 
of  antiquity.  The  rise  of  the  Ottoman  Turks  to  the 
rank  of  a  world-power  having  been  thus  brought 
about  by  the  firm  grasp  of  the  historic  highway,  its 
permanency  was  conditioned  upon  maintaining  its 


74      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

hold.  Once  more  we  note  that  the  key  to  the  East- 
ern situation  lies  not  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  nor 
in  the  possession  of  Constantinople,  but  in  the  stra- 
tegic character  of  the  route  connecting  Constanti- 
nople with  Bagdad — as  illustrated  by  the  constant 
repetition  of  events,  though  under  changed  outward 
circumstances  from  the  times  of  Mursil,  the  Hittite, 
in  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century  before  this 
era  to  Mohammed  II,  the  Osmanli  Turk  in  the  mid- 
dle of  the  fifteenth  century  of  our  era — an  astonishing 
example  of  historical  continuity  for  over  2700  years,  as 
a  result  of  the  geographical  position  of  Asia  Minor. 

The  taking  of  Constantinople,  marking  the  con- 
trol of  the  highway  of  which  it  forms  the  starting- 
point,  meant  the  raising  of  an  impassable  barrier 
to  the  East,  erected  against  any  further  efforts  of 
Christian  and  Western  Europe  to  break  through  it. 
The  year  1453  marks  the  real  end  of  the  Crusades, 
viewed  in  their  broader  historical  significance  as  the 
endeavor  to  save  the  access  to  the  East  for  Europe. 
A  direct  consequence  of  the  capture  of  Constanti- 
nople was  the  stimulus  given  to  navigation  to  find  a 
new  route  to  the  East  by  sea.  Columbus  sailed  west 
in  the  hope  of  making  good  by  a  water  route  to  India 
what  had  been  lost  through  the  failure  of  the  Crusades 
to  keep  the  land  highway  to  the  East  open  to  western 
nations.  A  new  continent  is  discovered  by  accident 
in  the  search  for  this  route  in  1492,  and  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope  is  rounded  by  Vasco  da  Gama  in 
1477  in  the  endeavor  to  find  a  more  direct  sea 
route  to  the  East.  The  "  trend  towards  the  East," 
manifesting  itself  in  such  a  variety  of  forms,  appears 
to  be  an  ineradicable  longing  that  the  West  received 
when  it  fell  heir  to  the  high  culture  that  arose  in 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  75 

the  ancient  East.  The  "call  of  the  East"  still 
resounds  in  the  ears  of  contemporary  Europe,  and 
America.  It  is  the  impelling  force  behind  commer- 
cial exploitation  and  the  construction  of  railways 
to  the  East.  So  closely  intertwined  is  the  fate  of  the 
West  upon  access  to  the  East  that  the  taking  of  Con- 
stantinople leads  to  the  discovery  of  America.  One 
is  inclined  to  put  it  strongly  that  after  the  closing  up  of 
the  highway  across  Asia  Minor,  there  was  nothing  for 
Columbus  to  do  but  to  discover  America— and  he  did  it. 

XIV 

The  Ottoman  rulers,  however,  failed  to  recognize 
that  their  position  in  the  world  depended  upon  their 
being  and  remaining  an  eastern  power.  In  their 
endeavors  to  become  also  a  western  power,  they 
sinned,  as  it  were,  against  their  own  destiny  and 
brought  about  the  downfall  of  a  great  empire.  They 
tried  like  Janus  to  face  in  both  directions,  instead 
of  keeping  their  gaze  steadily  turned  toward  the 
East.  Actuated  by  ambitions  to  overstep  natural 
barriers  to  their  extension,  they  became,  as  has 
always  been  the  inevitable  fate  of  attempts  at  world 
power,  a  menace  to  the  world. 

The  height  of  the  Turkish  Empire  was  reached 
in  the  reign  of  Suleiman  I  (1520-1566),  whose  sur- 
name "the  Magnificent"  symbolizes  the  climax 
attained.  Belgrade  was  captured  in  1521,  Budapest 
in  1528.  The  gates  of  Vienna  are  reached  in  1529, 
and  Suleiman  prepared  for  a  contest  at  arms  with 
the  Emperor  Charles  V.  The  Moslemization  of 
Europe  seemed  imminent,  and  when  Suleiman  died 
in  1566,  the  Turkish  Empire  extended  close  to  the 
frontiers  of  Germany. 

The  decline  may  be  dated  from   the  battle   of 


76      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Lepanto  in  October,  1571,  when  Don  John  of  Austria 
destroyed  the  menace  of  the  Turkish  fleet,  which  had 
secured  control  of  the  African  coast  to  Morocco  and 
had  endangered  Italy,  Spain  and  France.     Worn  out 
by  almost  continuous  wars  in  Europe  and  the  sup- 
pression of  revolts  in  Asia  Minor  and  Persia  for  a 
stretch  of  over  thirty  years,  the  Turks  concluded 
a  peace  at  Sitvatorok  (in  Hungary)  in  November, 
1606,  which  put  an  end  to  their  period  of  conquest. 
From  now  on,  the  efforts  of  the  Ottoman  Sultans  are 
directed  towards  maintaining  their  dominions  with 
a  steady  decline  of  their  power  in  Europe,  though  it 
was  not  until  well  towards  the  close  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  that  the  defensive  power  of  the  Em- 
pire was  broken  to  the  extent  of  forcing  upon  her 
onerous  terms   of  peace.     The   treaty   of   Kutchuk 
Kainarji  (in  Bulgaria)  signed  in  July,  1774,  between 
Russia    and    Turkey    marks    another   turning-point 
which  definitely  gave  to  Russia  the  ascendancy.    In 
1792  the  Crimea  was  added  to  Russia  by  the  treaty 
of  Jassy.     The  next  century  saw  the  struggle  of 
Turkey  to  retain   possession  of   the   states   of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  with  the  gradual  loss  of  one  after 
the  other  until  her  European  possessions  were  re- 
duced  to   the    comparatively    small    corner   at    the 
southeastern    extremity,    which    now    represents    all 
that  is  left  of  what  was  once  a  formidable  dominion. 
But  Turkey  was  still  an  Eastern  power  after  hav- 
ing been  shorn  of  her  European  possessions.     De- 
spite uprisings  and  revolts  in  Persia  and  Syria  and 
Egypt,  she  had  managed  to  retain  her  control  of  the 
Nearer  East  by  holding  the  highway  across  Asia 
Minor.     During  the  seventeenth  century,  however, 
her  hold  on  the  one  end  at  the  Persian  Gulf  was 
loosened.    She  was  forced  to  make  a  supreme  effort 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  77 

to  put  down  independent  movements  that  were  tak- 
ing place  in  Mesopotamia  to  throw  off  the  yoke. 
Since  the  days  of  Suleiman  more  particularly,  the 
Mesopotamian  plain  had  been  neglected.  The  canal 
systems  were  not  kept  in  repair,  and  Bagdad  itself 
lost  its  prestige  and  its  magnificence.  The  country 
went  backward  steadily.  Turkish  misrule  completed 
the  havoc  wrought  by  the  submerging  of  large  dis- 
tricts through  the  annual  overflow  of  the  two  rivers, 
now  no  longer  directed  into  the  fields.  Though  still 
strong  at  one  end  of  the  chain,  the  links  at  the  other 
end  grew  weaker  and  affected  the  resistance  power 
of  the  chain  as  a  whole.  A  situation  arose  as  in  the 
days  of  the  Roman  occupancy,  which  similarly  began  to 
fail  with  the  loosening  of  the  grip  at  the  Persian  Gulf, 

XV 
The  possibility  of  a  decided  break  in  the  current 
stretching  from  Constantinople  and  Bagdad  was 
foreshadowed  by  Napoleon's  expedition  to  Egypt  in 
1798,  which  came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  Turkey 
herself.  With  the  keen  insight  of  a  military  genius, 
Napoleon,  dreaming  of  the  exploits  of  world  con- 
querors of  the  past — Cyrus,  Alexander  and  their  suc- 
cessors to  Mohammed  II — saw  that  the  East  was  to 
be  conquered  and  Turkey  eliminated  not  by  way  of 
Europe,  but  through  the  East.  His  occupation  of 
Egypt  was  merely  the  preliminary  step.  His  design 
as  shown  by  his  siege  of  Acre  on  the  Palestinian 
coast  was  to  make  himself  master  of  Syria,  and 
thence  to  threaten  the  possession  of  the  Asia  Minor 
Highway — to  cut  the  chain  as  it  were  at  a  strategic 
point.  Egypt  was  merely  a  passage-way  to  Pales- 
tine which,  as  we  have  seen,  had  always  played  the 
part  of  a  bulwark  for  Egypt  against  attacks  from 


78  THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Asia  Minor.  Napoleon  was  hastily  called  back  to 
Egypt,  and  after  the  battle  of  Abukir  returned  to 
France  where  disturbing  conditions  had  arisen  dur- 
ing his  absence.  He  was  thus  forced  to  abandon 
further  designs.  It  is,  of  course,  somewhat  pre- 
carious in  default  of  definite  evidence  to  speculate 
as  to  what  was  in  his  mind,  but  the  expedition  to 
Syria  is  significant  as  an  index  of  his  plans.  In  the 
case  of  a  military  genius  it  is  not  essential  to  assume 
that  he  forms  his  plans  through  a  conscious  knowl- 
edge of  past  history,  though  Napoleon  was  a  student 
of  the  past.  Insight  often  anticipates  the  conclu- 
sions of  the  investigator.  As  an  expert  in  strategy, 
he  would  have  had  no  difficulty  in  recognizing  that 
a  successful  attack  on  the  highway  leading  from 
Constantinople  to  Bagdad  would  have  spelled  the 
end  of  Ottoman  domination  of  the  East. 

However  this  may  be,  the  expedition  to  Egypt 
marks  the  beginning  of  the  attempt  on  the  part  of 
Europe  to  recover  the  direct  access  to  the  East.  It  is 
the  first  turn  in  the  unwinding  of  the  chain  of  those 
events  which  in  the  past  had  led  to  the  triumph  of 
the  Crescent  over  the  Cross.  The  barrier  set  up  by 
the  grasp  of  the  route  from  Constantinople  to  Bag- 
dad in  the  hands  of  a  Moslem  power  was  to  be  thrown 
down,  and  the  route  to  be  restored  to  Christian 
Europe.  This  European  struggle  for  the  control  of 
the  East  which  thus  begins  with  Napoleon  is  in  a 
manner  a  new  crusade,  though  the  meaning  of  the 
symbols  have  changed,  and  the  Cross  stands  for  the 
restless  spirit  of  progress  marked  by  commercial 
and  political  expansion,  and  the  Crescent  for  the  fatal- 
istic conservatism  of  an  incrustated  civilization.  As 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  all  the  great  European  Powers 
are  participating  in  this  new  crusade — France,  Eng- 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  79 

land,  Russia,  Austria,  Italy,  and  as  the  last  comer 
the  resuscitated  Germany,  reunited  into  a  mighty 
empire  in  1871. 

The  history  of  Europe  since  the  end  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  is  largely  taken  up  with  the  ambitions 
of  the  Powers  to  secure  a  slice  of  the  Near  East, 
though  before  the  process  of  dissolution  in  the  Near 
East  sets  in  we  find  the  historic  highway  once  more 
playing  a  decisive  role.  In  1833  the  Ottoman  Empire 
virtually  lost  its  control  of  Egypt  through  the  treaty 
of  Kutaia  (Asia  Minor)  with  Mehemet  AH,  which 
not  only  recognized  the  latter's  authority  as  heredi- 
tary Pasha  of  Egypt,  but  made  him  also  master  of 
Syria  up  to  the  Cilician  gates.  The  treaty  followed 
upon  the  successful  campaign  w^hich  Ibrahim  Pasha, 
the  son  of  Mehemet  Ali,  waged  in  1831-1832  against 
the  Sultan  Mahmud  II.  Ibrahim  Pasha  led  the 
Egyptian  troops  victoriously  through  the  historic 
highway  to  Konia — once  the  residence  of  the  Seljuk 
Sultans — where  he  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  on 
the  Turkish  army  and  captured  its  commander, 
Reshid  Pasha.  At  the  Cilician  gates,  as  the  strategic 
point,  he  erected  fortifications  which  are  still  to  be 
seen.  The  control  of  this  highway  was  thus  lost  for 
the  Turkish  Empire,  and  the  loss  would  have  been 
absolute  but  for  the  intervention  of  Russia.  In  1839 
the  Sultan  made  an  attempt  to  regain  his  prestige  in 
Asia  Minor,  but  Ibrahim  was  victorious  at  Nisibin 
near  Birejik  on  the  Euphrates.-^  The  Ottoman 
Empire  was  once  more  in  a  critical  position,  from 

^  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  famous  Moltke  was 
present  at  this  battle  as  adviser  to  Hafiz  Pasha,  and  wrote  an 
account  of  it  in  his  "  Letters  from  Turkey,"  which  he  pub- 
lished in  1841  ("  Briefe  Aus  der  Tiirkei)  of  which  a  French 
translation  appeared  in  1872  and  an  Italian  one  in  1877. 


80   THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

which  this  time  it  was  saved  by  the  European  Powers 
whose  intervention  now  became  more  active — and 
intervention  meant  partition. 

England  estabHshed  her  protectorate  over  Egypt, 
France  definitely  took  Algiers,  Russia  made  her 
peace  with  England  to  share  in  the  domination  over 
Persia,  Austria  acquired  a  sphere  of  influence  over 
Palestine  and  snatched  Bosnia  and  Herzogovina  as 
stepping-stones  leading  to  the  great  highway.  Italy 
has  seized  Tripoli,  and  France  obtained  a  dominant 
position  over  Syria  through  railway  concessions, 
while  England  with  keen  foresight  secured  naviga- 
tion control  at  the  Persian  Gulf  to  Bagdad.  Lastly, 
Germany  by  a  master  stroke  obtained  the  concession 
of  a  railway  across  the  historic  highway  from  Con- 
stantinople to  Bagdad — with  the  privilege  of  exten- 
sion to  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  with  important  branch 
roads  at  various  points  of  commercial  and  strategic 
importance.  The  control  of  this  highway  by  any 
European  power — whether  Germany,  England  or 
France — must  lead  to  the  end  of  Ottoman  domina- 
tion of  the  Near  East.  It  would  mark  in  every  sense 
of  the  word  the  close  of  an  era  and  the  opening  of  a 
new  one,  that  would  have  its  effect  on  the  entire  world. 
The  force  of  the  change  would  sweep  away  all  en- 
deavors of  any  modern  power,  engaged  in  world  com- 
merce, to  remain  in  a  state  of  political  isolation. 
The  fate  of  the  Near  East  once  more  lies  in  the  hands 
of  Western  nations.  Its  future  will  be  determined 
by  the  disposition  that  will  be  made  of  the  highway 
across  Asia  Minor. 

XVI 

The  course  of  events  in  the  Near  East  since 
the  entering  wedge  represented  by  Napoleon's  ex- 
pedition to  Egypt  is  thus  to  be  interpreted  as  the 


THE  STORY  OF  ASIA  MINOR  81 

irresistible  onslaught  of  the  West  to  break  down  the 
barrier  created  in  1453.    As  we  survey  the  successive 
steps  in  this  onslaught,  the  struggle  between  France 
and  England  culminating  in  the  convention  of  1904, 
which  gave  France  a  dominant  position  in  Morocco 
in  return  for  allowing  England  a  free  hand  in  Egypt, 
the  attempts  of  France  and  Russia  to  hedge  in  Eng- 
land in  India,-*  followed  by  England  and  Russia,  in 
dividing  up  their  "  spheres  of  influence  "  in  Persia,  the 
commercial  and  railway  concessions  secured  by  Eng- 
land, France  and  Russia  from  Turkey,  sinking  ever 
deeper  into  a  slough  of  desperate  weakness,  we  see  how 
these   struggles,   conventions   and   partnerships   all 
lead   up   to   the    dramatic    climax— the    struggle    for 
the  historic  highway  which  is  the  key  to  the  Nearer 
East.     Its  possession  will  mean  in  the  future  as  it 
always   has    in   the    past — domination    over    Syria, 
Mesopotamia,  Egypt  and  probably  Arabia;  and  the 
Near   East  points   its  finger   directly   towards   the 
Farther  East.     Under  the  modern  symbol  of  rail- 
way control,  Asia  Minor,  true  to  the  genius  of  its 
history,  once  more  looms  up  as  a  momentous  factor 
in  the  world  history.     The  war  of  1914  has  brought 
the  events  of  the  past  to  another  turning-point  in 
the  political  kaleidoscope.    The  story  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway  is  thus  crucial  for  an  understanding  of  the 
crisis  that  was  a  large  factor  in  bringing  on  the  great 
war,  even  though  at  the  time  it  appeared  to  be  a 
hidden  feature  because  of  the  accidental  occurrence 
that  brought  the  European  crisis  to  an  issue.    The 
murder  at  Sarajevo  was  merely  the  match  applied 
to  the  pile  all  ready  to  be  kindled. 

"  See  below,  p.  89. 
6 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD 
RAILWAY 

I 

The  Bagdad  Railway  project,  or,  to  give  its  offi- 
cial title,  "  La  Societe  Imperiale  Ottomane  du 
Chemin  de  Fer  de  Bagdad,"  was  definitely  launched 
in  1903  by  a  diplomatic  agreement  (known  as  a  con- 
vention), dated  March  5th,  between  the  Turkish  gov- 
ernment and  a  syndicate  of  Germans,  organized  as 
the  Societe  du  Chemin  de  Fer  Ottoman  d'  Anatolie 
(Anatolian  Railway  Company).  This  company  had 
obtained,  in  1888,  from  the  Turkish  government  the 
concession  to  build  a  railway,  stretching  from  Haidar 
Pasha  (opposite  Constantinople)  to  Angora  that  has 
played  such  a  notable  part  in  Asia  Minor  history — 
a  distance  of  576  kilometres,  or  about  360  miles,^  under 
a  guarantee  from  the  Turkish  government  of  an 
annuity  of  15,000  francs  per  kilometre.  British  capi- 
tal was  originally  represented  in  the  company,  but 
was  subsequently  bought  out  by  the  German  Syndi- 
cate so  that  the  Anatolian  company  became  a  purely 

*  To  be  quite  accurate,  a  short  section  from  Haidar  Pasha 
to  Ismid  on  tlie  sea  of  Marmora — 91  kilometres — had  been 
constructed  in  1871-73  under  the  superintendence  of  Dr. 
Wilhelm  von  Pressel  (see  below,  p.  86,  note),  by  the 
Turkish  government.  The  road  was  built  to  give  the  Sultan 
Abdul  Aziz  readier  access  to  his  shooting-box  at  Ismid. 
This  section  was  taken  over  by  the  Anatolian  Railway  Com- 
pany at  the  time  that  the  concession  was  given  to  extend  it 
to  Angora. 
82 


VIEW    OF    ANGORA,    ON    THE    ANATOLIAN    RAILWAY 


VIEW   OF   KONIA  ON   THE   BAGDAD   RAILWAY 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      83 

German  enterprise.  The  railway  was  begun  in  1889 
and  completed  in  1893.  A  further  concession  to  ex- 
tend the  road  to  Konia  from  the  junction  Eskishehr 
(the  ancient  Dorylaeum)  on  the  Angora  line — a  dis- 
tance of  444  kilometres  or  about  280  miles — was  ob- 
tained in  1893  under  an  annuity  guarantee  of  13,892 
francs  per  kilometre.-  This  branch  was  completed  in 
1896.  A  concession  accorded  at  the  same  time  to 
continue  the  Angora  line  to  Csesarea  and  eventually 
to  Diarbekr  and  Bagdad  was  abandoned  by  the  com- 
pany, in  favor  of  a  much  more  ambitious  plan  which 
was  brought  forward  as  a  result  of  the  visit  of  the 
German  Emperor  to  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  in 
1898.  A  German  commission  was  empowered  to  sur- 
vey a  line  cutting  transversely  across  Asia  Minor  from 
Konia,  following  largely  the  historic  highway  along 
which  the  armies  of  so  many  peoples  and  lands  had 
passed  forward  and  backward  for  thousands  of  years, 
emerging  from  the  Taurus  range  into  the  plain 
through  the  famous  Cilician  gates,  thence  across  the 
Amanus  range  eastwards  to  Mosul  and  south  to 
Bagdad.^  A  German  cruiser,  the  Ancora,  was  at 
the  same  time  sent  to  examine  the  conditions  at  the 
proposed  terminus  of  the  line  on  the  Persian  Gulf. 
Angora,  Konia,  the  Cilician  gates,  Adana,   Mosul, 

*The  reduction  was  perhaps  due  to  the  estimated  lower 
cost  of  the  very  simple  construction  of  the  branch  on  an 
easy   level. 

^  It  is  said  that  the  Sultan,  realizing  the  importance  of 
the  railway  in  the  event  of  war,  was  particularly  insistent 
that  the  main  road  was  to  avoid  any  approach  to  the  coast 
so  as  to  avert  the  danger  of  a  bombardment  through  a  hostile 
fleet.  The  transverse  route  across  the  historic  highway  fulfils 
this   condition. 


84     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Bagdad  would  link  this  enterprise  in  a  most  romantic 
fashion  with  the  most  famous  landmarks  in  the  his- 
tory of  Asia  Minor  and  of  Mesopotamia,  which,  we 
have  seen,  cannot  be  separated  from  Asia  Minor  in 
any  historical  or  geographical  survey  of  the  region. 
The  fate  of  the  one  determines  the  fate  of  the  other. 
On  November  27th,  1899,  Dr.  Siemens,  the  Director 
of  the  Deutsche  Bank  and  President  of  the  Anatolian 
Railway  Company,  announced  the  scheme,  though 
for  the  present  only  the  general  policy  of  the  con- 
cession had  been  agreed  upon  by  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment. Over  two  years  were  to  elapse  before  on 
January  i6th,  1902,  an  Irade  of  the  Sultan  approved 
the  convention,  which  was  naturally  hailed  with  great 
enthusiasm  in  Germany.  The  Anatolian  Railway 
Company,  however,  found  the  undertaking  too  diffi- 
cult to  handle  under  its  management  alone,  and 
accordingly  a  supplementary  company — the  above- 
named  Societe  du  Chemin  de  Fer  de  Bagdad — was 
organized  to  carry  out  the  larger  scheme  in  co-opera- 
tion with  the  Anatolian  company.  A  new  convention 
was  therefore  drawn  up  in  March,  1903,  in  which 
the  Bagdad  Railway  Company  appears  as  the  suc- 
cessor to  the  Anatolian  Company,  though  the  parties 
interested  in  both  were  the  same.  By  this  conven- 
tion, the  concession  was  extended  to  Basra,  a  stretch 
of  about  576  kilometres,  or  360  miles,  below  Bagdad, 
and  it  also  included  a  number  of  branch  lines,  the 
three  most  important*  of  which  were    (i)    one  at 

*The  other  branches  contemplated  and  included  in  the 
convention  were:  (i)  Toprak-Kale  (near  Adana)  to  Alex- 
andretta,  (2)  from  Haran  (on  the  way  to  Mosul)  to  Urfa — 
the  ancient  Edessa,  (3)  Bagche  to  Marash,  (4)  to  Aintab 
from  a  point  near  Killis.     According  to  Woods  in  the  Geo- 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      85 

Sadijeh  on  the  Tigris  (above  Bagdad)  running  to 
Hanikin,  and  pointing  towards  a  union  with  pro- 
jected railways  in  Persia,  centering  in  Teheran;  (2) 
MusHmiya  to  Aleppo,  connecting  with  the  Syrian  and 
the  Hedjaz  railroads  running  to  Damascus,  Medina 
and  Mecca,  and  (3)  a  branch  from  Zubeir  (on  the 
way  to  Basra)  to  some  point  on  the  Persian  Gulf  to 
be  determined  in  the  future.^  The  extension  from 
Konia  to  Basra  involved  an  extension  of  about  2264 
kilometres,  or  about  141 5  miles,  making  a  total  of 
about  3000  kilometres,  or  1875  miles,  from  Haidar 
Pasha  to  Basra.  Including  the  branches,  estimated 
at  about  800  kilometres,  or  500  miles,  the  project 
would  thus  place  in  German  hands  the  control  of  over 
3800  kilometres,  or  2375  miles/*  with  junctions  con- 
graphical  Journal  for  July,  1917,  pages  46-47,  it  is  possible, 
also  that  the  Turkish  government  may  have  constructed  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  a  branch  from  Ras  el-Ain  to  Diar- 
bekr,  but  this  is  not  certain  and  has,  therefore,  not  been  in- 
cluded in  the  map.  The  Toprak-Kale  branch  was  bombarded 
by  the  English  in  the  early  part  of  the  war. 

The  railway  distance  from  Bagdad  to  Basra  can  only  be 
approximately  indicated,  since  this  section  is  not  actually  con- 
structed. The  direct  distance  from  Bagdad  to  Basra  is  only 
500  kilometres,  or  about  312  miles,  but  the  route  along  the 
Tigris,  with  its  bends  and  curves,  increases  this  distance  to 
about  800  kilometres,  or  500  miles.  According  to  the  estimate 
of  Sir  William  Willcocks,  the  railway  route  will  cover  about 
360  miles. 

"Kuweit  was  in  the  mind  of  the  projectors,  but  had  to 
be  abandoned.    See  below  p.  10 1. 

'^  Included  in  this  calculation  is  the  stretch  Eskishehr- 
Angora  of  311  kilometres,  or  about  194  miles,  as  a  branch  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway. 


86  THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

necting  with  the  other  railways  of  Asia  Minor,  Syria, 
Palestine,  Arabia  and  eventually  Persia — truly  a 
magnificent  enterprise  that  must  command  our 
admiration,  the  emanation  of  fertile  brains  endowed 
with  a  vision  of  the  future. 

II 

The  road  was  to  be  built  in  twelve  sections  of  200 
kilometres  each,  though  this  item  in  the  convention 
was  subsequently  modified.  The  original  plan  had 
been,  as  above  indicated,  to  reach  the  Persian  Gulf 
by  an  extension  of  the  Angora  line  across  Csesarea 
and  Diarbekr  and  thence  along  the  Tigris,  passing 
Mosul,  to  Bagdad  and  the  Persian  Gulf.  This  was 
the  route  mapped  out  by  Dr.  Wilhelm  von  Pressel,  a 
distinguished  German  engineer  *^  who  had  con- 
structed the  Baron  de  Hirsch  group  of  railways  in 
European  Turkey  and  who  built  the  first  stretch  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway  Haidar-Pasha-Ismid  for  the 
Sultan  in  1871-1873,  as  well  as  the  extension  to  An- 
gora and  Konia.  The  change  in  favor  of  a  transverse 
route  from  Konia  marks  an  important  turning-point 
in  the  political  aspect  of  the  enterprise.  The  north- 
ern route  would  not  have  interfered  with  English 
or  French  plans  for  railway  extension  in  Asia  Minor 
and  Syria.  England  and  France,  indeed,  had  the 
right  of  priority  in  the  field.  As  early  as  1856  (Sep- 
tember 23rd)  the  construction  of  a  railway  from 
Smyrna  to  Aidin  had  been  granted  to  an  English 
company  which  was  completed  in  1866  and  eventually 

•He  died  at  Constantinople  in  1902.  Sliortly  before  his 
death  he  published  a  monograph,  Les  Chemins  de  Fer  en  Tur- 
quie  d'Asie  (Zurich,  1902). 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      87 

extended  to  Ergerdir,  a  distance  of  470  kilometres,  or 
about  294  miles,  with  four  small  branches  totaling 
a  little  over  120  kilometres,  or  about  76  miles — a  total, 
therefore,  of  592  kilometres,  or  370  miles.  This,  the 
oldest  railway  in  Asia  Minor,  built  without  any  guar- 
antee from  the  Turkish  government,  is  the  only  one 
that  was  still  in  English  hands  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  A  request  made  in  1891  for  the  extension 
of  this  line  to  Konia  was  not  granted.  Not  long 
afterwards,  however,  in  1893,  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment granted  the  concession  to  extend  a  second  line 
from  Smyrna  to  Kassaba  (93  kilometres,  or  about  58 
miles),  likewise  organized  by  an  English  company  and 
completed  in  1897  to  Afiun-Karahissar,  a  total  distance 
from  Smyrna  of  420  kilometres,  or  262  miles.''  The 
Turkish  government  availed  itself  of  its  privilege  to 
purchase  the  line  in  1893  and  turned  it  over  to  French 
capitalists.  Probably  the  plan  to  extend  this  second 
line  from  Smyrna  to  a  junction  with  a  Bagdad  rail- 
way, starting  from  Konia,  was  the  real  reason  for  not 
according  the  request  of  the  English  company  for 
a  prolongation  to  Konia.  There  would  in  that  case 
have  been  two  such  lines  from  Smyrna,  connecting 
with  the  Bagdad  Railway.  A  third  smaller  coast  line 
Mersina  to  Adana,  of  67  kilometres,  or  about  42  miles, 
was  originally  in  the  hands  of  an  Anglo-French  Com- 
pany, but  was  subsequently  transferred  to  the  Turkish 
government  and  later  acquired  by  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way Company.     It  was  opened  in  1886. 

^  To  be  accurate,  a  preliminary  extension  of  75  kilo- 
metres or  47  miles  from  Kassaba  to  Alashehr  had  been 
granted  in  1872.  Afiun-Karahissar  is  the  junction  with 
the  Konia-Bagdad  route.  Adding  a  number  of  small  branches 
the  Smyrna-Kassaba  Company  operates  in  all  322  miles.  The 
company  was  organized  as  far  back  as  1863. 


88      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

III 

Had  the  original  plan  of  the  German  group  to 
run  the  Bagdad  Railway  across  northern  Asia  Minor 
from  Angora  been  adhered  to,  the  interior  would 
have  been  kept  free,  and  it  is  likely  that  a  favorite 
English  plan  (afterwards  taken  up  also  by  the  French 
government),  to  run  a  railway  from  the  Gulf  of 
Alexandretta  via  Aleppo  and  the  Euphrates  to  Bag- 
dad might  have  been  carried  out.  Far  back  in  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  this  project  had 
been  brought  forward  by  far-sighted  British  men 
of  affairs.  Sir  Wm.  Andrew,  a  railway  official  of 
wide  experience  in  India,  was  particularly  prominent 
in  advocating  this  scheme  of  an  Euphrates  Valley 
Railroad,  which  he  regarded  as  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance for  strengthening  England's  hold  on  India."*  In 
1857  an  official  report  was  presented  to  the  English 
government  by  Sir  John  Macneill  and  General  Ches- 
ney  of  the  proposed  route  from  Alexandretta  as  the 
starting-point — a  much  shorter  and  far  simpler  way 
than  across  the  difficult  Taurus  range.  In  1872  Sir 
Wm.  Andrew  succeeded  in  having  a  Committee  of 
the  House  of  Commons  appointed  to  carefully  exam- 
ine into  the  project.  The  Committee  reported  favor- 
ably, the  Turkish  government  was  well  disposed, 
but  nothing  came  at  the  time  of  the  splendid  scheme. 
The  Suez  Canal  began  to  absorb  the  public  interest 
in  England.    England's  ultimate  possession  of  it  and 

*  So  according  to  Fraser,  Short  Cut  to  India,  p.  32,  who 
regards  Andrew  as  the  father  of  the  Euphrates  Railway 
project.  In  1857  Sir  Wm.  Andrew  published  a  Memoir  on 
the  Euphrates  Valley  and  the  Route  to  India  (London,  W.  H. 
Allen  &  Co.)  and  again,  as  late  as  1882,  Euphrates  Valley 
Route  to  India. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      89 

her  occupation  of  Egypt  prompted  her  to  rest  con- 
tent with  a  shortened  water  route  to  India,  as  a  suffi- 
cient protection  for  her  Eastern  possessions. 

Had  the  northern  route  to  Bagdad  been  followed 
by  the  German  syndicate  and  left  a  southern  route 
free  for  a  second  line  in  the  hands  of  England  or 
France,  the  railway  projects  of  Asia  Minor  and 
Syria  might  have  remained  purely  commercial 
undertakings  of  great  cultural  value,  marking  the 
economic  progress  of  contact  between  East  and 
West.  The  political  aspect  of  railway  plans  in  the 
Near  East  might  have  been  permanently  kept  in  the 
background.  The  European  situation  would  have 
assumed  an  entirely  different  coloring,  if  England 
and  Germany  had  not  clashed  in  the  East  over  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  as  happened  immediately  upon  the 
announcement  of  the  convention  of  1902-1903. 

The  stumbling  block  that  prevented  the  execution 
of  the  original  plan  was — strangely  enough — Russia. 
Her  opposition  to  the  northern  route  brought  about 
the  change.  Russia  had  plans  of  her  own  in  Asia 
Minor  and  in  the  lands  to  the  East  beyond.  In  the 
last  two  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Russia 
fearing  the  extension  of  English  power  in  the  Far 
East  cast  her  eyes  about  for  securing  zones  of  in- 
fluence that  might  bring  her  into  touch  with  the 
Persian  Gulf  and  the  Indian  Ocean.  She  secured 
the  co-operation  of  France  in  1891,  and  it  is  both 
interesting  and  instructive  to  note  that  the  Franco- 
Russian  alliance  was  originally  directed  against 
England  rather  than  against  Germany.®  France  was 
to  form  a  barrier  to  English  expansion  in  India  east- 
"  See  Bodley's  article  on  France  in  the  new  edition  of 
the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  vol.  x,  p.  901. 


90  THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

wards  by  her  control  of  Indo-China,  while  Russia 
was  to  check  an  advance  westwards  by  obtaining 
control  of  Afghanistan  and  Beluchistan.  With  this 
in  view  her  interest  lay  in  securing  a  hold  in  northern 
and  eastern  Asia  Minor,  with  a  free  hand  on  the 
southern  coast  of  the  Black  Sea.  She  exacted  from 
Turkey  the  Black  Sea  Basin  agreement,  formally 
sanctioned  in  1900,  which  reserved  to  her  the  right 
to  construct  railroads  in  northern  Asia  Minor.  She 
never  availed  herself  of  this  right,  and  indeed,  while 
busy  in  building  military  commercial  roads,  appeared 
to  oppose  railway  construction  in  Asia  Minor,^°  and 
finally  transferred  her  concession  in  Asia  Minor  to 
French  capitalists.  She  wanted,  however,  to  keep 
the  route  clear  for  herself  from  Trebizond  south- 
wards to  Diarbekr  where  the  Mesopotamian  plain 
begins,  and  eastwards  through  Armenia  and  Persia. 
In  the  background  was  also  the  fear  that  a  railway, 
dominating  northern  Asia  Minor,  which  in  case  of  a 
war  would  be  seized  by  the  Turkish  government 
for  military  transportation,  might  threaten  Russia's 
zones  of  influence  in  the  East.  At  all  events,  her 
opposition  was  strong  enough  to  secure  a  modifi- 
cation of  the  plan  of  the  Bagdad  railway  in  favor  of 
the  transverse  route  which,  as  it  turned  out,  gave 
Germany  a  tremendous  advantage  over  all  rivals, 
though  it  also  brought  on  the  opposition  of  England. 
This  opposition  at  the  time  was  presumably  not 
unwelcome  to  Russia.  Although  at  the  turn  from 
the  nineteenth  century  to  the  twentieth  century  the 

"  See  Geraud  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  1914,  pp.  965- 
969  and  1324,  who  dwells  on  this  point  of  Russia's  opposition 
to  railways  in  the  Near  East  till  1910,  when  a  change  in  her 
policy    ensued. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      91 

relations  between  Russia  and  Germany  had  become 
strained,   through  the   substitution   of    Italy   in    1882 
for  Russia  as  the  third  member  in  the  Alliance  with 
Germany  and  Austria,  and  though  as  a  consequence 
the  alliance  with  France  had  been  diverted  from  its 
original    purport    to    a    compact    against    German 
aggression,  Russia  was  not  prepared  to  allow  any 
further  advantage  to  be  gained  in  the  East  by  Eng- 
land.    On  the  whole  she  still  preferred  Germany, 
and  was  at  any  rate  willing  to  see  Germany  and 
England  fight  the  issue  out  among  themselves.    The 
"  Entente  Cordiale  "  between  England  and  France, 
too,   had   not  yet  begun,   though   the   new   era   was 
approaching  which  changed  the  entire  aspect  of  the 
alignment    among    European    powers.     It    eventually 
led  England  and  Russia  through  their  common  fear 
of  Germany  to  settle  their  past  accounts  and  pool 
their  issues  in  the  East  by  an  amicable  division  of 
spheres  of  influence   in   Persia  in   191 1,   with  little 
regard  to  the  rights  of  that  small  nation,  struggling 
at^the  time  to  secure  a  popular  parliamentary  form 
of  government."     With  the  European  Powers  thus 
concerned,   each   with   its   own   interests,   and   dis- 
seminating an  atmosphere  of  mutual  suspicion  and 
distrust,  what  could  the  ultimate  outcome  be  except 
the  "  European  Anarchy,"  as  Lowes  Dickinson  aptly 
calls  the  situation  that  had  developed  in  1914- 

"  See  Shuster's  work,  Strangling  of  Persia  (New  York, 
1912).  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  treatment  accorded  to  Per- 
sia by  Russia  and  acquiesced  in  by  the  English  government, 
aroused  great  indignation  at  the  time  in  Great  Britain. 


92      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

IV 

England's  influence  at  Constantinople,  paramount 
till  1880,  had  weakened  since  then,  largely  through 
Gladstone's  opposition  to  the  regime  of  Turkey,  for 
which  there  was  ample  justification.  The  Armenian 
massacres  of  1894,  had  shocked  Europe,  and  Glad- 
stone was  irreconcilable  in  his  denunciation  of  the 
"  unspeakable  Turk,"  as  the  Sultan  and  all  Turkey 
came  to  be  called.  This,  naturally,  was  not  pleasing 
to  Constantinople,  at  the  time  under  the  complete 
domination  of  Abdul  Hamid.  Germany  was  quick 
to  seize  upon  the  situation  and  under  the  leadership 
of  her  ambitious,  restless  and  romantically  inclined 
young  Emperor,  with  his  mind  full  of  far-reaching 
schemes,  obtained  by  a  series  of  cleverly  designed 
steps  the  position  at  the  Turkish  capital  which 
England  had  once  held.  The  convention  of  1902-03 
made  it  evident  that  Germany  had  stolen  a  march  on 
England,  and  that  France's  prestige  at  Constanti- 
nople had  likewise  suffered  through  the  distinct 
advantage  that  Germany  would  have  over  her  in 
the  future  exploitation  of  Asia  Minor. 

The  terms  on  which  the  German  Syndicate  ob- 
tained the  concessions  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  were 
indeed  most  favorable.  The  concession  was  to  last 
for  99  years,  and  this  included  the  two  branches 
already  built,  Haidar-Pasha-Angora  and  Eskishehr- 
Konia.  It  had  been  assumed  that  the  concession 
would  not  go  beyond  a  line  to  Bagdad,  and  England 
felt  that  as  long  as  the  Persian  Gulf  was  not  to  be 
reached,  the  situation  would  not  be  serious  for  her, 
either  from  the  commercial  or  the  political  point 
of  view.  The  India  trade  would  not  be  diverted  to 
the  Persian  Gulf  in  favor  of  the  short  land  route, 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      93 

because  of  the  double  loading  involved  and  the  water 
trip  from  the  Gulf  to  Bagdad.  When,  however,  the 
precise  terms  of  the  convention  became  known,  it 
was  seen  that  the  extension  not  only  included  Basra, 
but  also  contemplated  a  branch  from  Zubeir  (not 
far  from  Basra)  to  a  terminus  on  the  Persian  Gulf 
"  to  be  determined,"  together  with  the  right  of  navi- 
gation on  the  Shatt  el-Arab  and  the  Tigris — an 
exclusively  English  privilege — during  the  period  of 
construction  of  the  Railway  in  this  region.  That 
gave  an  entirely  new  interpretation  to  the  conven- 
tion as  a  whole  and  at  once  created  a  critical  situation 
which  steadily  grew  worse. 

The  new  Bagdad  Railway  Company  was  to  be 
capitalized  at  15  million  francs,  of  which  only  one- 
half  was  to  be  paid  up.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
Anatolian  Railway  there  was  to  be  a  guarantee  on 
the  part  of  the  Turkish  government,  fixed  at  an 
annuity  of  11,000  francs  per  kilometre,  with  an  addi- 
tional guarantee  of  4500  francs  per  kilometre  per 
year  for  the  management  of  the  railway.  The 
receipts  above  this,  up  to  10,000  francs  per  kilometre 
per  year,  to  go  to  the  Turkish  government  and  above 
this  amount,  60  per  cent,  to  the  government  and  40 
per  cent,  to  the  company.  The  sum  needed  for 
each  section,  fixed  at  54  million  francs,  was  to  be 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  company  through  loans 
to  be  issued  by  the  government,  and  the  interest  on 
the  loan  was  further  assured  out  of  the  coflfers  of  the 
Dette  Puhlique.^-    With  such  a  guarantee,  the  invest- 

"On  this  Turkish  institution,  setting  aside  fixed  revenues 
of  the  Turkish  Empire  from  definite  sources  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  European  creditors  of  Turkey  and  for  their 
protection,  see  the  article  on  Turkey  in  the  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,     pp.  437,  438. 


94     THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

ment  of  the  German  syndicate  was  a  safe  one, 
with  scarcely  any  risks  and  under  assurances  of  a 
good  return.  Moreover,  since  the  material  for  the 
road  would  naturally  be  supplied  from  Germany — 
and  free  of  duty — the  profits  of  construction  would 
all  accrue  to  German  firms.  From  this  point  of  view 
alone  the  project  meant  a  great  boon  to  the  German 
industries. 

The  "  kilometre  guarantee  "  worked  so  well  in 
the  case  of  the  first  section  of  the  road  from  Konia 
to  Bulgurli,  that  by  dint  of  economy  the  construction 
actually  cost  about  25  million  francs  less  than  the 
amount  secured  through  the  loan.^^  There  was  thus 
left  a  handsome  surplus  for  the  syndicate,  though 
one  that  was  in  danger,  to  be  sure,  of  being  wiped  out 
by  the  far  greater  cost  involved  in  the  second  sec- 
tion across  mountain  passes  involving  most  difficult 
engineering  feats.  Moreover,  the  Bagdad  Railway 
Company  sold  the  annual  guarantee  of  4500  francs 
per  kilometre  for  the  running  of  the  road  to  the 
Anatolian  Company  {i.e.,  the  German  syndicate  sold  to 
itself)  for  3200  francs.  The  difference  gave  the 
Bagdad  Company  an  annual  income  of  160,000 
francs,  with  which  it  could  do  what  it  pleased.  Appar- 
ently the  lower  sum  was  all  that  the  investment 
called  for,  and  the  rest  was  a  "  bonus "  for  the 
investors.  Plenty  of  time  was  given  both  for 
beginning  the  work  on  each  section  after  it  had 
been  decided  upon — 18  months — and  for  the  com- 
pletion of  each  section  after  the  work  had  been 
begun,  eight  years.  All  material  imported  for  the 
construction  of  the  road  was  to  be  free  from  duty, 

"  The  loan  was  floated  in  Berlin  at  86.40,  and  thus  realized 
somewhat  over  46^2  million  francs. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      95 

the  company  was  to  have  a  monopoly  of  kilns  erected 
on  the  route  for  the  construction  of  the  road,  to  have 
access  to  all  ports  and  to  navigation  on  the  Euphrates 
and  Tigris  and  the  Shatt-el-Arab  (junction  with 
Euphrates)  during  the  operations,  and  the  privilege 
of  reserving  to  itself  the  right  to  construct  and  ex- 
ploit ports  at  Bagdad,  Basra  and  on  the  Persian  Gulf. 
In  return,  the  Turkish  government  was  satisfied  with 
the  demand  that  the  workmen  to  be  employed  were 
to  be  Turkish  subjects  and  the  trains  manned  by 
Turkish  officials,  with  the  exception  of  the  highest 
posts  which  were  to  be  held  by  Germans — and  that 
everybody  connected  with  the  railway  was  to  wear 
a  fez !  For  the  present  the  railway  was  to  be  a 
single  track,  but  the  Turkish  government  would 
have  the  right  as  soon  as  the  receipts  reached  an 
average  of  30,000  francs  per  kilometre  per  year  to 
demand  the  laying  of  a  second  track  at  the  expense 
of  the  company.  That  contingency  was  remote. 
Years  would  elapse  before  the  number  of  passen- 
gers and  the  freight  could  possibly  defray  the  cost 
of  the  management  of  the  road.  Its  main  value 
would  be  in  stimulating  trade  and  in  encouraging 
movements  of  population  to  the  interior  of  Asia 
Minor,  apart  from  the  advantage  to  German  indus- 
tries in  supplying  the  material  for  the  construction — 
the  latter  a  very  large  item  indeed. 

The  favor  shown  the  German  syndicate  was  evi- 
dent on  the  surface.  Such  terms  had  never  been 
secured  before.  No  wonder  that  there  were  great 
rejoicings  in  Germany  when  they  were  announced 
and  gnashing  of  tfeeth  outside  of  Germany. 

The  German  syndicate,  to  be  sure,  offered  to 
English  and  French  capitalists  a  share  in  the  enter- 
prise.    Dr.  Siemens  and  Dr.  von  Gwinner,  the  two 


96      THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

leading  spirits  of  the  project,  emphasized  strongly 
the  desire  to  give  to  the  undertaking  an  international 
character,^*  but  this  move  was  generally  regarded 
as  due  to  an  anxiety  on  the  part  of  the  German 
syndicate  to  obtain  foreign  capital  to  aid  them.  It 
was  estimated  that  the  cost  of  the  Konia-Bagdad 
construction  would  mount  to  350  million  francs,  and 
this  was  more  than  Germany  was  supposed  to  be 
able  to  carry  alone.  The  control  of  affairs  was  so 
arranged,  it  was  claimed,  that  it  would  always  re- 
main in  German  hands.  Five  of  the  eleven  directors 
were  to  be  chosen  practically  by  the  Anatolian  Com- 
pany, and  Germany  would  also  be  in  a  position  to  con- 
trol the  vote  of  three  Ottoman  representatives  provided 
for  as  members  of  the  board,  so  that  the  Germans  would 
always  be  certain  of  a  majority  over  representatives 
of  other  shareholders.  A  storm  of  protest  against 
the  entire  project  arose  in  England  and  France,  and 
the  two  governments  were  severely  blamed  in  the 
press  and  in  the  legislative  bodies  for  having  per- 
mitted the  convention  to  go  through,  the  political 
significance  of  which  when  the  terms  of  the  con- 
vention became  known  entirely  overshadowed  the 
commercial  aspects.  England  more  particularly 
felt  that  not  only  were  her  interests  in  the  Near 
East  threatened  through  the  trade  and  freight  that 
would  pass  to  the  route  of  the  railway,  but  that  her 
domination  in  India  was  endangered.  She  had  good 
grounds  for  this  fear,  seeing  the  open  manner  in 
which  advocates  of  national  expansion  in  Germany 
pointed  out  the   possibilities   involved   in   securing 

"Dr.  von  Gwinner  wrote  an  article  on  the  subject  for 
the  Nineteenth  Century  (June,  1909)  "  The  Bagdad  Railway 
and  the  Question  of  British  Cooperation,"  in  which  he  declared 
the  Company  to  be  open  to  all. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAn.WAY      97 

for  Germany  a  continuous  route  from  Hamburg  to 
the  Persian  Gulf  in  seven  or  eight  days,  with  only 
four  additional  days'  journey  by  steamer  to  reach 
India.  The  Pan-Germanists,  whose  voice  had  be- 
come blatant  in  Germany  by  this  time,  added  coals 
to  the  fire  by  their  equally  open  jubilation  at  the 
prospects  of  a  complete  German  control  of  Turkish 
possessions  in  Asia.  German  colonization  in  Asia 
Minor  was  to  be  encouraged,  following  in  the  wake 
of  the  commercial  advantages  to  be  gained  by  the 
railway,  and  thus  the  diplomatic  supremacy  of 
Germany  in  Constantinople  was  to  be  strengthened 
by  the  spread  of  German  settlements  throughout 
the  East. 

It  was  felt  in  England  that  if,  as  Napoleon  is 
said  to  have  remarked,  Antwerp  in  the  hands  of 
a  great  continental  power  was  a  pistol  leveled  at 
the  English  coast,  Bagdad  and  the  Persian  Gulf  in 
the  hands  of  Germany  (or  any  other  strong  power) 
would  be  a  42-centimetre  gun  pointed  at  India. 

For  England,  the  situation  that  would  be  created 
at  the  eastern  terminus  of  the  railway — once  the 
project  was  completed — would  indeed  be  most 
serious ;  and  quite  apart  from  the  political  aspects  of 
the  enterprise  and  the  danger  to  her  far  Eastern 
possessions,  the  privileges  which  she  had  enjoyed 
for  many  years  through  her  control  of  navigation 
from  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf  along  the  Shatt 
el-Arab  and  the  Tigris  would  have  vanished  into 
thin  air.  It  was  from  this  end,  therefore,  that  the 
English  government  attacked  the  problem  raised  by 
the  new  project. 

V 

England's  relations  with  the  Persian  Gulf  date 
from  the  time  of  Napoleon's  expedition  to  Egypt  in 


98  THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

1798.  If  the  French  military  genius  foresaw,  as 
there  is  good  reason  to  believe,  that  the  campaign 
for  the  control  of  the  Near  East  must  be  begun  by 
cutting  the  current  stretching  from  Constantinople 
to  Bagdad,  English  statesmen  foresaw  with  no  less 
perspicuity  that  to  nip  the  project  of  a  control  of 
the  highway  across  Asia  Minor  in  the  bud,  the  pole 
at  the  one  end  needed  to  be  secured.  England, 
realizing  at  this  early  period  the  strategic  importance 
of  the  Persian  Gulf  for  safeguarding  her  possessions 
in  India,  proceeded  to  entrench  herself  in  that  region. 
The  East  India  Company  in  the  very  same  year  that 
Napoleon  brought  his  army  to  Egypt  appointed 
a  Resident  at  Bagdad  to  watch  English  interests.^^ 
This  appointment  was  soon  after  recognized  by  the 
Turkish  government,  and  in  consequence  of  the  risks 
to  which  the  Resident  was  exposed,  especially  dur- 
ing a  period  of  hostility  between  Turkey  and  Eng- 
land, a  guard  was  given  to  him.  In  1834,  the  post 
of  Resident  was  placed  under  the  authority  of  the 
Government  of  India,  and  the  Resident  was  vested 
with  consular  powers.  England  was  thus  the  first 
in  the  field,  and  indeed  it  was  not  until  1880  that 
other  European  powers  began  to  appoint  consular 
agents  at  Bagdad. 

In  the  same  year  that  the  English  Resident  be- 
came an  official  of  the  government  of  India,  naviga- 
tion rights  on  the  Euphrates  were  granted  the  firm 
of  Lynch  Brothers — three  Englishmen  who  had 
settled  in  Bagdad  as  traders.  In  i860  their  right  of 
steam  navigation  on  the  Shatt  el-Arab,  the  water- 
course connecting  Bagdad  with  Basra  (including  the 
Tigris),  was  confirmed  by  the  Turkish  government, 
and  they  enjoy  the  monopoly  to  this  day. 

"  "  To  report  on  French  intrigue  in  that  country,"  is  the 
way  Fraser,  Short  Cut  to  India,  p.  235,  puts  it. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY      99 

Looking  to  the  future  development  of  the  region 
which  in  ancient  times  had  been  noted  for  its 
wealth  and  fertility,  the  English  government  had 
undertaken  a  careful  survey  of  Mesopotamia  ex- 
tending over  the  years  1835-1837  under  the  direction 
of  Colonel  Chesney.  This  survey  no  doubt  led 
Chesney  subsequently  to  his  advocacy  of  the  Eu- 
phrates Valley  project  in  order  to  connect  the  Medi- 
terranean and  the  Persian  Gulf  by  a  railway  as  an 
effectual  means  of  opening  up  this  entire  region  to 
Western  Europe,  as  well  as  furnishing  the  much- 
needed  shorter  route  to  India. 

England  had  thus  obtained  a  firm  grasp  of  one 
end  of  the  great  highway  and  was  determined  to  hold 
to  it.  Shortly  after  it  became  known  that  Turkey 
had  agreed  to  the  policy  of  granting  an  extension  of 
the  Konia  line  across  y\sia  Minor,  the  English  govern- 
ment took  the  further  step  of  establishing  a  protec- 
torate over  Kuweit  lying  on  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
which,  it  was  known,  would  be  picked  out  by  the 
Bagdad  Railway  Company  as  the  eventual  terminus  of 
the  stretch  from  Bagdad  to  the  shore.  For  a  long 
time  Turkey's  suzerainty  over  the  region  south  of 
Bagdad  had  been  purely  nominal,  and  she  was  obliged 
to  recognize  the  independence  of  several  little  Sultan- 
ates and  Emirates  in  this  section,  among  others  that 
of  Kuweit,  which  gave  her  considerable  trouble. 
England  took  advantage  of  the  situation  and,  cham- 
pioning the  cause  of  a  certain  Moubarek,  forced  the 
recognition  of  his  claims  and  of  his  independence. 
In  return  for  this  protection,  the  district  around 
Kuweit  came  practically  under  English  control.  She 
thus  put  an  effectual  spoke  into  the  wheel  of  the 
German  syndicate  several  months  before  the  conven- 
tion of  January,  1902,  with  the  Anatolian  Railway 


100    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Company  was  actually  signed,  and  no  doubt  in  an- 
ticipation of  this  contingency.  It  necessitated  a 
change  in  the  terminus  to  Fao  (60  miles  south  of 
Basra),  not  as  advantageous  as  Kuweit,  and  involv- 
ing costly  "  barrage  "  undertakings  to  be  carried  out. 
Moreover,  with  Kuweit  further  south  under  British 
control,  a  British  fleet  could  in  case  of  an  emergency 
command  Fao. 

British  policy  was  determined  that  the  railway 
should  not  reach  the  Persian  Gulf  under  German 
control.  This  was  clearly  enunciated  by  Lord  Cran- 
bourne,  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in 
January,  1902,  who  stated  that  the  "  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo  in  the  Persian  Gulf  was  incompatible 
with  the  occupation  by  any  Power  of  a  port  on 
those  waters."  ^^  The  Bagdad  Railway,  if  extended 
even  to  Basra,  would  destroy  the  trade  that  English 
merchants  and  English  capital  had  painfully  built 
up  in  the  most  important  centre  between  India  and 
the  Suez  Canal.  With  Germany  pushing  English 
commerce  at  every  point  through  the  remarkable 
energy,  perseverance  and  enterprise  shown  by  Ger- 
man merchants,  the  English  prospects  for  retaining 
the  commercial  supremacy  in  the  East  were  not 
bright,  but  over  and  above  this  was  ever  the  political 
danger  involved  in  seeing  Germany  standing  behind 
the  railway  project,  entrenched  at  a  port  on  the 
Persian  Gulf — with  nothing  intervening  between  that 
sheet  of  water  and  the  ports  of  India.  The  Bagdad 
Railway  was  indeed  a  short  cut  to  India — but  a  short 
cut  from  Berlin,  not  from  London.  The  Suez  Canal 
which  was  the  English  "  short  cut "  would  be  brought 

"  Quoted  by  Geraud  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  1914, 
(June)  p.  1317. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    101 

into  rivalry  with  the  Asia  Minor  route  which  was  the 
shorter  cut,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  former  in 
almost  every  respect. 

VI 

The  delay  between  the  announcement  of  the 
concession  of  the  Konia-Bagdad  route  in  November, 
1899,  and  the  drawing  up  of  the  convention  in  January, 
1902,  was  due  in  part  to  the  protests  voiced  in  Eng- 
land, France  and  Russia,  in  part  to  negotiations 
with  the  Turkish  government  in  regard  to  details, 
and  in  part  to  preparations  needed  for  so  gigantic 
an  undertaking.  The  German  Emperor  visited  Eng- 
land in  November,  1899,  and  obtained,  so  it  is  said, 
the  promise  of  a  free  hand  in  Asia  Minor  from  Mr. 
Chamberlain,  but  fresh  difficulties  must  have  arisen 
when  the  full  significance  of  the  scheme  became 
apparent.  The  details  of  the  diplomatic  negotiations 
during  these  years  are  not  known.  It  is  said  that 
France  at  one  time  offered  to  build  a  route  from 
Horns  on  her  Beirut-Damascus  line  to  Bagdad  with- 
out a  guarantee,  but  the  protests  and  counter  pro- 
posals were  unavailing  and  the  convention  was 
drawn  up  and  published. 

The  storm  then  broke  loose  with  renewed  fury 
in  England  and  France.  Debates  ensued  in  the 
House  of  Commons  and  in  the  Chambre  des  Deputes, 
and  in  both  the  decision  was  reached  not  to  accept 
the  offer  of  the  German  syndicate  for  participation 
in  the  scheme.  The  English  government  seemed  at 
one  time  indeed  favorably  disposed  towards  sharing 
in  the  railway  as  a  means  of  making  her  influence 
felt  and  safeguarding  English  interests,  but  the 
popular  opposition  roused  to  a  high  pitch  of  indig- 
nation at  the  failure  of  the  government  to  prevent  the 


102    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

convention  from  being  consummated,  forced  Balfour 
at  the  time  Prime  Minister,  to  abandon  furtlier  nego- 
tiations. Moreover,  there  seemed  to  be  no  prospect 
of  securing  for  England  a  place  in  the  enterprise  on 
an  equal  footing  with  the  German  and  French  capi- 
talists. This  was  in  April,  1903.  A  little  later, 
after  a  violent  debate  in  the  French  Chambre,  the 
decision  was  reached  that  the  bonds  of  the  Bagdad 
Company  were  not  to  be  quoted  on  the  Paris  Bourse. 
In  France  the  inclination  of  the  government  was  like- 
wise to  participate,  with  the  understanding  that 
French  capital  was  to  be  represented  by  40  per 
cent.,  equal  to  that  of  the  German  syndicate,  and  the 
balance,  20  per  cent.,  to  be  accorded  to  some  power — 
presumably  Russia.  Charges  were  brought  against 
M.  Delcasse,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  that 
he  and  the  French  Ambassador  at  Constantinople, 
M,  Constans,  had  abetted  Germany  in  her  negotia- 
tions with  the  Porte.  This  suspicion  was  probably 
a  factor  in  leading  to  the  final  action  which  was,  to 
be  sure,  in  the  nature  of  a  compromise,  for  it  per- 
mitted French  capitalists  to  invest  if  they  so  felt 
inclined,  without  having  the  stock  of  the  company 
listed  on  the  bourse.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  French 
capital  some  years  later — about  1910 — became  inter- 
ested to  the  extent  of  30  per  cent,  as  against  40  per 
cent,  of  German  capital,  with  the  balance  divided 
among  Swiss  and  Austrian  capitalists  and  banks. 
Since  the  latter  groups  worked  in  harmony  with 
Germany,  the  German  control  of  the  entire  enter- 
prise remained  undisputed. ^^ 

"  According  to  the  most  recent  data,  the  Directors  of 
the  company  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  consisted  of  26, 
distributed  as  follows:  11  Germans,  8  French,  4  Turks,  i 
Austrian  and  2  Swiss,  i.e.,  18  votes  controlled  by  the  Germans. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    103 

Looking  at  the  action  taken  by  England  and 
France  in  the  light  of  later  developments,  one  is 
inclined  to  commend  the  wisdom  of  Balfour  and  Del- 
casse  in  favoring  participation,  and  to  regret  that 
they  could  not  carry  through  the  negotiations  in 
progress  to  a  successful  issue.  Even  with  a  pre- 
ponderating German  representation  in  the  Direc- 
torate of  the  company,  the  presence  of  English  and 
French  capitalists  would  have  acted  as  a  check 
against  designs  to  use  the  project  for  political  aims, 
as  their  presence  would  also  have  enabled  the  Eng- 
lish and  French  governments  to  watch  the  unfolding 
of  plans  in  a  direct  manner,  instead  of  being  depend- 
ent upon  reports  and  announcements  after  the  fait 
accompli.  There  was  also — it  must  be  recognized — 
a  justification  for  the  German  point  of  view  that  the 
control  should  not  be  transferred  to  a  combination 
that  might  become  strong  enough  to  oust  the  German 
syndicate  at  some  time  in  case  of  a  crisis.  The  proj- 
ect, whatever  its  origin  and  its  purpose,  had  taken 
definite  shape  in  Germany.  It  was  a  creation  of 
German  enterprise  and  it  had  been  made  possible 
through  German  pressure  at  Constantinople  and 
through  the  willingness  of  German  capitalists  to 
undertake  it.  Most  favorable  terms  for  investors 
had  been  secured  through  German  influence  at  Con- 
stantinople, and  under  these  circumstances  the  offer 
of  the  German  syndicate  to  "  internationalize  "  the 
enterprise  should  have  been  accepted  on  its  face  value 
and  in  good  faith  until  evidence  to  the  contrary 
had  been  forthcoming.  The  German  syndicate  was 
insistent  through  Dr.  Siemens  that  there  was  no 
political  aim  attached  to  the  project,  and  there  was 
no  reason  to  question  his  perfect  sincerity  in  this 
view.     The  German  government  had  given  assur- 


104    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  EAILWAY 

ances  to  the  Sultan  that  it  did  not  propose  to  use 
the  project  for  colonization  purposes,  though  German 
publicists  foresaw  that  the  increase  of  commerce 
with  the  Orient  would  lead  to  large  settlements  of 
Germans  in  Asia  Minor,  as  coinmercial  opportunities 
had  brought  them  in  large  numbers  to  Brazil  and  to 
the  Argentine  Republic.  Such  a  result,  natural  and 
legitimate,  could  only  be  of  benefit  to  the  general 
commercial  and  industrial  progress  of  the  world,  as 
long  as  it  was  not  deflected  towards  carrying  out 
political  aims.  The  German  Chancellor  von  Biilow 
had  explicitly  declared  in  1903  that  Germany  was 
not  connecting  political  aims  with  the  railway.  Even 
though  this  statement  might  have  been  made  in 
order  to  put  the  European  powers  off  the  scent,  it 
would  still  have  been  better  for  England  and  France 
to  have  accepted  the  offer  to  participate,  if  for  no 
other  reason  than  to  be  in  a  better  position  to  watch 
the  game  from  the  inside,  instead  of  being  forced  to 
peep  through  the  fence. 

VII 

For  France  there  was  an  additional  reason  for 
participation  because  of  her  large  holdings  of  railways 
in  Asia  Minor  and  Syria  which  would  all  connect 
eventually  with  the  Bagdad  Railway.  Besides  the 
Smyrna-Kassaba  line,  transferred  to  a  French  com- 
pany in  1893,  and  the  Mersina-Adana  line  in  which 
French  and  English  capital  was  interested  (before  re- 
ferred to),^*  French  capital  and  French  enterprise  had 
built  a  railway  from  Jaffa  to  Jerusalem  (86  kilo- 
metres, or  about  54  miles)  in  1892.  A  French  Company 
was  organized  in  the  same  year  for  the  building  of  the 
Beirut-Damascus   railway,   later  extended  northward 

"  Page  87. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAH^WAY    105 

to  Horns  and  Aleppo,  and  south  to  Mezerib,  a  total  of 
578  kilometres,  or  361  miles,  and  completed  in  1910.^''' 
Early  in  the  century  the  French  also  constructed  a 
railway  from  Tripoli  to  Homs,  which  was  to  offset 
in  a  measure  the  Bagdad  Railway  through  the  con- 
trol of  a  second  port  on  the  Mediterranean  by  the 
side  of  Beirut.  The  French  plans  also  contemplated 
the  extension  from  Damascus  to  Jerusalem  and 
thence  through  Bethlehem  to  Gaza.-"  At  Aleppo 
the  junction  would  be  made  with  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way and,  via  the  section  Aleppo-Damascus,  with  the 
starting-point  also  of  the  Hedjaz  railway,  built  by  the 
Turkish  government  for  the  benefit  of  the  Mohamme- 
dan pilgrims.  This  road  runs  along  a  stretch  of  1754 
kilometres,  or  1097  miles,  to  the  two  sacred  cities  of 
Arabia,  to  Medina  where  Mohammed  died,  and  to 
Mecca  where  he  was  born. 

'^The  section  Damascus-Mezerib  was  opened  in  1894;  the 
section  Beirut-Damascus  in  1895,  and  the  connection  with 
Aleppo  in  1906.  There  is  also  a  railway  Acre-Haifa  to  Da- 
mascus, opened  in  1905,  and  under  Turkish  control,  connecting 
with  the  Hedjaz  Railway  at  Darat. 

^"  Since  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  connection  of  the 
Haifa-Damascus  Railway  has  been  extended  by  the  Turkish 
government  from  El-Fule  to  Lydda,  where  a  junction  has  been 
formed  with  the  Jaffa-Jerusalem  line.  Beyond  Jerusalem  the 
railway  has  also  been  extended  at  least  to  Beersheba,  perhaps 
to  Bir  Auja  (according  to  Woods  in  the  Geographical  Journal 
for  July,  1917,  p.  54) — a  total  distance  of  about  160  miles.  A 
part  of  this  railway  has  been  destroyed  by  the  English  army 
coming  across  the  Sinai  Peninsula  from  Egypt  and  which, 
according  to  recent  reports,  has  taken  Beersheba.  Within  the 
last  two  years  the  English  have  built  a  railway  from  Port  Said 
along  the  coast  to  within  about  10  miles  from  Gaza.  Since 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Turks  have  destroyed  the  Jaffa- 
Ramie  section  and  the  Tripoli-Homs  railroad,  to  use  the  rails 
for  the  construction  of  the  El-Fule-Lydda-Jerusalem-Beer- 
sheba  stretch. 


106    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

The  Tripoli-Homs  road  had  been  built  without  any 
guarantee  or  subsidy  from  the  Turkish  government. 
It  was  the  intention,  moreover,  of  the  French  capi- 
talists to  carry  on  the  Beirut-Damascus-Aleppo  line 
to  Birejik  and  extend  east  to  Adana,  so  as  to  con- 
nect with  the  southern  coast  of  Asia  Minor.  This 
plan  w^as,  of  course,  destroyed  by  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way convention.  Moreover,  had  the  convention  not 
come  in  between,  the  French  company  would  have 
also  extended  the  Syrian  railway  system  to  the  south- 
east of  Birejik,  along  the  Euphrates,  direct  to  Bagdad. 
This  plan  had  actually  been  worked  out  while 
M.  Paul  Cambon  was  French  Ambassador  at  Con- 
stantinople. The  approval  of  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment had  been  secured,  but  the  necessary  capital 
could  not  be  obtained  at  the  time  and  so  the  scheme, 
which  tallied  closely  with  the  English  project  of 
Sir  William  Andrew,^^  was  temporarily  abandoned. 

France  had,  therefore,  good  reasons  for  chagrin 
and  alarm  upon  the  announcement  of  the  convention 
for  the  Bagdad  Railway  scheme,  but  an  equally 
strong  reason  for  participating  in  it  as  a  fait  accompli, 
because  of  the  two  junctions  with  French  railways 
at  Afiun-Karahissar  in  Asia  Minor,  and  at  Aleppo 
in  Syria.  Over  two  hundred  millions  francs  of 
French  capital  had  been  invested  in  these  Asia  Minor 
and  Syrian  railways,  besides  one  hundred  and  fifty 
million  francs  represented  by  improvements  in  the 
ports  of  Smyrna  and  Beirut,  by  the  invested  capital 
of  French  commercial  houses  in  Asia  Minor  and 
Syria,  and  by  the  value  of  the  holdings  of  French 
religious  and  educational    institutions    in    Palestine.^- 

"  Above,  p.  88. 

"These  are  the  figures  for  1903,  given  by  Cheradame, 
Le  Maccdoinc,  Lc  Chcmin  dc  icr  dc  Bagdad,  p.  262.  No 
doubt  they  have  increased  considerably  since  then. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    107 

Had  France  accepted  the  40  per  cent,  of  the  total 
capital  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  offered  to  her  in  1902, 
or  had  France  and  England  joined  in  accepting  this 
share,  equal  to  that  to  be  retained  by  the  German 
syndicate,  the  "  internationalization  "  of  the  scheme 
might  have  developed  amicably.  That  possibility 
at  all  events  was  the  only  hope  of  avoiding  what  did 
happen — the  political  exploitation  of  the  scheme  by 
Germany  for  enlarging  her  hold  on  Turkey  and  the 
East,  and  the  endangering,  in  consequence,  of  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

It  would  have  been  worth  while  to  take  the  chance 
of  participation  instead  of  standing  outside  and 
allowing  Germany  free  scope,  which  was  no  doubt 
what  the  German  government  wanted,  though  per- 
haps not  the  German  capitalists  who  needed  and 
sincerely  desired  outside  co-operation.  There  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  at  the  end  of  the  war, 
the  "  internationalization  "  of  the  Bagdad  Railway 
will  again  be  brought  forward  as  the  solution  of 
the  problem,  and  as  the  safeguard  against  using  a 
great  and  valuable  commercial  enterprise  for  politi- 
cal ends.  To  be  sure,  it  may  be  argued  that  the 
later  investment  of  30  per  cent,  of  French  capital 
with  French  representatives  on  the  Directorate  did 
not  prevent  political  affairs  from  taking  their  course, 
but  this  capital  came  in  at  a  late  hour  (about  1910). 
Moreover,  it  did  not  have  the  backing  of  the  French 
government,  and,  therefore,  lacked  an  important 
element  of  influence. 

VIII 

Meanwhile  the  railway  began  to  be  built  and 
in  October,  1904,  the  first  section  from  Konia  to 
Bulgurli  was  completed  and  opened  a  traffic.     The 


108    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

construction  of  this  section  was,  as  pointed  out,  a 
comparatively  simple  matter  and  left  a  large  margin 
of  profit  out  of  the  guarantee  for  the  concessionaires. 
The  second  and  third  sections,  however,  involved 
passage  through  a  formidable  mountain  region  with 
great  engineering  obstacles  to  be  overcome  that 
vastly  increased  the  cost.^^  As  against  about  153/2 
million  francs  for  the  first  section,  the  second  was 
estimated  to  cost  75  millions  and  the  third  40  million 
francs,  while  the  cost  of  the  fourth  running  again 
on  a  level  surface  would  only  be  22J/2  millions. 
Under  the  terms  of  the  convention  the  loans  were 
to  be  floated  for  one  section  only  at  a  time.  The 
company  would,  therefore,  have  only  54  million 
francs  on  hand  (assuming  a  full  return  on  the  floated 
second  loan)  from  which  to  build  a  section  to  cost 
75  millions.  A  long  delay  now  occurred  with  tedious 
negotiations  and  it  was  not  until  June,  1908,  that  a 
modification  of  the  original  convention  was  pushed 
through,  whereby  the  plan  of  building  only  one  sec- 
tion of  200  kilometres  at  a  time  was  changed  to  a 
concession  to  build  840  kilometres,  or  525  miles, 
from  Bulgurli  to  El-Helif,  not  far  from  Mosul.  The 
loan,  covering  almost  three  sections,  was  to  be  floated 
at  one  time,  so  as  to  place  the  full  amount  needed 
at  the  disposal  of  the  company.  Moreover,  the  com- 
pany as  a  further  concession  was  not  obliged  to 
begin  building  till  191 1,  at  which  time  funds  guaran- 
teeing the  interest  on  the  enormous  additional  debt 
that  Turkey  was  thus  forced  to  take  upon  herself 
were  available  out  of  the  Dette  Ptibliquc.  In  191 1, 
finally,  when  work  was  resumed,  a  third  convention 
was  drawn  up  (March  20th),  giving  the  concession 

"  See   the   account   of   these   difficulties   with    illustrative 
sketch  in  Fraser,  Short  Cut  to  India,  pp.  55~^i- 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    109 

for  the  600  kilometres  remaining  from  El  Helif  to 
Bagdad.  Work  was  carried  on  at  several  points  at 
the  same  time.  At  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  in  1914,  the  second  section  from  Bulgurli  to 
Adana  was  almost  finished,  all  but  a  small  stretch 
of  some  42  kilometres,  or  26  miles,  of  particularly 
difficult  construction  to  connect  the  two  ends  of  the 
stretch.-*  The  stretch  from  Bagdad  to  Samarra — 120 
kilometres,  or  75  miles, — was  also  finished.  Since  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  not  only  has  the  Bulgurli-Adana 
section  been  completed,  but  work  beyond  has  been 
pushed  to  some  30  miles  beyond  Nisibin,  within  less 
than  100  miles,  from  Mosul,  so  that  only  this  stretch  and 
the  one  from  Mosul  to  Samarra — a  total  of  about  425 
kilometres,  or  265  miles, — is  all  that  remains  to  com- 
plete the  gigantic  enterprise  up  to  Bagdad.-^ 

The  long  delay  of  almost  seven  years  ensuing 
between  the  completion  of  the  first  section  and  the 
resumption  of  the  work  was  not,  however,  due  en- 
tirely to  the  financial  difficulties.  The  opposition  to 
the  scheme  continued  and  many  things  happened 
in  Turkey  to  change  the  face  of  things.  The  Turk- 
ish revolution  of  1908-1909  brought  a  different  set 
of  men  to  the  helm.  The  growing  complications  in 
Morocco,  which  had  not  been  simplified  by  the  con- 
ference of  Algeciras,  constituted  another  factor 
suggesting  to  Germany  to  proceed  cautiously.     The 

'■"  From  Dorak  to  Karapurnar  work  was  carried  on  simul- 
taneously at  the  Bulgurli  and  Adana  ends.  See  Geographical 
Jbunml,  vol.  44  (iQU).  PP-  -S77-58o,  with  map.  This  stretch 
has  now  been  completed. 

'^  See  Dominian,  Railroads  of  Turkey,  in  the  Bulletin  of 
the  American  Geographic  Society,  December,  1915,  and  the 
references  there  given,  the  Levant  Trade  Review  for  June, 
1916,  p.  100,  and  the  most  recent  account  by  Woods  in  the 
Geographical  Journal  for  July,  1917. 


110    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

agitation  for  an  increase  of  the  navy  had  also  be- 
come more  active  during  this  period  in  Germany, 
occasioning  further  fears  in  England  and  Russia  of 
Germany's  future  designs,  while  on  the  other  hand 
the  rapprochement  between  England  and  France, 
which  received  a  strong  impetus  from  the  visit  of 
King  Edward  to  Paris,  in  May,  1903,  was  a  forecast 
of  the  complete  reconciliation  between  England  and 
Russia,  and  had  its  natural  reaction  in  making  Ger- 
many feel  that  she  was  being  encircled  by  Powers  that 
wished  to  repress  her  ambitions. 

The  archives  of  the  chancelleries  of  Europe,  no 
doubt,  conceal  many  negotiations  and  diplomatic 
conversations  that  took  place  during  these  years 
which  have  not  as  yet  found  their  way  to  the  public 
and  perhaps  never  will.  They  would  afford  further 
explanations  for  the  delay  in  the  resumption  of  the 
project.  Germany,  more  particularly,  would  be 
prompted  to  proceed  slowly  for  fear  of  arousing  a 
European  conflict  before  she  was  ready  for  it.  But 
while  other  issues  in  Europe  and  elsewhere  were 
thus  comina:  forward  which  contributed  still  further 
towards  changing  the  political  atmosphere  until  the 
storm  of  1914  broke  out,  the  most  serious  problem, 
though  occasionally  receding  into  the  background, 
was  ever  that  created  by  the  suspicion  of  Germany's 
ambitions  in  connection  with  the  Bagdad  Railway. 
The  growing  influence  of  Germany  in  Turkey, 
strengthened  if  anything  after  the  Turkish  revolution, 
— for  Turkey  needed  a  powerful  support  for  the  two 
Balkan  wars, — made  England  fear  for  the  safety  of 
the  Suez  Canal  as  well  as  for  India.  Russia  realized 
that  her  hold  on  eastern  Asia  Minor  and  on  lands 
beyond  was  threatened  by  Germany's  plans. 

Negotiations  followed  which  at  one  time  looked 


BRIDGE  OVER  THE  EIPHRATES  AT  JERABLUS  OX  THE   UA(.I).\1)   KAU.WAV 


TERMINAL    STATION   OF    THE    IJAGDAD    RAILWAY    AT    HAIDAK-I'ASHA 
OPPOSITE  CONSTANTINOPLE 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    111 

as  though  the  European  powers  might  avert  the  con- 
flict which  publicists  and  men  of  affairs  felt  was 
coming.  To  counteract  the  political  influence  of  the 
Bagdad  Railway,  the  general  policy  was  advocated 
of  building  other  railways  in  the  disputed  territory 
which  through  Russia's  energetic  policy  in  Persia 
had  extended  to  that  country.  The  French  scheme 
of  an  Euphrates  Railway  from  Damascus-Homs  to 
Bagdad  with  connections  to  Tripoli,  Beirut  and 
Haifa,  was  taken  up.  This  railway  in  French  hands 
would  offset  Germany's  ambition  for  a  complete 
control  of  the  highway  of  Asia  Minor,  since  it  would 
cut  into  this  highway  at  a  most  important  point.  In 
case  of  war,  French  and  English  troops  could  be 
transported  from  three  ports  on  the  Mediterranean 
into  Mesopotamia  and  secure  that  end.  England 
was  to  be  accorded  the  Bagdad-Basra  stretch  as  her 
possession,  while  Russia  was  to  be  urged  to  carry  out 
plans  for  railways  in  Persia  which  would  include  a 
line  from  Teheran  to  Bagdad.  It  is  interesting  to 
see  in  these  plans  their  convergence  towards  one 
point — the  Persian  Gulf.  Fully  in  accord  with  what 
we  have  seen  to  have  been  the  primary  factor  in  a 
control  of  the  Near  East,  it  was  recognized  that 
with  the  one  pole  of  the  wire  stretching  frojn  Con- 
stantinople via  Bagdad  and  the  Gulf  in  the  hands  of 
England  and  her  allies — France  and  Russia — Ger- 
many, holding  Constantinople  in  her  grasp  through 
her  alliance  with  Turkey,  could  never  carry  out  her 
ambitions  in  the  Near  East,  except  by  a  military 
success  over  the  Triple  Entente  of  so  decided  a  char- 
acter as  to  force  England,  France  and  Russia  out 
of  the  East  entirely.  This  was  in  1909-1910.  In 
December,  1910,  the  English  and  French  plans  were 
laid    before    the    Turkish    government.     The    plan 


112    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

failed  because  of  Russia's  maintenance  of  her  oppo- 
sition to  railways,  and  because  Germany  refused  to 
give  up  the  Bagdad-Basra  sketch  entirely  to  Eng- 
land, though  Dr.  von  Gwinner  in  December,  1909, 
still  contending  that  the  entire  undertaking  was  of 
an  economic  character,  offered  to  English  capitalists 
through  Sir  Ernest  Cassel  a  controlling  influence  in 
that  section.  There  was  also  an  American  project  for 
obtaining  railroad  concessions  in  Asia  Minor,  brought 
forward  in  the  year  1909,  which  was  defeated  by  Rus- 
sian and  German  influence  in  Constantinople. 

For  a  time  the  situation  looked  more  hopeful.  Eng- 
land felt  sufficient  confidence  in  her  ultimate  ability 
to  prevent  any  German  control  beyond  Bagdad  to 
encourage  in  the  years  1909-1911,  under  the  nominal 
auspices  of  the  Turkish  government,  an  elaborate 
investigation  for  scientific  irrigation  of  Mesopo- 
tamia so  as  to  redeem  the  country  from  the  shameful 
neglect  of  Turkish  rule,  which  for  centuries  had  done 
little  or  nothing  to  maintain  the  canal  system  upon 
which  the  prosperity  of  southern  Mesopotamia 
depended.-*^  This  investigation  was  carried  on  by 
Sir  William  Willcocks  who  formulated  detailed  plans 
for  irrigation  of  large  districts  which,  to  be  sure,  could 
only  be  carried  out  at  enormous  cost  but  which  would 
restore  the  country  to  its  former  splendor.  A  part 
of  this  work — the  Hindia  Barrage — was  undertaken 
by  Turkey  and  completed  by  the  end  of  1913.     The 

""As  a  result  of  this  neglect  great  swamps  are  found 
in  the  southern  Euphrates  Valley,  covering  an  area  of  over 
50  miles  in  width  and  more  than  200  miles  in  length.  This 
swampy  district,  stretching  to  Basra,  was  one  of  the  factors 
in  bringing  about  the  failure  of  the  English  campaign  in  1915, 
since  it  prevented  reinforcements  sent  to  aid  General  Town- 
send  from  reaching  him  in  time. 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAHiWAY    U3 

concession  of  March  20th,  191 1,  to  build  an  additional 
section  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  was  Hmited  to  the  stretch 
El-Hehf  to  Bagdad.  This  seemed  to  accord  with  a 
definite  agreement  to  which,  according  to  Lord  Hal- 
dane's  recent  account  of  strained  relations  between 
England  and  Germany  during  the  years  immediately 
preceding  the  war,  the  German  Emperor  had  con- 
sented on  the  occasion  of  a  visit  to  England  in  1906, 
whereby  England  was  to  have  the  section  from  Bagdad 
absolutely.  It  is  said,  however,  that  the  Emperor  en- 
countered opposition  to  the  concession  on  his  return  to 
Berlin. 

Another  point  secured  in  the  year  191 1  was  the 
abandonment  of  Russia's  opposition  to  the  Bagdad 
Railway  and  her  willingness  to  undertake  railway 
construction  in  Persia  to  link  on  to  the  Bagdad 
line.^''  This  change  of  the  utmost  importance  took 
place  as  the  result  of  a  visit  to  the  Czar  to  Potsdam 
in  December,  1910,  and  was  announced  in  August, 
191 1.  Later,  the  reservations  held  by  Russia  for  many 
years  for  the  construction  of  railways  in  northern  Asia 
Minor  were  turned  over  by  her  to  a  company  of  French 
financiers.  A  successful  opposition  on  the  part  of 
England,  France  and  Russia  to  an  increase  of  custom 
duties  in  Turkey  of  4  per  cent.,  in  order  to  provide  more 
revenue  needed  to  pay  the  interest  of  loans  for  the 
Bagdad  Railway  and  which  would  have  seriously  im- 
paired English  and  French  interests  more  particularly, 
may  also  be  listed  as  a  gain.  Negotiations  to  definitely 
settle  other  points  of  contention  with  Germany,  more 

'"  At  Khanikin,  to  which  a  branch  of  the  Bagdad  line 
from  Sadijeh  was  to  be  constructed  by  the  Germany  company. 
See  above,  p.  85. 


114    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

particularly  the  ever  crucial  one  of  the  stretch  from 
Bagdad-Basra  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  were  in  progress 
when  the  war  broke  out  in  August,  1914.  It  is  reported 
that  in  July,  1914,  an  actual  agreement  had  been 
reached,  whereby  England  was  to  preserve  her  free 
scope  at  the  Persian  Gulf  and  her  preponderance 
in  that  zone  was  to  be  unequivocally  recognized. 
This  must  have  involved,  therefore,  either  the  abso- 
lute British  control  of  the  stretch  from  Bagdad  to 
Basra  with  no  projection  beyond  to  any  port  directly 
on  the  Persian  Gulf,  or  a  representation  on  the  Direc- 
torate, of  a  character  to  safeguard  English  interests 
and  to  prevent  the  political  exploitation  of  the  enter- 
prise— at  least  at  the  Persian  Gulf. 

IX 

If  this  report  be  correct — and  there  seems  to  be 
no  reason  to  question  it — the  outbreak  of  the  war 
came  at  a  particularly  unfortunate  time,  for  with  the 
Bagdad  Railway  problem  really  out  of  the  way,  the 
entire  Eastern  situation  would  have  assumed  a  far 
more  hopeful  aspect.  The  railway  has  been  a 
nightmare  resting  heavily  on  all  Europe  for  eighteen 
years — ever  since  the  announcement  in  1899  o^  the 
concession  granted  to  the  Anatolian  Railway  Com- 
pany. No  step  ever  taken  by  any  European  power 
anywhere  has  caused  so  much  trouble,  given  rise  to  so 
many  complications  and  has  been  such  a  constant 
menace  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  No  European 
statesman  to  whom  the  destinies  of  his  country 
has  been  committed  has  rested  easily  in  the  presence 
of  this  spectre  of  the  twentieth  century.  In  the  last 
analysis  the  Bagdad  Railway  will  be  found  to  be  the 
largest  single  contributing  factor  in  bringing  on  the 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    115 

Avar,  because  through  it  more  than  through  any- 
other  cause,  the  mutual  distrust  among  European 
Powers  has  been  nurtured,  until  the  entire  atmos- 
phere of  international  diplomacy  became  vitiated. 
The  explanation  for  this  remarkable  phenomenon, 
transforming  what  appeared  on  the  surface  to  be  a 
magnificent  commercial  enterprise,  with  untold  pos- 
sibilities for  usefulness,  into  a  veritable  curse,  an 
excrescence  on  the  body  politic  of  Europe,  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  history  of  the  highway  through  which 
the  railway  passes.  The  control  of  this  highway 
is  the  key  to  the  East — the  Near  and  the  Farther 
East  as  well.  Such  has  been  its  role  in  the  past — ■ 
such  is  its  significance  to-day. 

More  is  the  pity  that  an  undertaking  which  from 
every  other  except  the  political  point  of  view  spells 
progress,  and  which  should  have  been  the  means  of 
bringing  the  West  back  to  the  East,  the  daughter 
back  to  the  mother  and  source  of  all  civilization, 
should  instead  have  led  to  the  most  violent  struggle 
among  the  leading  nations  of  the  world  in  all  history 
— a  struggle  in  which  all  the  gains  made  since  the 
French  revolution  in  the  direction  of  the  advance- 
ment of  humanitarian  aims,  the  betterment  of  the 
condition  of  the  great  masses,  popular  liberties  and 
the  progress  in  science  and  the  arts,  and  all  the 
efforts  to  bring  nations  closer  to  one  another  in  a 
recognition  of  the  common  goal  of  mankind  threaten 
to  be  dissipated.  A  railway  which,  as  a  medium  of 
exchange  of  merchandise  and  of  ideas,  ordinarily  ful- 
fils the  function  of  binding  nations  together,  in  this 
instance  has  been  the  primary  cause  of  pulling  them 
apart  and  of  drawing  them  up  in  opposing  camps, 
bent  on  mutual  destruction. 


116    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 


To  be  entirely  fair  the  blame  for  this  outcome  of 
the  project  must  not  be  put  entirely  on  the  shoulders 
of  Germany,  though  by  far  the  major  portion  lies  at 
her  door.  In  the  first  place,  there  are  no  substantial 
reasons  for  assuming  that  when  German  capitalists 
began  to  develop  their  plans  for  a  railway  in  a  small 
section  of  Anatolia,  they  were  actuated  by  another 
motive  than  that  which  had  prompted  English  capi- 
talists in  earlier  days  to  build  a  line  from  Smyrna, 
and  French  capitalis'ts  to  undertake  railways  in 
Syria.  Germany  since  the  end  of  the  seventies  had 
moved  forward  by  leaps  and  bounds  in  her  foreign 
commerce  as  in  the  growth  of  industries  within  her 
borders.  Commerce  is  progressive  and  looks  ever 
forward  to  new  regions  to  conquer.  Before  the 
present  Emperor  came  to  the  throne,  Bismarck  had 
launched  German  colonization  in  southern  Africa,  as 
a  natural  outlet  for  surplus  population  and  as  a 
further  medium  of  commercial  expansion.  German 
trade  with  the  United  States  and  with  South  America 
as  with  the  Levant  was  growing.  What  more  natural 
than  that  enterprising  German  capitalists  should 
recognize  the  possibilities  of  an  increase  of  trade 
through  a  railway  across  Asia  Minor ! 

Railways  are  the  natural  means  of  opening  up 
the  resources  of  a  country,  and  Asia  Minor  is  par- 
ticularly rich  in  natural  resources  and  in  fertile 
plateaus  that  under  cultivation  could  become  most 
productive.  By  the  same  natural  process,  England 
had  come  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  established  her 
trade  on  a  firm  basis,  and  France  had  come  to  Syria. 
The  thought  of  a  further  extension  of  the  railway 
from  Angora  or  Konia  was  equally  natural,  and  it 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    117 

will  be  recalled  that  the  project  of  a  railway  to 
Bagdad,  connecting  the  Mediterranean  with  the 
Persian  Gulf  first  took  shape  in  English  brains  and 
came  near  to  being  realized  long  before  Germany 
had  appeared  on  the  scene.-^^  Moreover,  the  orig- 
inal plan  of  the  German  syndicate,  following  the 
scheme  of  Dr.  Wilhelm  von  Pressel,  the  engineer  of 
the  Anatolian  Company,  would  have  avoided  any 
conflict  with  English  or  French  plans  for  a  more 
direct  route  from  the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta  across  to 
the  Euphrates.  The  northern  route,  if  it  had  been 
chosen,  would  never  have  led  to  an  ambitious  Pan- 
Germanic  program  for  a  German  control  of  the  East, 
which  could  only  be  carried  out  through  the  mediimi 
of  a  transverse  route  for  the  Bagdad  Railway,  con- 
trolling the  highway  along  the  historical  road  from 
Constantinople  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  was  Russia 
who  was  responsible  for  the  change  in  the  German 
route  which,  as  we  have  tried  to  show,  made  all  the 
difference  in  the  political  aspects  of  the  enterprise. 
The  far  more  difficult  and  infinitely  more  costly  route 
from  Konia  across  the  Taurus  range  created  the 
international  problem.  One  may  question,  therefore, 
whether  up  to  the  close  of  the  last  century,  German 
capitalists  were  in  league  with  a  government  having 
ulterior  motives  of  a  political  character  in  view  in 
pushing  their  project. 

Exactly  when  the  German  government  under  the 
leadership  of  the  Emperor  connected  these  motives 

^The  plan  was  again  brought  forward  by  Sir  Wm. 
Willcocks  in  1910  (see  Geographical  Journal,  vol.  35  [rgio], 
p.  13)  in  connection  with  his  plans  for  the  renascence  of  the 
Euphrates  Valley  through  an  elaborate  scheme  of  irriga- 
tion. The  railway  was  to  start  at  Tripoli  and  pass  across 
northern  Syria  via  the  Euphrates  to  Bagdad. 


118    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

with  the  railway  is  a  question  difficult  if  not  impos- 
sible to  answer.  In  a  general  way  the  policy  of 
expansion  for  Germany  was  an  inheritance  of  the 
Bismarck  period.  It  took  on  a  larger  aspect  with 
the  growing  prosperity  of  the  country,  and  no  doubt 
was  stimulated  by  the  restless  energy  of  the  young 
Emperor — who  was  as  progressive  in  everything 
that  concerned  Germany's  advancement  as  he  was 
aggressive  in  his  whole  attitude.  The  two  traits 
are  generally  found  united.  But  such  aggression, 
taking  on  the  formulation  of  plans  for  acquiring  a 
foothold  in  the  East,  was  entirely  in  line  with  the 
general  policy  of  European  nations,  who  from  the 
beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  had  gathered 
like  hawks  around  a  carcass,  to  divide  up  as  much 
of  the  Turkish  Empire  as  they  could  snatch.  No 
doubt  this  appropriation  has  worked  great  benefits 
for  the  lands  thus  absorbed.  Witness  Algiers  and 
Tunis  and,  more  particularly,  the  marvellous  trans- 
formation that  England  has  worked  for  Egypt 
through  her  splendid  and  tactful  regime,  but  the 
absorption,  albeit  beneficent,  involved  taking  away 
the  liberty  of  peoples  to  choose  their  masters.  Ger- 
many was,  therefore,  in  her  policy,  merely  following 
the  example  set  by  others,  and  she  had  determined 
like  Shylock  to  "  better  the  instruction." 

She  did  so,  and  seized  upon  the  magnificent 
project  of  a  railway  that  would  forjii  the  shortest 
route  through  the  Near  East  to  the  Far  East  and, 
connecting  on  its  way  with  all  the  veins  of  the 
region  marked  by  railways  constructed  or  projected, 
would  give  her  a  dominant  position  among  Euro- 
pean powers.  We  may  assume  that  some  such  idea 
was   in   the   Emperor's   mind   when   on   his   visit   to 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY    119 

Damascus  in  1898,  he  proclaimed  himself  to  be  the 
"  friend  and  protector  of  the  three  hundred  millions  -'-^ 
of  Mohammedans."  He  had  a  vision  of  the  glorious 
future  in  store  for  his  country,  extending  its  influence 
over  the  entire  East — even  to  distant  India  where 
there  are  large  numbers  of  Mohammedans,  and  natur- 
ally to  Egypt.  Utterances  of  such  a  mystic  character, 
coming  from  the  Emperor,  and  given  under  a  dramatic 
setting,^''  did  much  to  arouse  suspicion  of  Germany's 
ulterior  designs  in  the  Near  East,  and  when  such  delphic 
sayings  were  translated  into  language  of  unmistakable 
clearness  by  boastful  Pan-Germanic  publicists,  intoxi- 
cated with  enthusiasm  over  their  far-reaching  schemes, 
the  natural  result  was  to  arouse  all  Europe  to  the 
menace  involved  in  a  control  of  the  historic  highway, 
dominating  the  East  by  the  strongest  military  power  in 
the  world,  and  which  was  fast  becoming  also  one  of 
the  strongest  naval  powers.  The  terms  of  the  conven- 
tion when  made  public  in  the  two  forms  in  1902  and 
1903  clinched  the  situation,  and  left  no  doubt  of  the 
decidedly  political  character  that  the  enterprise  had 
acquired  through  the  backing  of  the  German 
government. 

Even  then  we  need  not  assume  that  the  German 
syndicate  was  in  league  with  the  Pan-Germanic 
movement.  Capitalists — even  though  they  be 
patriotic  Germans — are  not  apt  to  be  carried  away 
by  political  visions.     They  realize  the  advantage  of 

^  The  figure  was  too  large  by  about  a  hundred  millions, 
but  that  did  not  disturb  his  Majesty. 

""Tlie  words  were  uttered  under  the  shadow  of  the 
tomb  of  the  Sultan  Saladin,  the  conqueror  of  Jerusalem,  and 
on  whose  grave  the  Emperor  laid  a  wreath  which  was  still  there 
in  1912,  when  I  visited  Damascus. 


120    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

large  enterprises  for  their  country,  but  their  point 
of  view  for  all  that  is  apt  to  remain  financial  rather 
than  political.  To  the  credit  of  leaders  of  finance  in 
Germany,  like  Dr.  von  Gwinner,  it  should  be  said 
that  they  did  all  in  their  power  to  "  internationalize  " 
the  undertaking,  with  the  perfectly  natural  limitation 
of  not  wishing  to  see  the  project  pass  out  of  Ger- 
many's hands.  Dr.  von  Gwinner  was  handicapped 
by  the  conviction  that  grew  stronger  year  by  year, 
that  whatever  the  attitude  of  the  German  syndicate 
as  business  men  might  be,  the  German  government 
was  behind  the  plan  with  political  ends  in  view.  We 
have  seen  how  the  suspicion  of  this  end  grew  apace, 
and  despite  occasional  prospects  of  a  settlement  of 
the  points  of  contention  among  the  European  powers, 
the  inevitable  conflict  as  a  result  of  this  suspicion  set  in. 

XI 

Such  is  the  story  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  which 
contributed  more  than  any  other  complication  to 
create  the  condition  needed  for  the  conflict.  From 
the  historical  point  of  view  there  are  thus  two  aspects 
to  the  Bagdad  Railway.  It  represents,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  last  act  in  the  process  of  reopening  the 
direct  way  to  the  East  which  became  closed  to  the 
West  by  the  fall  of  Constantinople  in  1453,  ^^^  which 
began  to  be  reopened  with  the  loosening  of  Turkey's 
hold  on  one  end  of  the  historic  highway  stretching 
across  Asia  Minor.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conflict 
to  which  the  railway  gave  rise  illustrates  once  more 
the  crucial  role  that  this  highway  has  always  played 
in  determining  the  fate  of  the  Near  East  from  the 
most  ancient  days  down  to  our  times.  The  opposi- 
tion of  the  European  powers  to  the  Bagdad  Railway, 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  BAGDAD  RAH^WAY    121 

used  as  a  political  scheme  for  the  aggrandizement 
of  a  particular  country,  registers  the  instinctive  pro- 
test of  the  West  against  the  domination  of  the  East 
hy  any  one  power — no  matter  which.  The  danger 
would  have  been  just  as  great  and  the  hostility 
aroused  just  as  strong  if  Russia  had  at  any  time 
seized  Constantinople  and  threatened  the  East  by 
an  advance  into  Asia  Minor,  whether  with  an  army 
or  by  means  of  a  railway.  The  fatal  error  of  Ger- 
many was  to  conceive  of  such  a  domination,  for  with 
the  reopening  of  the  Near  East  to  the  West,  the 
logical  plan,  the  one  dictated  by  the  verdict  of  his- 
tory, was  to  keep  the  world's  highway  open  for  the 
entire  West — and  for  the  East.  The  Bagdad  Railway 
in  the  hands  of  Germany,  stretching  from  Con- 
stantinople via  Bagdad  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  would 
have  meant  the  practical  closing  of  the  highway  to 
all  other  nations — as  effectively  as  the  taking  of 
Constantinople  accomplished  this  in  1453. 

The  history  of  Asia  Minor  gives  the  verdict  that 
the  highway  must  be  kept  open — if  the  world  is  to 
progress  peaceably  and  if  the  nations  of  the  West 
are  to  live  in  amicable  rivalry,  while  once  more  pass- 
ing through  the  period  of  an  exchange  between 
Orient  and  Occident — such  as  first  took  place  in  the 
days  of  Alexander  the  Great.  This  verdict  suggests 
"  internationalization  "  of  the  highway  as  the  solu- 
tion, and  it  also  voices  a  warning  to  the  West  that 
the  reopening  of  the  highway  must  not  be  used  for 
domination  over  the  East  but  for  co-operation  with 
it,  not  for  exploiting  the  East,  but  for  a  union  with 
it.  What  form  that  union  should  take  will  become 
clearer  after  a  consideration  of  the  two  issues  in- 
volved in  the  war. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK 


The  war  of  1917  is  not  the  war  of  1914;  it  is  in 
fact  an  entirely  different  war.  The  terrific  explosion 
of  three  years  ago  was  the  result  of  over-pressure 
exerted  on  the  European  body  politic  by  conflicting 
national  ambitions,  by  Pan-Germanism  on  the  one 
side,  by  Pan-Slavism  on  the  other,  by  growing 
mutual  distrust  and  fears  among  European  nations, 
leading  to  the  Triple  Entente  to  counterbalance  the 
Triple  Alliance, — the  one  combination  as  unnatural 
as  the  other  was  incongruous,  and  by  economic 
rivalries.  There  were  definite  issues  of  a  political, 
racial  and  economic  character  involved  in  the  war 
that  thus  broke  out,  but  these  issues  have  all  been 
moved  into  the  background  for  the  present  by  the 
paramount  one  that  marks  the  war  of  1917.  The 
present  war  is  actually,  as  has  been  so  often  set  forth, 
a  struggle  on  a  gigantic  scale  for  the  preservation 
of  popular  government — and  that  is  w'hat  that  sadly 
overworked  term  "  democracy  "  in  its  essence  means 
— in  those  countries  in  which  such  government  ex- 
ists, and  for  the  triumph  of  popular  government  in 
those  countries  in  wdiich  it  does  not  as  yet  exist. 
We  are  at  war  with  Germany,  because  Germany 
represents  a  most  powerful  and  a  most  menacing 
government,  based  not  on  the  democratic  but  on 
the  autocratic  principle.  The  sinking  of  the  Lusi- 
122 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  123 

tania  and  the  resumption  of  a  ruthless  sink-at-sight 
submarine  poHcy  represent  the  occasion  for  our 
entrance  into  the  war,  as  the  violation  of  Belgium's 
guaranteed  neutrality  on  the  part  of  Germany  was 
the  occasion  for  England's  entrance.  The  reason 
in  both  cases  lies  deeper. 

The  change  from  the  war  of  1914  to  that  of  1917 
was  brought  about  by  three  factors :  ( i )  by  Germany's 
conduct  of  the  war,  (2)  by  the  Russian  revolution,  and 
(3)  t)y  our  entrance  into  the  stupendous  conflict. 

Germany's  diplomatic  case  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  of  1914  was  not  bad.  There  was  assuredly  some 
justification  for  her  feeling  that  she  was  hemmed 
in  by  hostile  powers — by  France  and  Russia.  She 
had  reason  to  fear  Russian  aggression,  Russia  being 
at  the  time  in  the  control  of  a  government  of  much 
the  same  autocratic  character  as  that  of  Germany. 
With  England  and  Russia  pooling  their  interests  in 
Persia  in  1910,  a  new  enemy  had  shown  her  hand, 
for  it  was  the  fear  of  Germany's  growing  power  in 
the  East  that  brought  England  to  the  side  of  Russia. 
The  Agadir  incident  of  191 1  revealed  the  definite 
alignment  of  England  and  France  against  Germany 
and  foreshadowed  the  triple  Entente,  directed  pri- 
marily against  Germany.  These  facts  must  not  be 
brushed  aside  in  a  review  of  the  European  situation, 
growing  more  complicated  year  by  year,  though  it 
does  not,  of  course,  follow  that  we  must  accept 
Germany's  interpretation  of  the  facts.  Germany 
saw  France  and  Spain  gaining  control  of  Morocco, 
she  saw  Italy  getting  a  slice  of  Turkey,  and  she  was 
left  out  in  the  cold  without  the  prospect  of  getting 
so  much  as  a  bone,  if  the  plans  of  the  European 


124   THE  WAE  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

powers  arrayed  against  her  were  to  be  carried  out.^ 
There  was  also  some  "  academic  "  justification  for 
her  contention  that  a  quarrel  between  Austria  and 
Servia  should  be  fought  out  by  these  two  contest- 
ants, albeit  that  in  reality  the  position  taken  may 
have  had  a  sinister  substratum,  but  Germany  en- 
tirely spoiled  her  case  by  her  conduct  of  the  war. 

It  is  that  conduct  rather  than  her  responsibility 
for  the  war  that  has  aroused  at  once  the  fear  and 
the  hostility  of  practically  the  entire  world,  outside 
of  the  groups  arrayed  on  her  side,  and  even  these 
groups  stand  in  fear  of  her.  In  regard  to  the  share 
of  responsibility  for  the  actual  outbreak  of  the  war  of 
1914,  there  is  still  room  for  difference  of  opinion 
even  after  three  years  of  unprofitable  discussion. 
Certainly,  the  official  mobilization  of  the  Russian 
army  in  the  last  week  of  July  was  a  contributing 
factor.  No  one  who  was  in  Germany  at  the  time 
when  the  mobilization  of  the  Russian  army  was  an- 
nounced could  have  had  any  doubt  of  the  genuine 
fear  of  Russia  felt  in  Germany.  Germany  could 
have  prevented  the  war,  and  that  is  quite  as  serious 
a  charge  against  her  as  the  general  belief  that  she 
willed  it.^     In  regard  to  her  conduct  of  the  war, 

*  When  I  was  in  the  East  in  1912,  during  the  Turco- 
Itahan  war,  I  heard  much  talk  of  a  probable  further  partition 
of  Turkey's  Mediterranean  possessions,  England  to  get  or 
take  Palestine,  and  France  to  have  Syria,  and  an  agreement 
that  Germany  was  to  have  nothing.  Of  course,  this  may  have 
been  mere  talk,  but  I  heard  it. 

'  Her  rejection  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a 
European  conference  to  take  up  the  Austro-Servian  question, 
when  it  was  perfectly  evident  that  the  question  without  such 
a  conference  would  lead  to  a  general  European  war,  revealed 
Gi-Tinaiiy's  unwillingness  to  prevent  war. 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  125 

however,  there  can  be  no  difference  of  opinion.  The 
facts  are  there  and  speak  for  themselves.  By  Ger- 
many's conduct,  I  mean  the  mihtary  poHcy  adopted 
by  the  General  Staff  and  executed  as  the  official 
acts  of  the  German  government,  I  mean  the  official 
violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality,  the  official  imposi- 
tion of  exorbitant  fines  on  Belgian  cities  and  towns, 
the  official  recourse  to  such  mediaeval,  aye,  almost 
primitive,  methods  of  warfare  as  taking  hostages  and 
deporting  the  population  of  invaded  districts,^  the 
official  order  to  burn  and  sack  a  large  portion  of 
Louvain,  the  official  sinking  of  ships  carrying  non- 
combatants,  the  official  destruction  of  towns  and 
villages  in  the  line  of  retreat,  the  official  raiding  of  cities 
and  towns  by  airships.*  The  feature  common  to 
these  acts,  apart  from  their  inhuman  aspect,  is  that 

'  This  was  the  favorite  policy  of  the  ancient  Assyrians. 

■"I  exclude  unofficial  acts  of  individual  soldiers,  firstly, 
because  such  acts  (violation  of  women,  looting  and  individual 
deeds  of  cruelty)  take  place  in  every  war.  There  are  brutes 
in  every  army,  and,  secondly,  because  the  accounts  of  such 
individual  atrocities  have  probably  been  grossly  exaggerated, 
as  American  newspaper  correspondents  traveling  through 
Belgium  at  the  time  of  the  atrocities  testify.  Most  of  the 
cases  in  Lord  Bryce's  report  on  the  atrocities  in  Belgium 
are  official  acts,  not  the  doings  of  individual  soldiers,  acting 
from  brute  instincts  let  loose  through  the  war'.  In  the  Atlantic 
Monthly  for  Octolier,  191 7,  Professor  Kellogg,  of  the  American 
Belgian  Relief  Commission,  while  severely  arraigning  Ger- 
many's treatment  of  Belgium,  expressly  states  that  he  came 
across  no  instances  of  Belgian  children  with  their  hands  cut 
off  or  of  women  with  breasts  mutilated,  despite  the  wide  spread 
of  such  reports  during  the  first  year  of  the  war  and  from  time 
to  time  since  then. 


126    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

they  affect  to  an  almost  exclusive  degree  the  civilian 
non-combatant  population.  Their  evident  purpose 
was  to  terrorize  and  thus  to  reduce  the  morale  of  the 
enemy.  They  are  militory  measures,  and  the  German 
government  so  far  from  complaining  of  the  hostility 
aroused  by  them  ought  consistently  to  welcome  such 
hostility  as  an  indication  of  the  success  of  these 
measures.  To  be  sure,  the  measures  have  also  been 
stupid,  for  they  have  stimulated  recruiting  in  Eng- 
land, have  intensified  the  hatred  of  Germans  in  all 
the  belligerent  countries  and  have  brought  new 
opponents  of  Germany  into  the  field — but  they  have, 
on  the  other  hand,  undoubtedly  resulted  in  striking 
terror  throughout  the  world  and  in  bringing  the  entire 
world  to  the  realization  of  the  menace  involved  in 
the  existence  of  a  government  acting  autocratically, 
without  any  responsibility  to  the  people  and,  there- 
fore, without  control. 

II 

Germany's  military  conduct  is  responsible  for 
the  present  situation,  and  even  those  (if  there  be 
any)  who  would  justify  such  conduct  on  the  ground 
of  military  necessity,  must  recognize  the  result  as  a 
natural  and  logical  sequence.  The  responsibility 
for  oificial  conduct  rests  with  the  German  govern- 
ment and  not  with  the  people,  who  were  not  con- 
sulted either  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  or  at  any 
time  during  the  war.  The  German  government  de- 
clared the  war  before  calling  in  the  Reichstag,  and 
the  same  government  is  carrying  it  on,  with  little 
regard  to  the  national  legislative  body  which  merely 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  127 

passes  the  credits.  Even  the  fact  that  the  people 
are  patriotically  behind  the  government  does  not 
make  the  German  people  a  particcps  criminis  in  any 
real  sense  of  the  word.  That  government  has  never 
received  a  mandate  from  the  people.  It  does  not 
act  through  the  representatives  of  the  people,  but 
imposes  its  authority  on  the  population.  In  the  case 
of  an  autocratic  non-responsible  government,  it  is 
proper  to  speak  of  the  people  behind  the  government ; 
in  a  democratic  responsible  government,  the  govern- 
ment is  behind  the  people.  In  a  democracy  the 
people  lead  and  the  government  follows.  In  Ger- 
many, the  government  leads  and  the  people  nolens 
volens  must  follow.  The  distinction  between  the 
German  government  and  the  German  people  in  the 
ofUcial  conduct  of  the  war  is,  therefore,  proper. 

Such  a  distinction,  entirely  out  of  place  in  a  popu- 
lar government,  is  an  inherent  feature  in  a  govern- 
ment imposed  upon  a  people ;  and  it  makes  little 
difference  whether  we  assume  the  German  people 
to  be  blinded,  cowed,  obstinate,  politically  immature, 
or  poisoned  by  mischievous  and  insidious  theories  of 
the  state,  it  is  the  government  that  must  assume  the 
responsibility  for  the  results  of  the  policy  adopted 
by  it.  Besides,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  for  many 
years  before  the  war,  there  was  a  continuous  strug- 
gle in  Germany  for  democratization,  chiefly  on  the 
part  of  the  Socialists  controlling  several  million 
voters,  and  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  there  must 
have  been  over  50  per  cent,  of  the  German  people 
who  were  opposed  to  the  form  of  government  pre- 
vailing in  Germany.  The  107  Socialists  in  the 
Reichstag,  now  joined  by  the  Clericals  (about  90) 
and  some  of  the  liberal  factions,  constitute  a  major- 


128    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

ity,  fighting  autocracy  in  Germany  and  determined 
to  bring  about  that  internal  change  which  is  a  neces- 
sary preliminary  to  any  peace  negotiations. 

Germany's  conduct  of  the  war,  shameful  and 
inexcusable,  is  thus  the  chief  factor  in  creating  the 
war  of  1917 — which  may  be  defined  as  a  realization 
of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  room  in  the  modern  world 
for  autocracy,  especially  if  that  autocracy  be  power- 
ful and  efficient.  Nations  cannot  live  on  ecjuable 
terms  with  one  another  in  the  present  age  of  close 
intercommunication  unless  they  are  all  organized 
on  a  basis  of  popular  government.  That  kind  of 
government  is  the  spirit  of  the  age,  and  the  German 
government  in  opposing  itself  to  that  spirit  becomes 
the  enemy  of  mankind.  The  war  of  1917  is,  there- 
fore, a  struggle  forced  upon  the  world  to  secure  the 
triumph  of  the  spirit  of  democracy. 

Ill 
The  significance  of  the  Russian  revolution  lies 
similarly  in  revealing  the  strength  of  the  spirit  of 
the  age  in  a  country,  which  at  the  beginnnig  of  the 
war  in  1914  was  still  striving  to  suppress  it.  Revo- 
lutions come  ordinarily,  before  a  war  or  after  a  war. 
The  almost  unprecedented  occurrence  of  a  great 
revolution  during  a  great  war  was  a  signal  that  the 
war  for  the  triumph  of  democracy  was  about  to 
replace  the  earlier  one.  It  came  at  a  time  when 
Germany's  conduct  of  the  war  had  shown  the  menace 
involved  in  a  government  that  was  in  opposition  to 
the  spirit  of  the  age.  The  Russian  revolution  was 
not  only  a  revolt  against  a  government  that  had 
imposed  a  war  on  its  ])cople,  precisely  as  Germany 
had  imposed  it,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  plans 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  129 

of  aggression  at  the  expense  of  other  nations,  it 
was  the  first  decisive  stroke  for  the  triumph  of  world 
democracy.  It  revealed  the  existence  of  forces, 
lying  deeper  than  the  issues  which  brought  on  the 
war  of  1914.  It  showed  the  real  cause  for  the 
"  European  Anarchy,"  so  forcibly  described  by 
Lowes  Dickinson  in  his  survey  of  the  situation 
before  1914.  That  cause  lay  in  the  existence  of  gov- 
ernments which  made  their  plans  independently  of 
the  will  of  the  people.  The  Russian  Duma,  though 
designed  to  have  more  authority  than  the  German 
Reichstag,  had  become  an  offense  to  a  government 
that  was  determined  to  make  it  its  tool,  and  for  a 
time  succeeded  in  doing  so.  The  spirit  of  autocracy 
was  still  strong  enough  in  Russia  in  1914  to  ride 
roughshod  over  the  principle  of  popular  government, 
but  the  real  issue,  concealed  for  the  time  being  by 
complications  of  a  diplomatic  character,  rose  to  the 
surface  during  the  war  of  1914  and  helped  to  bring 
on  the  revolution. 

The  present  Russian  government,  entirely  popu- 
lar in  character,  has  no  concern  with  the  issues  of 
1914.  It  therefore,  naturally  and  consistently,  re- 
nounces all  plans  of  annexation  and  aggression  which 
occupied  the  now  overthrown  autocratic  government. 
It  has  no  designs  on  Constantinople,  nor  is  it  con- 
cerned with  the  formation  of  a  great  Pan-Slavic 
state  that  would  have  been  as  serious  a  menace  to 
the  tranquillity  of  the  world,  as  the  carrying  out  of 
the  ambitions  of  the  German  government  for  a 
"  place  in  the  sun,"  which  would  have  thrown  the 
rest  of  the  world  into  the  shadow.  Russia  is  fight- 
ing for  the  preservation  of  its  democracy,  and  its 
best  leaders  realize  that  this  democracy  is  not  safe  as 
9 


130    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

long  as  an  autocratic  government  is  maintained  in  a 
neighboring  state.  Whether  these  leaders  can  guide  the 
country  through  the  present  crisis  remains  to  be  seen. 
Finally,  our  entrance  into  the  war  clinched  the 
situation  and  gave  to  the  war  of  1917  its  definite 
character  as  a  struggle  for  the  preservation  and 
triumph  of  democracy  throughout  the  world.  The 
President  of  this  great  Republic  has  become  the 
spokesman  of  the  world.  His  peace  and  war  mes- 
sages alike  breathe  the  spirit  of  democracy.  A  true 
statesman  does  not  act  upon  "  academic  "  theories, 
formed  in  his  study,  but  from  a  profound  recognition 
of  the  meaning  of  the  events  as  they  transpire.  Led 
step  by  step  through  his  interpretation  of  actual 
occurrences,  President  Wilson  has  reached  his  pres- 
ent commanding  position,  which  has  found  its  most 
notable  expression  in  his  answer  to  the  Pope's  pro- 
posals for  peace.  He  has  made  the  program  of  the 
war  of  1917  so  clear  that  he  who  runs  may  read. 
He  has  clarified  the  issue  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
make  it  evident  even  to  the  people  of  Germany 
that  our  war — the  world's  war — against  Germany 
is  actually  a  war  for  the  German  people,  as  much 
as  a  war  for  the  preservation  of  American  democracy. 
We  as  Americans  have  no  special  concern  with  the 
issues  that  brought  on  the  war  of  1914;  we  are 
solely  concerned  with  securing  the  peace  of  the 
world  through  the  establishment  of  popular  gov- 
ernment in  Germany.  The  precise  form  of  that 
government  must  be  left  to  the  people  of  Germany 
who  will  work  it  out  in  accordance  with  their  special 
genius,  but  the  basic  principle  of  that  government 
must  be  the  same  as  prevails  in  democratic  govern- 
ments elsewhere — the  complete  responsibility  of  a 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  131 

government  to  its  people  through  its  elected  repre- 
sentatives. Such  is  the  war  of  1917,  clearly  set 
forth  by  the  attitude  of  Russia  and  of  the  United 
States ;  set  forth  with  almost  equal  definiteness  by 
recent  utterances  of  such  leading  English  statesmen  as 
Lloyd  George  and  Arthur  Balfour,  and  which  ere 
long  must  be  fully  accepted  as  the  issue  by  France 
and  Italy.  How  small  and  petty  seem  purely 
national  ambitions  or  measures  of  revenge  after  the 
war  in  the  light  of  the  great  paramount  issue  which, 
in  the  President's  interpretation  of  this  war,  stamps 
it  as  one  of  the  noblest  as  well  as  one  of  the  most 
dreadful  of  all  wars — noblest  by  virtue  of  the  issue 
involved,  dreadful  in  that  the  leading  exponents  of 
modern  civilization  should  still  be  obliged  to  have 
recourse  to  the  most  barbaric  manner  of  securing 
the  triumph  of  a  great  ideal. 

IV 

In  contrast  to  the  war  of  1917,  which  may  be 
called  the  world  war  for  democracy,  the  war  of  1914 
is  the  European  struggle  for  supremacy.  Had  this 
latter  war  taken  the  ordinary  course,  it  would  have 
shaped  itself  as  a  supreme  struggle  between  Eng- 
land and  Germany."^  If  England  had  triumphed, 
there  would  probably  have  been  a  combination  of 
Germany  and  Russia  against  England.  If  Germany 
had  succeeded  in  imposing  her  authority  on  Europe, 
the  combination  against  her  would  have  continued 
and  would  have  led  in  time  to  an  attempt  to  throw 
off  the  yoke — probably  with  the  additional  help  of 
the  United  States  and  China  and  the  South  American 

■*  See  the  closing  paragraph  in  Cramb,  England  and  Ger- 
many, p.  136. 


132    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Republics.  In  either  case  the  world  would  have 
been  involved  for  years  to  come  in  preparations  for 
another  war,  and  militarism  would  have  become 
rampant  everywhere.  The  causes  that  led  to  the 
explosion  in  1914  were  of  the  ordinary  kind — that  is 
to  say,  the  kind  that  ordinarily  lead  to  wars.  They 
have  in  the  main  been  indicated  above, "^  but  there 
were  two  striking  features  marking  the  outbreak  of 
the  war.  In  the  first  place  there  were  the  pre- 
monitions through  the  aggressive  spirit  of  both 
Germany  and  Russia,  closely  allied  with  the  com- 
plications in  the  Balkan  States,  and  in  the  second 
place  the  surprisingly  large  number  of  supplemental 
issues  that  converged  to  intensify  the  struggle  for 
supremacy  into  a  general  melee  on  an  unprecedented 
scale. 

The  Moroccan  situation  on  two  occasions  within 
the  last  decade  became  threatening  through  Ger- 
many's ambitions,  while  the  Balkan  wars  had  a 
larger  significance  because  of  the  face  of  Russia  to 
be  seen  in  the  background.  England's  and  Russia's 
interference  in  the  affairs  of  Persia  was  another 
premonitory  symptom,  as  was  Italy's  seizure  of 
Tripoli.  Again,  the  outbreak  of  the  war  at  once 
revived  other  issues  like  that  of  Alsace-Lorraine  for 
France,  the  Trentino  provinces  for  Italy,  Finnish 
independence,  the  dream  of  a  resuscitation  of  Poland, 
the  hopes  of  the  Jewish  Zionists  for  the  possession 
of  Palestine.  Added  to  all  these  issues  was  the 
Bagdad  Railway  project  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
developed  from  a  commercial  undertaking  of  the 
first  magnitude  to  a  political  scheme  of  even  greater 
proportions.     This  transformation  in  the  character 

•Page  123. 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  133 

of  the  project  was,  as  I  have  tried  to  show,  gradually 
brought  about  through  two  factors  (i)  through  the 
natural  growth  of  Germany's  political  power  as  a 
consequence  of  her  marvellous  industrial  expansion 
and  which  led  her  rulers  to  cherish  political  am- 
bitions which  were  unnatural,  because  they  trans- 
gressed bounds  dictated  both  by  existing  circum- 
stances and  by  due  consideration  for  the  peace  of 
the  world,  and  (2)  through  the  close  alliance  be- 
tween Germany  and  Turkey,  which  had  led  to  the 
reorganization  of  the  Turkish  army  under  the  tute- 
lage of  German  officers. 

This  movement  dates  back  to  1885,  when  the 
German  General  von  der  Goltz  was  called  to  Con- 
stantinople by  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  to  become 
a  professor  in  the  chief  military  school  of  Turkey.'^ 
Others  followed  to  assist  von  der  Goltz,  but  it  was 
not  until  after  the  Turkish  revolution  of  1908-1909 
that  a  further  stimulus  was  given  to  the  movement 
by  the  appointment  of  a  military  commission  of 
thirty  German  officers  to  train  the  Turkish  army 
in  German  military  discipline  and  German  methods. 
The  results  are  to  be  seen  in  the  present  war,  in 
which  the  military  strategy  of  the  Turkish  armies 
is  carried  out  under  the  direction  of  German  officers. 
The  Turkish  anny  is  practically  an  adjunct  to  the 
German  military  machine.  An  alliance  between  two 
nations,  so  diverse  as  the  Germans  and  the  Turks, 
naturally   had   an   exclusively   political   significance 

'  It  is  worth  nothing,  however,  that  fifty  years  earlier 
(in  1836)  Moltke,  then  a  young  officer  in  the  Prussian  army, 
spent  over  two  years  in  Constantinople  at  the  request  of  the 
Sultan  Mahmud  II,  in  imparting  military  instruction  and  in 
organizing  the  Turkish  militia. 


134    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

that  still  further  demonstrated  the  intention  of  the 
German  government  to  use  the  Bagdad  Railway  for 
carrying  out  its  political  ambitions.  The  historic 
highway  across  Asia  Minor,  thus  controlled  by  the 
military  staff  of  Germany,  would  be  closed  to  the 
rest  of  Europe.  The  railway  would  serve  as  a 
barrier  as  effective  as  the  one  erected  by  the  Ottoman 
Turks,  when  by  the  taking  of  Constantinople  they 
controlled  the  entire  stretch  to  Bagdad  and  the 
Persian  Gulf.  If  anything  was  needed  to  bring 
the  various  issues  agitating  Europe  to  a  convergence, 
the  situation  created  by  the  political  character  given 
to  the  Bagdad  Railway  was  able  to  do  so.  One  of 
the  articles  in  the  convention  of  1902-1903,  granting 
the  concession  of  the  line  to  Bagdad,  stipulated 
that  the  road  was  to  be  used  by  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment for  military  transportation,  and  the  German 
company  had  to  pledge  itself  to  build  military  sta- 
tions along  the  route,  at  an  expenditure  up  to  four 
million  francs.  The  stipulation  was  perfectly  natu- 
ral, but  the  reorganization  of  the  Turkish  army 
under  German  tutelage  changed  the  character  of 
the  article  in  the  convention  to  a  German  military 
measure,  which  would  give  Germany  not  a  commer- 
cial but  a  military  support  for  the  exploitation  of  the 
East.  It  could  lead  to  nothing  else  but  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  entire  Nearer  East.  With  Asia  Minor 
in  her  hands,  Germany  would  be  in  a  position  to 
follow  in  the  wake  of  ancient  Persia,  Greece,  Rome 
and  the  Arabs,  and  to  have  Mesopotamia,  Syria, 
Palestine  and  Egypt  fall  into  her  lap. 

Through  the  Bagdad  Railway  events  were  thus 
shaping  themselves  for  a  terrific  conflict  in  the  East 
that   would   parallel   the   coming  clash   in   the   West. 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  135 

The  addition  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  project  to  the 
Eastern  question  rendered  the  outlook  for  any  satis- 
factory settlement  of  that  question  practically  hope- 
less. The  gathering  clouds  became  more  ominous, 
and  despite  occasional  rifts  they  grew  thicker  and 
steadily  descended. 

Since  the  Agadir  incident  in  191 1,  it  was  more 
clearly  evident  than  ever  to  careful  observers  that 
the  hopes  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  many  prob- 
lems presented  by  European  politics  had  diminished. 
Only  wise  counsels  or  the  rise  of  a  great  command- 
ing figure  in  some  European  capital  could  have 
averted  the  catastrophe  which  was  "  on  the  cards." 
Without  either  contingency  it  was  only  a  question  of 
time  before  Pan-Germanic  ambitions,  contemplating 
a  sphere  of  influence  stretching  from  Berlin  across 
Vienna  and  Constantinople  to  the  Persian  Gulf, 
would  clash  with  Pan-Slavic  policies  for  the 
creation  of  a  confederacy  of  Slavonic  States  under 
Russian  domination,  or  before  Germanic  expansion 
would  lead  to  a  life-and-death  encounter  with  Eng- 
land, with  the  slumbering  yet  potent  hostility  be- 
tween Germany  and  France  ready  to  be  aroused 
by  either  outbreak.  Wise  counsels  did  not  prevail 
either  in  St.  Petersburg  or  Vienna,  nor  did  the  great 
statesman  with  a  large  vision  appear  either  in  Lon- 
don or  Paris  or  Berlin,  and  so  when  the  fatal  last 
week  of  July,  1914,  arrived,  the  scene  was  set  for  the 
tragic  climax  to  the  futile  negotiations  of  the  diplomats. 

V 

The  issue  of  1917  will  have  to  be  settled  before 
those  of  1914  can  be  taken  up.  So  much  is  evident 
from  the  profound  change  that  has  come  over  Russia 


136    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

and  from  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the 
war.  President  Wilson's  answer  to  the  peace  pro- 
posals of  the  Pope  has  committed  this  country  defi- 
nitely to  the  policy  of  first  making  "  the  world  safe 
for  democracy  "  before  taking  up  the  issues  involved 
in  the  war  of  1914.  It  is  only  a  question  of  time — 
and  perhaps  a  short  time — ^before  the  Allies  will 
clearly  and  unequivocally  accept  this  policy,  and 
make  the  sacrifice  of  placing  their  claims  and  hopes 
for  the  time  being  into  the  background  in  order  to 
win  the  paramount  issue — the  overthrow  of  a  medi- 
aeval form  of  autocratic  government  in  Germany,  and 
the  substitution  of  a  form  that  will  recognize  as  its 
central  principle  the  responsibility  of  a  government 
to  the  constituted  representatives  of  the  people. 
The  details  are  unimportant.  The  recognition  of  the 
principle  is  the  essential  thing.  It  is  hardly  neces- 
sary to  argue  that  the  preliminary  condition,  so  for- 
cibly set  forth  by  President  Wilson,  does  not  involve 
any  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  a  nation. 
The  democratization  of  Germany  is  precisely  what 
the  liberal  element  in  that  country,  representing 
even  before  the  war  a  majority  of  the  people,  was 
striving  for;  and  this  proportion  has  increased  since 
the  war,  as  is  evident  by  the  defection  of  the  Cen- 
trum party,  which  before  the  war  was  always  to  be 
found  on  the  side  of  the  govermnent.  It  is.  there- 
fore, entirely  accurate  to  say  that  the  issue  of  1917 
is  being  fought  for  the  benefit  of  the  German  people 
as  much  as  for  the  safety  of  the  world.  The  danger 
for  us  lies  in  a  confusion  or  a  commingling  of  the 
issues  of  1914  with  the  single  one  of  1917.  With 
the  issues  of  1914  we  as  a  nation  are  not  concerned. 
They  arose  in  Europe  and  belong  to  Europe,  but 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  137 

for  that  very  reason  we  will  be  in  a  stronger  position 
to  advocate  at  the  peace  conference  a  solution  that 
will  be  just,  and  one  that  will  give  due  consideration 
to  avoiding  the  repetition  of  the  conditions  that 
brought  on  the  war. 

The  adjustment  will  be  difficult  but  not  hopeless 
after  once  the  atmosphere  shall  have  been  cleared 
of  the  vitiated  currents  created  by  the  poisonous 
gases  of  an  irresponsible  autocracy,  using  as  its 
weapon  military  terrorism.  The  world  will  breathe 
more  freely  after  Germany  shall  have  adopted  or 
shall  have  by  circumstances  been  forced  to  adopt 
the  principle  of  popular  government,  and  thus  be 
placed  on  a  par  with  conditions  prevailing  in  all 
other  civilized  governments  at  the  present  time — 
though  under  varying  forms.  Political  intrigue,  and 
political  plots,  including  an  elaborate  and  sinister 
"  spy  "  and  "  agent "  system  are  the  tools  that  an 
autocracy  needs  to  maintain  itself  in  opposition  to 
the  will  of  its  people.  Russia  before  the  war  used 
precisely  the  same  tools — only  not  so  cleverly  and 
perhaps  not  so  lavishly  as  Germany.  A  govern- 
ment that  receives  its  mandate  from  the  people,  that 
derives  its  authority  from  the  popular  will  and  that 
makes  its  account  to  the  people  does  not  need  such 
methods — it  spurns  them.  An  autocratic  military 
government  is  necessarily  bent  upon  perpetuating 
itself ;  a  democratic  popular  form  of  government  is 
necessarily  bound  by  the  will  of  the  people.  A  free 
people  does  not  favor  conquest  at  the  expense  of 
enslaving  another  people ;  it  will  not  tolerate  a 
policy  that  creates  the  atmosphere  of  war.  Democ- 
racy, to  be  sure,  is  liable  to  error  and  not  infre- 
quently falls  into  error,  but  the  inherent  sense  of 


138    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

right  and  justice  in  the  people  will  assert  itself 
sooner  or  later — and  generally  sooner  than  later — to 
correct  the  error.  An  autocracy  regards  itself  as 
infallible.  It  knows  no  law  the  fulfilment  of  which 
might  endanger  its  own  existence  or  its  hold  upon 
the  people.  In  a  democracy  law  is  supreme ;  in  an 
autocracy  the  law  is  bent  to  serve  the  purpose  of  the 
rulers. 

With  all  the  nations  engaged  in  this  gigantic  strug- 
gle— to  safeguard  and  promote  popular  government  to- 
wards which  the  entire  civilized  world  has  been  tend- 
ing— including,  of  course,  Germany — since  the  French 
Revolution,  it  is  impossible  for  nations  to  live  on  terms 
of  peace  with  those  that  have  not  yet  accepted  the 
underlying  principle  of  democracy.  In  its  last 
analysis,  the  fundamental  cause  of  the  kind  of  war 
that  is  now  being  waged  was  the  existence  of  an 
undemocratic  government  in  one  of  the  sister  nations 
— and  that  one  of  the  most  powerful  and  efficient,  and 
in  all  other  respects  one  of  the  most  advanced.  One 
cannot  go  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the  issues  of  the 
war  of  1914  which  were  real  and  fundamental  would 
not  have  led  to  an  outbreak  if  Germany  had  been 
organized  on  a  democratic  basis,  but  the  war  would 
have  been  fought  out  in  an  entirely  different  way. 
It  would  not  have  led  to  the  war  of  1917. 

VI 

With  the  paramount  issue  won,  the  world  will 
be  in  a  position  to  take  up  the  issues  of  1914,  some 
of  which  are  of  comparatively  recent  origin,  like  the 
Alsace-Lorraine  question  or  the  problem  of  Finnish 
independence,  others  of  long  standing  like  the  Polish 
question   and   the   situation   in   the    Balkan   States, 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  139 

which  may  be  traced  back  to  the  foundation  of  the 
Ottoman  world  empire  in  the  fifteenth  century. 

It  is  perhaps  safe  to  predict  at  present,  even  be- 
fore the  paramount  issue  has  been  disposed  of,  that 
although  there  will  be  some  readjustments,  the  map 
of  Europe  will  not  be  materially  changed  after  the 
peace  conference  has  done  its  work.  Belgium  will  be 
on  the  map  as  before  the  war,  Finnish  independence 
will  be  restored  by  a  Russian  Republic  that  will 
have  neither  the  interest  nor  the  desire  to  dominate 
a  foreign  nation.  The  one  radical  change  to  be 
expected  in  northern  Europe  will  be  the  creation 
of  an  independent  kingdom  of  Poland  with  its  neu- 
trality guaranteed.  There  may  be  a  series  of 
"  internationalized  "  independent  states^  Belgium, 
Luxemburg,  Lorraine  and  Alsace  to  form  a  con- 
tinuous barrier  between  Germany  and  France,*  and 

*  This  solution  appears  to  find  much  favor  in  England 
and  might  prove  to  be  more  satisfactory  for  the  peace  of  the 
world  than  the  alternative  of  allowing  Lorraine  and  Alsace 
to  decide  by  a  referendum  to  which  government  each  desires 
to  be  connected.  We  must  not  forget  that  while  Lorraine 
is  French,  Alsace  is  at  least  as  much  German  as  it  is  French. 
It  was  German  before  it  became  French.  See  Dominian, 
Frontiers  of  Language  and  Nationality  in  Europe,  p.  42,  who 
says  "  Alsace  was  a  province  of  German  speech  throughout  the 
Middle  Ages  as  well  as  after  Louis  XIV's  conquest  of  the 
land.  The  French  took  a  solid  foothold  mainly  after  the 
Revolution  and  during  the  nineteenth  century.  An  enlightened 
policy  of  tolerance  towards  Alsatian  institutions  cemented 
strong  ties  of  friendship  between  the  inhabitants  and  their 
French  rulers." 

The  entire  third  chapter  in  this  admirable  book  on  The 
Franco-German  Linguistic  Boundary  in  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
Switzerland  is  an  important  contribution  to  the  subject,  which 
should  be  carefully  read  by  those  interested. 


140    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

whose  neutrality  will  be  guaranteed  by  all  the 
nations  of  Europe  combined,  or  by  the  League  of 
nations  which  may  be  formed  after  the  war.  There 
may  be  some  alteration  of  the  boundary  between  Italy 
and  Austria,  along  the  lines  of  concessions  which  Aus- 
tria was  ready  to  make  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
during  her  negotiations  with  Italy.  It  may  be  that 
a  confederacy  of  the  Balkan  States  will  be  formed, 
and  that  Greece  will  obtain  possession  of  all  the 
islands  in  the  archipelago,  which  by  natural  conditions 
belong  to  her. 

In  the  Near  East,  however,  momentous  changes 
are  to  be  expected.  He  would  be  bold,  indeed,  who 
would  venture  to  predict  of  what  nature  they  will 
be.  All  that  I  propose  in  these  closing  pages  is  the 
more  modest  attempt  to  forecast  the  outlook  at  the 
time  of  the  Peace  Conference.  In  the  deliberations 
of  the  Peace  Conference  to  which  the  world  is  look- 
ing forward  so  anxiously,  the  future  of  the  countries 
lying  around  the  Mediterranean  Basin  will  consti- 
tute the  most  serious  problem  to  be  considered.  It 
is  a  problem  far  more  intricate  than  any  of  the 
issues  in  the  West.  The  prerequisite  condition  to 
a  satisfactory  settlement  is  the  determination  of  the 
principles  that  should  guide  the  deliberations  of  the 
conference.  What  these  principles  should  be  is  sug- 
gested by  the  history  of  Asia  Minor  which  is,  as 
has  been  so  constantly  emj)hasized  in  this  study, 
the  key  to  the  Near  East. 

Let  us  in  the  first  place  recognize  that  the  exten- 
sion of  Western  civilization  into  the  East  is  as  inevi- 
table as  was  the  peopling  of  the  Western  Continent 
by  settlers  from  Europe,  consequent  upon  the  voy- 
ages of  discovery  four  centuries  ago.     The  "  trend 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  141 

towards  the  East "  which  we  have  traced  back  to 
the  days  of  Alexander  the  Great,  which  actuated 
Rome  and  which  underlies  the  movement  repre- 
sented by  the  Crusades,  again  set  in  at  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century  when  Napoleon  brought  his 
armies  to  the  base  of  the  pyramids  of  Egypt.  That 
expedition  foreshadowed  the  removal  of  the  barrier 
set  up  by  Mohammedanism  against  European  and 
Christian  access  to  the  East.  The  Western  invasion 
of  the  East  has  been  going  on  steadily  since  that 
time  and  will  receive  a  fresh  stimulus  through  the 
present  struggle. 

But  this  important  distinction  between  the  ear- 
lier and  the  recent  "  trend  "  is  to  be  noted.  Until 
the  last  effort  of  the  Crusaders  to  keep  the  way  to  the 
East  open  to  the  West,  the  West  was  attracted  to  the 
East  for  what  it  could  bring  out  of  it.  The  East 
until  the  fifteenth  century  was  still  the  treasure- 
house  of  art,  of  artistic  manufacture,  and  of  prod- 
ucts essential  to  Western  civilization.  It  had  still 
retained  in  a  large  measure  its  position  as  the  mother 
of  all  culture,  for  even  Greek  civilization  was  largely 
Eastern  in  origin,  having  the  stamp  of  the  East  on 
it,  and  Rome  was  dependent  for  her  art  and  her  litera- 
ture and  her  thought  upon  the  stimulus  she  received 
from  the  Greek  models.  The  religion  of  Western 
Europe  was  an  eastern  product,  modified  by  contact 
with  Greek  thought,  that  was  unfolded  under  the 
influence  of  Eastern  ideas.  The  Arabs  passed  on 
the  torch  of  learning  to  the  West.  Even  Greek 
philosophy  came  to  Christian  Europe  in  the  form 
given  to  it  by  Mohammedan  scholastics.  Moorish 
and  Byzantine  architecture — essentially  Eastern — 
formed  the  inspiration  that  led  to  the  "  Gothic " 


142   THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

as  the  notable  expression  of  the  Western  spirit. 
The  Mediaeval  mind  was  largely  steeped  in  Eastern 
thought  and  in  Eastern  views  of  life. 

In  the  modern  "  trend  toward  the  East,"  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  the  West  that  is  pouring  its  pro- 
ducts info  the  East.  Commerce  is  based  on  exchange 
of  wares,  but  what  we  are  sending  to  the  East  far 
outbalances  what  we  are  extracting  from  there. 
Trade  with  the  East  in  our  days  means  bringing 
the  West  to  the  East.  Europe  and  America  measure 
their  success  in  securing  this  trade  by  the  increase  of 
their  exports.  The  tendency  at  least  is  all  in 
the  direction  of  filling  the  East  with  Western 
manufactures. 

We  are  also  introducing  Western  modes  of 
transportation,  Western  inventions.  Western  meth- 
ods of  building.  Western  sanitation  and  Western 
ideas  of  education,  as  well  as  Western  models 
of  government.  The  East  is  being  transformed 
under  this  influence  of  the  West — slowly  but  surely ; 
and  travelers  whose  romantic  natures  are  thrilled 
by  the  originality  and  picturcsqucness  of  the  dis- 
appearing East  not  infrequently  lament  the  change," 
which  it  must  be  admitted  is  not  always  to  the 
advantage  of  the  East.  The  tendency,  however,  is 
unmistakable,  due  to  forces  over  which  we  have  no 
control.  It  should  be  our  task  to  understand  this 
tendency,  to  recognize  its  deeper  import,  and  to 
direct  it  by  an  intelligent  policy  into  the  proper 
channels. 

'So  Lord  Redesdale  in  his  charming  "Memoirs"  (Lon- 
don, 1916). 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  143 

VII 

What  can  the  modern  "  trend  "  or  rather,  let  us 
say,  what  should  it  be  but  the  movement  towards 
the  resuscitation  of  the  East? 

The  East  made  its  last  notable  contribution  in 
the  seventh  century  of  this  era  when  it  gave  birth 
to  a  new  religion,  genuinely  oriental  in  spirit  and 
character,  Mohammedanism  swept  through  the  world 
and  led  to  a  distinct  civilization  known  as  Arabic, 
which  exercised  a  profound  influence  on  European 
thought  and  science.  This  civilization  ran  its  course 
to  the  climax  during  the  six  centuries  following 
upon  Mohammed.  Since  then  the  East  has  entered 
upon  a  state  of  languish,  from  which  it  has  been 
occasionally  roused  as  after  the  Crusades  under  the 
spell  of  the  Ottoman  conquests,  but  without  making 
any  further  contributions  to  the  world's  treasure- 
house.  The  soil  of  the  East  had  become  exhausted 
after  so  many  milleniums.  Some  new  chemical  ele- 
ment was  needed  to  restore  it  to  vigor.  The  con- 
servatism which  we  are  in  the  habit  of  associating 
with  the  East  is  merely  a  symptom  of  this  languish- 
ing condition.  The  Ancient  East  was  progressive, 
or  it  would  not  have  produced  the  great  civilizations 
that  are  being  unearthed  through  the  researches  of 
the  archaeologist  and  the  historian.  The  modern 
East  is  disillusioned,  because  it  is  so  old.  It  has  seen 
glory  arise  and  fade  away  so  often  that  it  has  lost 
faith  in  permanent  progress,  and  has  either  resigned 
itself  to  a  fatalistic  attitude  towards  life,  or  sought 
refuge  from  struggle  by  a  quiescent  myticism. 

But  the  West,  yielding  to  the  charm  and  allure- 
ments of  the  East,  is  being  once  more  driven  to  the 


144    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

lands  that  are  the  source  and  the  very  inspiration 
of  all  our  Western  culture.  The  pressure  comes  in 
the  form  of  commercial  expansion,  greed  if  you 
please,  but  it  also  assumes  other  garbs,  as  the  mis- 
sionary zeal  to  bring  Western  education,  Western 
medical  progress,  hygiene  and  religious  and  political 
ideals  to  the  East.  Both  movements,  the  commer- 
cial and  the  educational  invasion  of  the  East,  have 
been  going  on  side  by  side  for  a  century.  They  both 
spring  from  a  source  deeper  than  any  force  that 
can  be  controlled  by  human  efforts,  but  to  our 
shame  it  should  be  said  that  instead  of  recognizing 
this  source  as  the  real  incentive  to  the  Western  in- 
vasion of  the  old  East,  we  have  acted  on  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  progressive  culture  of  the  West  justifies 
a  forcible  conquest  of  the  East.  Availing  ourselves 
of  the  growing  weakness  of  the  East,  its  inability 
to  cope  with  the  new  forces  developed  by  the  West, 
we  have  considered  it  to  be  our  destiny  to  bring 
the  East  under  subjection  to  the  West.  European 
nations  have  grabbed  and  exploited  the  East.  They 
have  looked  upon  the  East  as  a  hunting  ground  and 
have  vied  with  one  another  in  bagging  the  spoils. 
And  yet  beneath  all  this,  and  despite  the  opposition, 
aye,  the  hostility  that  through  the  spirit  of  greed 
and  rivalry  among  European  nations  has  been 
aroused  in  the  East,  the  process  of  the  resuscitation 
of  the  East  has  gone  on,  at  times  silently,  but  also 
through  the  direct  methods  which  have  been  fol- 
lowed with  such  signal  success  by  the  French  in 
Algiers  and  Tunis,  and  by  the  English  in  India  and 
Egypt.  Full  recognition  should  be  given  to  the 
results  of  European  domination,  on  the  whole  benefi- 
cent, in  these  lands.    A  large  share  of  credit  falls  also 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  145 

to  the  educational  institutions  organized  in  Eastern 
lands  by  European  effort — missionary  efforts  in  the 
best  sense  under  both  Christian  and  Jewish  tutelage 
— and  that  have  been  productive  of  such  striking 
results,  though  as  yet  within  restricted  circles. 

Is  not  the  implication  clear  that  in  our  policy 
towards  the  East,  we  should  start  from  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  force  that  drives  the  West  towards 
the  East?  Beneath  the  impelling  economic  and  in 
part  sordid  motives  on  the  surface  is  the  recognition 
that  the  East  at  present  needs  the  West  in  order  to 
be  awakened  to  a  new  life.  Political  aims  must  be 
made  subservient  to  this  higher  meaning  of  the 
modern  "  trend  towards  the  East."  Herein  lies  the 
fatal  error  of  Germany  in  reversing  the  proposition, 
and  making  the  trend  subservient  to  political  ambi- 
tions. Through  this  error  she  transformed  what 
would  have  been  an  inestimable  blessing  into  a  dire 
curse.  She  is  far  from  being  the  only  sinner,  but 
she  has  the  misfortune  of  being  the  latest  culprit. 
Her  great  chance  of  success  in  a  political  scheme 
of  vast  proportions  that  ran  counter  to  the  move- 
ment for  opening  up  the  East  has  been  the  means 
of  rousing  the  world  to  the  wrong  course  that  we 
have  all  followed  in  our  dealings  with  the  East,  and 
this  despite  great  benefits  that  have  been  conferred  on 
the  Orient. 

vni 

The  West  should  seek  the  co-operation  of  the 
East.  It  should  come  as  an  awakener,  not  as  a 
conqueror.  The  aim  must  be  to  bring  to  the  East 
the  best  that  the  West  has  to  offer,  but  not  to  attempt 
to  make  the  East  merely  a  profitable  adjunct  to  the 
10 


146    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

West.  Nor  should  we  go  so  far  as  to  dress  up  the 
East  in  Western  clothes  and  produce  a  misfit.  There 
is  a  decided  sense  in  which 

"  East  is  East  and  West  is  West 
And  never  the  twain  shall  meet." 

A  resuscitated  East  must  remain  Eastern  to  bring 
about  the  best  results.  If  the  East  has  any  further 
contributions  to  make — in  art  or  science,  in  com- 
merce or  thought,  or  perhaps  in  the  domain  of  relig- 
ion in  which  she  has  given  the  world  at  least  three- 
fourths  of  what  religion  there  is,  she  can  only  do  so 
through  revivification — through  the  reunfolding  of 
her  own  peculiar  genius. 

All  this  may  sound  "  academic  " — possibly  Uto- 
pian. Is  there  any  practical  policy  to  be  followed 
upon  the  conclusion  of  the  war  to  rectify  the  errors 
that  have  been  made?  I  believe,  yes.  The  story  of 
the  Bagdad  Railway  points  the  way  out.  Had  the 
"  internationalization  "  of  the  project  been  carried 
out  at  the  start  before  an  ambitious  Emperor,  arous- 
ing Pan-Germanic  dreams,  succeeded  in  attaching 
to  the  undertaking  political  aims  which  soon  over- 
shadowed the  commercial  and  industrial  aspects, 
there  would  have  been  no  clash  among  European 
nations  over  the  historic  highway.  That  highway 
would  have  been  opened  up  to  the  entire  West,  and 
the  process  begun  by  Napoleon  completed  to  the 
benefit  of  the  world — to  the  benefit  of  the  East  as 
well  as  of  the  West,  and  all  nations  would  have  had 
their  share.  "  Internationalization  "  means  co-opera- 
tion among  European  and  American  nations,  and  such 
co-operation  spells  also  partnership  with  the  East, 
instead  of   domination   .  "  Internationalization  "   in 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  147 

enterprises  that  are  of  importance  to  the  world  as 
a  whole  is  a  guarantee  of  mutual  good  faith,  for 
where  all  share  in  the  results,  there  is  also  a  sharing 
of  the  feeling  of  responsibility.  Internationalization 
brings  home  the  conviction  that  the  interest  of  one 
nation  is  bound  up  with  the  interest  of  all  the  others 
involved. 

Ever  since  the  decline  of  the  Turkish  Empire, 
Turkey  has  needed  the  support  of  European  nations, 
and  this  support  should  have  been  given,  not  for  the 
sake  of  Turkey,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  East,  of  which 
Turkey  was  merely  the  chief  symbol.  Instead,  Tur- 
key has  been  exploited  now  by  one  group  now  by 
another.  The  European  nations  have  been  stand- 
ing around  the  bedside  of  the  "  sick  man  of  Europe  " 
(as  Turkey  has  been  called)  for  half  a  century, 
quarreling  over  the  division  of  the  prospective 
corpse.  It  is  not  an  edifying  spectacle.  But  even 
if  Turkey  should  die,  the  East  would  still  be  there, 
the  various  peoples  of  the  East,  the  Turks,  the  Arme- 
nians, the  Arabs,  the  Egyptians  would  still  remain. 

The  weakness  of  the  Turkish  Empire  should  be 
interpreted  as  the  call  of  the  East  to  the  West  to 
come  to  its  support — to  bring  new  life  to  it.  The 
great  opportunity  will  come  at  the  close  of  the 
war.  It  rests  with  the  West  to  direct  the  momen- 
tous changes  which  the  East  is  forced  to  face  into  a 
channel  that  will  lead  to  its  resuscitation.  The 
policy  of  "  internationalization,"  so  plainly  suggested 
by  existing  conditions  in  the  East,  should  at  least 
be  given  a  trial.  Let  a  beginning  be  made  with  the 
reorganization  of  the  Bagdad  Railway  on  a  basis 
which  will  divide  the  investment  among  the  capital- 
ists of  various  nations  interested,  with  equal  repre- 


148    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

sentation  in  the  Board  of  Control.  That  will  be  the 
first  important  step  towards  opening  up  the  great 
highway  to  all.  Asia  Minor  is  the  world's  highway. 
It  should  be  secured  for  the  benefit  of  the  world. 
The  fate  of  the  East,  dependent  upon  the  control 
of  the  route  stretching  from  Constantinople  to  the 
Persian  Gulf,  should  not  be  at  the  mercy  of  any  one 
nation. 

The  proposed  policy  would  further  involve  the 
"  internationalization  "  of  Constantinople  under  the 
protectorate  of  an  international  commission,  with  a 
circuit  around  it,  the  neutrality  of  which  should  be 
guaranteed  not  by  a  few  Powers  but  by  the  concert 
of  nations.  Internationalization  has  been  tried  in 
the  instance  of  the  Danube  commission  and  has 
worked  satisfactorily.  Why  should  it  not  apply  to 
Constantinople  as  the  starting-point  of  the  great 
highway?  Sir  Edwin  Pears,  whose  life-long  resi- 
dence in  Constantinople  makes  him  a  valuable  wit- 
ness to  the  needs  of  the  East,  has  been  advocating 
its  "  internationalization  "  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  and  the  plan  is  meeting,  one  is  given  to  under- 
stand, with  favor  in  France.  The  overthrow  of 
autocracy  in  Russia  strengthens  the  claims  for  such 
"  internationalization  "  of  the  historic  city  on  the 
Bosphorus.  Constantinople  in  the  hands  of  Russia 
would  never  have  led  to  a  solution  of  the  Eastern 
Question.  On  the  contrary,  it  would  have  compli- 
cated it  by  another  aggravating  factor.  The  Rus- 
sian Revolution  has  repudiated  the  policy  of 
conquest,  which  was  a  part  of  the  old  regime. 
Russia,  the  republic,  has  no  interest  in  holding 
Constantinople,  if  under  an  "  international  "  protec- 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  149 

torate  the  passage  through  the  straits  will  be  open 
to  all  nations.  Mesopotamia,  Palestine  and  Arabia 
should  likewise  be  placed  under  an  "  international  " 
protectorate,  and  its  populations  be  given  the  oppor- 
tunity of  developing  their  capability  for  autonomy, 
which  at  present  they  do  not  possess.  Let  England 
after  the  war  resume  the  protectorate  over  Egypt 
which  she  has  held  for  so  many  years,  and  encourage 
the  education  of  the  population  so  as  to  fit  them 
for  Home  Rule ;  and  France  should  do  the  same  for 
Algiers  and  Tunis.  The  "  internationalization  "  of 
Morocco,  begun  some  years  ago  in  a  tentative 
fashion,  should  be  made  more  definite,  as  a  guaran- 
tee against  a  partitioning  which  would  be  an  injus- 
tice. Finally,  Turkey  should  again  become  what 
she  originally  was — an  Asiatic  empire.  Her  fatal 
error,  as  we  have  seen,  was  the  attempt  to  become 
also  a  European  power.  That  ambition  led  to  her 
decline.  The  natural  capital  of  Turkey  is  Konia  (the 
ancient  Iconium),  which  the  Seljuk  Sultans  had 
chosen  as  their  residence.  The  policy  of  "  inter- 
nationalization "  should  be  extended  to  Armenia, 
which  should  be  organized  as  a  separate  state  under 
the  protection  of  the  concert  of  nations,  and  Persia 
should  be  freed  from  all  semblance  of  foreign  domina- 
tion ^°  and  her  neutrality  similarly  guaranteed  by  all 
the  powers. 

"The  flagrant  wrong  done  to  Persia  in  191 1  by  Russia 
and  England  must  not  be  glossed  over.  It  needs  to  be  undone 
thoroughly  and  unflinchingly.  Brandes  comes  close  to  the 
truth  when  he  calls  Persia  "the  Asiatic  Belgium."  (The 
World  at  War,  p.  250.) 


150    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

IX 

Under  such  conditions,  the  resuscitation  of  the 
East  will  proceed  slowly  but  surely.  The  Western 
spirit  of  enterprise  will  open  up  the  vast  resources 
of  the  East.  Irrigation  systems  in  the  interior  of 
Asia  Minor  and  Mesopotamia  will  restore  and  in- 
crease the  fertility  of  these  regions.  Mines  and 
wells  will  yield  their  treasures.  Trade  with  the  East 
will  continue  to  grow  in  amicable  rivalry.  Western 
methods  of  self-government  will  make  their  way  and 
a  fresh  impetus  given  to  the  education  of  the  masses 
in  the  East.  New  problems  will  assuredly  arise,  and 
international  crises  will  occur  in  the  future  as  they 
have  in  the  past,  but  with  the  spirit  of  co-operation 
between  West  and  East,  replacing  the  ambition  to 
conquer  and  dominate,  there  will  be  a  reasonable 
hope  that  these  critical  periods  will  be  passed  with- 
out plunging  the  world  into  internecine  warfare. 

It  may  be  looking  forward  to  Utopia  to  visualize 
the  time  when  swords  will  be  beaten  into  plough- 
shares, though  there  is  no  inherent  reason  why  set- 
tlements of  differences  among  nations  by  the  ordeal  of 
battle  should  not  give  way  to  other  methods.  Indeed, 
it  may  be  confidently  asserted,  that  unless  as  an  out- 
come of  the  present  war  for  democracy,  a  concerted 
effort  for  the  ultimate  abolition  of  war  be  made  by  the 
great  nations  who  have  it  in  their  power  to  bring  this 
about,  the  war  will  have  failed  of  its  purpose.  For  the 
world  can  never  be  "  made  safe  for  democracy  "  as 
long  as  the  menace  of  war  hangs  over  it.  The  spirit  of 
democracy  thrives  in  the  atmosphere  of  pacifism.  The 
deadliest  foe  to  democracy  is  the  militaristic  spirit, 
which  is  always  in  danger  of  being  engendered  by  war 


THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  OUTLOOK  151 

or,  if  it  already  exists,  is  in  danger  of  being  strength- 
ened by  war.  The  war  of  1914  marks  the  explosion  of 
the  militarist  spirit;  the  war  of  1917  is  the  pacifist 
war,  for  democracy  is  essentially  pacifism.  The  only 
kind  of  war  that  may  justifiably  be  waged  in  the  name 
of  democracy  is  a  war  to  safeguard  democracy;  and 
this  means  a  conflict  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  us 
nearer  to  the  end  of  all  wars. 

I  am  not  concerned,  however,  with  the  distant 
future,  but  only  with  the  outlook  suggested  by  the  pres- 
ent sad  and  depressing,  though  far  from  hopeless,  condi- 
tions. Dies  diem  docct.  The  world  proceeds  step  by 
step,  each  step  suggested  or,  if  you  choose,  imposed  by 
the  experiences  of  the  past.  The  story  of  the  Bagdad 
Railway  as  the  crux  of  the  Eastern  Question  during 
the  past  twenty  years  suggests  as  the  next  step — 
to  give  the  policy  of  co-operation  betw^een  East  and 
West  a  trial.  The  results  can  assuredly  not  be  worse 
than  the  mess  created  by  the  policy  heretofore  fol- 
lowed of  exploitation,  of  conquest  and  of  domina- 
tion, leading  to  diplomatic  intrigue,  mutual  distrust, 
political  anarchy  and — culminating  in  the  war  of  1914- 

During  the  past  century  there  have  been  three  nota- 
ble international  peace  conferences  among  European 
nations,  which  attempted  to  adjust  the  political 
problems  of  Europe  and  the  East,  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  in  181 5,  of  Paris  in  1856,  and  of  BerHn  in 
1878.  A  distinguished  English  writer"  has  recently 
pointed  out  the  fundamental  weakness  of  these  Con- 

"Sir  John  MacDonnell,  "The  Three  European  Settle- 
ments," Contemporary  Rcviczv,  September,  1917.  The  same 
view,  practically,  is  expressed  by  Messrs.  Hazen,  Thayer  and 
Lord  in  their  Three  Peace  Congresses  of  the  Nineteenth 
Century  (Cambridge,  Mass.,  1917)- 


152    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

gresses  in  their  neglect  of  the  claims  of  the  peoples 
whose  fates  were  involved  in  the  proposed  settle- 
ments of  disputed  questions.  Statesmen  at  these 
conferences  rocked  themselves  in  the  delusion  that 
by  a  shuffling  and  redistribution  of  the  cards  the 
world  would  move  on  smoothly.  Only  in  the  last 
of  the  three  Congresses  was  a  weak  attempt  made 
to  consider  the  rights  of  a  nation  to  lead  its  own 
life.  The  figure  of  Waddington,  the  French  statesman, 
at  the  Berlin  Congress,  stands  out  conspicuously  as  the 
spokesman  for  the  rights  of  the  people,  but  the  little 
that  was  accomplished  was,  soon  after  the  Congress, 
nullified. 

After  the  world  has  been  made  safe  for  democ- 
racy, it  will  be  the  chief  task  of  the  coming  fourth 
Conference  to  keep  it  safe,  by  giving  the  first  con- 
sideration to  the  claims  of  every  people  to  life, 
liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  The  "  old  "  diplo- 
macy of  1815,  1856,  and  1878  went  bankrupt  in  1914. 
The  war  to  safeguard  democracy  should  lead  logically 
to  a  "  new  "  diplomacy,  based  on  the  principles  recently 
laid  down  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  "  The  supremacy  of 
right  over  force  .  .  .  and  the  free  development 
under  conditions  of  equality  and  conformity  to  their 
own  genius,  of  all  the  states,  large  and  small,  who 
constitute  civilized  humanity."  ^"  If  that  spirit  prevails 
— and  the  participation  of  the  United  States  ought  to 
be  an  additional  guarantee  that  it  will — the  Eastern 
Question  will  finally  be  solved,  because  it  will  be  rightly 
solved. 

"See  the  extract  from  this  speech  (October  23.  1916)  in 
H.  A.  Gibbons'  Reconstruction  of  Poland  and  the  Near  East 
(New  York,  191;^),  p.  66. 


NOTES 

(P.  31).  The  best  work  on  Asia  Minor  (including 
also  the  Balkan  Peninsula)  covering  the  geography,  ethnology, 
climate,  products,  routes  and  general  conditions  of  life  is 
by  D.  G.  Hogarth,  The  Nearer  East  (New  York,  1902).  On 
the  varied  ethnic  elements,  composing  the  population,  we  now 
have  an  excellent  article  with  maps  and  illustrations  by 
Leon  Dominian,  "  The  Peoples  of  Northern  and  Central 
Asiatic  Turkey,"  in  the  Bulletin  of  the  American  Geographical 
Society,  vol.   xlvii    (1915),  pp.  833-871. 

(P.  32).  For  a  general  account  of  the  work  of  Sir 
Arthur  Evans  and  his  successors,  Mrs.  Boyd-Hawes  and 
Edith  Hall,  see  Burrows,  Discoveries  in  Crete,  (London,  1907) 
and  for  an  historical  summary,  C.  H.  and  H.  Hawes,  Crete, 
the  Forerunner  of  Greece  (London,  1909). 

(P.  2,2,).  Egyptian  influence  on  Cretan  culture  is  unmis- 
takable, and  was  the  result  of  a  contact  between  Cretan 
settlers  and  Egy-pt  on  the  initiative  of  the  former.  An  island 
people,  debarred  from  expansion  by  conquest,  is  pacific  and 
takes  to  navigation  as  its  sole  means  of  communication. 
Islanders  become  traders,  and  the  protection  and  encourage- 
ment of  trade  led,  under  ancient  conditions,  to  the  growth 
of  a  fleet,  just  as  in  our  day  oversea  commerce  and  naval 
expansion  go  hand  in  hand,  in  the  case  of  both  England  and 
Germany.  Cretan  traders  and  the  Cretan  fleets  are  thus  the 
two  factors  that  bring  about  early  relations  with  Egypt,  as 
also  with  the  Phoenician  coast  and  the  fringe  of  Asia  Minor. 

(P.  34).  The  fullest  account  of  the  Hittites  with  illus- 
trations and  illuminating  discussions  will  be  found  in  Gar- 
stang.  Land  of  the  Hittites  (New  York,  1910).  An  admirable 
survey  from  the  historical  and  archaeological  point  of  view 
is  given  by  Eduard  Meyer,  Reich  ttnd  Kultur  d^r  Chetiter 
(Berlin,  1914) — also  elaborately  illustrated  and  including 
later  material  than  is  to  be  found  in  Garstang's  work.  A 
general  article  on  the  Hittites  by  the  author  is  embodied  in 

153 


154   THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Cheyne  and  Black's  Encyclopcedia  Biblica,  and  one  on  the 
Religion  of  the  Hittites  by  Dr.  B.  B.  Qiarles,  in  Hasting's 
Dictionary  of  Religion  and  Ethics.  For  further  bibliography 
(up  to  1910)  see  Garstang,  op.  cit.,  pp.  192-401. 

(P-  37)-  The  intercourse  between  Asia  Minor  and  Meso- 
potamia led  to  mutual  art  influences.  The  Assyrians  appear 
to  have  adopted  from  the  Hittites  the  custom  of  sculpturing 
elaborate  scenes,  lining  both  the  exterior  and  interior  walls  of 
palaces.  We  find  also  affiliation  between  Egyptian  and  Hittite 
art.  The  Egyptian  origin  of  the  Hittite  Sphinx,  a  prominent 
feature  in  Hittite  architecture,  is  favored  by  Maspero,  Struggle 
of  the  Nations,  p.  648,  and  also  by  Eduard  Meyer,  Reich  und 
Kiiltur  der  Chetiter,  p.  24  seq.  It  is  accepted  by  Breasted, 
Ancient  Times,  p.  142,  but  is  questioned  by  Garstang,  Land  of 
the  Hittites,  p.  254,  though  on  insufficient  grounds  as  it  appears 
to  me.  The  fact  that  in  Egypt  the  Sphinx  has  the  body  of  a 
lion,  whereas  among  the  Hittites  it  has  the  body  of  a  bull,  would 
be  a  natural  modification  of  a  design  to  adapt  it  to  Hittite 
symbolism.  Besides,  the  great  antiquity  of  the  sphinx  in  Egypt 
points  to  that  country  as  the  source  of  inspiration  for  the  art  of 
Asia  Minor,  rather  than  vice  versa.  Another  trace  of  Egyptian 
influence  is  to  be  seen  in  the  symbol  of  the  winged  disc  which 
is  placed  over  the  hieroglyphics,  giving  the  name  of  a 
king  precisely  as  it  accompanies  the  royal  inscriptions  of 
Egypt.  From  the  Hittites  the  symbol  passed  on  to  the 
Assyrians  and  later  to  the  Persians.  To  the  former  it  became 
the  emblem  of  their  chief  god  Ashur,  originally  the  solar 
deity,  to  the  latter  of  the  supreme  god  Ahura-Mazda,  whose 
name,  signifying  "  brilliant  shining  one,"  likewise  reveals  his 
solar  origin.  See  Egyptian,  Hittite  and  Persian  Designs  of 
Winged  Disc  in  Meyer,  op.  cit.,  pp.  29  and  56,  and  Jastrow, 
Civilisation  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria,  Plate  31. 

(P.  27).  The  general  character  of  the  Hittite  language 
has  been  determined  by  the  transliteration  of  Hittite  into  the 
Cuneiform  syllabary  on  clay  tablets,  found  in  large  numbers  at 
Boghaz-Keui  by  Winckler  (1907).  Most  of  the  tablets  were 
brought  to  the  Imperial  Ottoman  Museum  at  Constantinople, 
and  the  remainder  to  the  Berlin  Museum.  Among  the  tablets 
are  a  large  number  of  fragments,  containing  lists  of  Hittite 
words,  verbal  forms  and  phrases  written  in  cuneiform  (and, 
therefore,  easily  read)  with  their  equivalents  in  Sumerian  and 
Akkadian  added  in  parallel  columns.    Through  the  preliminary 


NOTES  155 

study  of  some  of  these  fragments,  Delitzsch  laid  the  founda- 
tion for  the  scientific  study  of  the  Hittite  language  in  a  paper 
on  Sumerisch-Akkadisch-Hettitische  Vokabularfragmente 
(Abhandl.  d.  Kgl.  Preuss  Akad.  d.  Wiss.  Philol.  Hist.  Klasse, 
Berlin,  1914,  No.  3).  Tliis  was  followed  by  an  investigation 
of  an  Austrian  scholar,  Friedrich  Hrozny  (Mitteilungen  d. 
Deutsch.  Orient  Gesellschaft  No.  56,  May,  1916)  which  defi- 
nitely established  the  Aryan  character  of  the  Hittite  language. 
On  the  basis  of  the  researches  of  Delitzsch  and  Hrozny  further 
progress  in  Hittite  studies  will  be  rapid,  when  once  the 
texts  found  at  Boghaz-Keui  shall  have  been  published.  It 
will  then  be  possible  to  approach  the  decipherment  of  the 
hieroglyphic  inscriptions  with  a  surer  hand.  A  preliminary 
study  of  the  Hieroglyphic  Hittite  inscriptions  which  marks 
a  distinct  advance  over  former  attempts  was  made  a  few  years 
ago  by  R.  C.  Thompson,  A  New  Decipherment  of  the  Hittite 
Hieroglyphics  (London,  1913)- 

(P.  38).  The  presence  of  Aryan  settlements  at  an 
early  period  in  Asia  Minor  is  indicated  also  by  the  occurrence, 
in  the  clay  tablets  found  at  Boghaz-Keui,  of  the  names  of 
Hindu  gods  like  Indra,  Varuna  and  Mithra  and  the  dioscuri 
Nasatjas,  and  of  Aryan  words  like  mariana  "young  man." 
This  was  first  pointed  out  by  Winckler,  Vorldufige  Nachrichten 
iiber  die  Ausgrabungen  in  Boghaz-Keui  im  Somtner,  1907 
(Mitteilungen  d.  Deutschen  Orient  Gesellschaft,  No.  35, 
December,   1907). 

(P.  40).  Supplemental  to  Egyptian,  Babylonian  and 
Assyrian  records,  we  have  a  remarkable  archive  of  official 
correspondence  of  governors  of  Palestinian  towns  and  dis- 
tricts during  the  fifteenth  century,  with  Egyptian  Pharaohs 
under  whose  suzerainty  they  stood.  These  archives,  found  at 
Tel  el-Amarna  in  Egypt  and  consisting  of  several  hundred 
tablets — of  official  letters — shed  much  light  on  conditions 
in  Palestine  and  Assyria  during  the  fifteenth  century  before 
this  era,  with  the  Hittites  as  the  chief  disturbing  element. 
Furthermore,  we  have  the  archives  found  at  Boghaz-Keui, 
consisting  of  many  hundreds  of  clay  tablets  in  the  Hittite 
language,  transliterated  in  the  Cuneiform  script,  by  the  side 
of  many  Cuneiform  documents  in  the  Babylonian  language. 

(P.  40).  These  tablets  are  generally  spoken  of  as  Cap- 
padocian  Tablets.  Twenty-four  of  them  were  published  a 
number  of  years  ago  by  GolenischefT  Vingt-Quatre  Tablettes 


15G    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Cappadociennes  (St.  Petersburg,  1891)  and  studied  by 
Delitzsch,  Zur  Entaiffcrung  dcr  Kappadokischen  Tafcln  (Leip- 
zig, 1894).  Others  have  been  published  and  studied  by  Sayce 
and  Pinches. 

(P.  46).  On  the  remarkable  religious  reforms  at- 
tempted by  Ikhnaton,  who  proposed  to  concentrate  the  cult 
of  Egypt  on  the  sun-god  Aton,  see  Breasted,  Ancient  Times, 
page  91  scq.  and  the  interesting  popular  narrative  of  Ikhna- 
ton's  reign  by  Weigall,  Life  and  Times  of  Akhnaton^  Pharaoh 
of  Egypt  (Edinburgh,  1910).  The  king  changed  his  name 
Amenhotep,  containing  the  element  Amon  and  which  meant 
"  Amon  rests,"  to  Ikhnaton,  signifying  "  Aton  is  satisfied." 
Accompanying  the  religious  reformation  there  was  also  a 
remarkable  advance  to  a  more  realistic  and  less  conventional- 
ized art,  hardly  less  significant  as  a  sign  of  the  age  than  the 
religious  revolution  which  came  to  grief  after  Ikhnaton's 
death. 

(P.  47).  For  the  treaty  between  Hattusil  and  Rameses 
II  see  Messerschmidt's  monograph.  The  Hittites  (English 
translation,  published  by  the  Smithsonian  Institution,  Annual 
Reports,  1903,  pp.  681-703). 

(P.  47).  See  Breasted's  monograph,  The  Battle  of 
Kadesh  (Chicago,  1903)  for  the  strategic  details  of  the 
battle,  with  full  details  of  the  pictorial  and  writtt-n  material, 
including  a  poem  composed  by  an  ancient  Egyptian  on  this 
famous  battle. 

(P.  49).  For  the  details  of  Babylonian  and  Assyrian 
history  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  two  volumes  of  L.  W. 
King's  History  of  Sumer  and  Akkad  and  to  R.  W.  Rogers' 
comprehensive  work,  History  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria  (6th 
edition)  (New  York,  1916,  2  volumes)  ;  for  an  excellent 
survey  of  The  Ancient  History  of  the  Near  East  (Egypt, 
Babylonia,  Hittites,  Assyria,  Syria  and  Palestine)  to  H.  R. 
Hall's  work  under  this  title  (New  York,  1913). 

(P.  50).  Owing  to  the  sluggishness  of  the  flow  of  the 
Euphrates  which  receives  few  tributaries  after  it  leaves  its 
mountain  source,  and  to  the  deposits  which  are  brought  along 
by  the  down-wash,  the  river,  choked  up  at  one  point,  is  often 
forced  to  seek  a  new  bed  as  an  outlet. 

(P.  50).  Ashur  was  the  capital  of  Assyria  till  c. 
1300  B.C.  when  it  is  replaced  for  a  time  by  Calah,  a  little  to  the 
north.    Nineveh,  still  further  north,  did  not  become  the  capital 


NOTES  157 

till  iioo  B.C.,  and  not  permanently  so  till  the  reign  of  Shal- 
maneser  III  (858-824  B.C.).  See  Jastrow,  Civilbation  of 
Babylonia  and  Assyria,  p.  25. 

(P.  51).  I  follow  Breasted's  figures  for  Egyptian  his- 
tory, as  given  in  his  standard  work,  The  History  of  Egypt 
(New  York,  1909)  and  Ancient  Times,  A  History  of  the 
Early  World  (Boston,  1916)  which,  written  in  a  most  fascinat- 
ing manner  and  elaborately  illustrated,  cannot  be  too  highly 
recommended  to  anyone  who  wishes  to  obtain  a  view  of  the 
earliest  civilizations  of  maniknd. 

(P.  52).  The  "sons  of  Heth "  from  whom  Abraham 
purchases  the  cave  of  Macpelah  (Genesis,  Chapter  23)  are 
our  Hittites,  and  while  the  story  is  of  late  origin,  and  the  tra- 
dition is  introduced  with  a  view  of  legitimatizing  the  claims  of 
the  Hebrews  to  a  sacred  spot,  such  as  the  cave  must  have 
been,  the  substratum  of  the  tale,  assuming  an  early  possession 
of  the  region  around  Hebron  by  Hittites,  may  nevertheless 
be  sound  and  is  confirmed  by  other  evidence  of  the  early 
penetration  of  the  Hittites  into  Palestine). 

(P.  55).  See  for  a  general  account  of  Alexander's 
conquests,  B.  I.  Wheeler's  admirable  work,  Alexander  the 
Great  (New  York,  1900)  and  Janke,  Auf  Alexander  des 
Grossen  Pfaden.  Eine  Reise  dnrch  Kleinasicn  (Berlin,  1904) 
for  a  detailed  investigation  of  Alexander's  routes  in  Asia 
Minor. 

(P.  57).  Excavations  at  Pergamon  on  a  large  scale 
were  carried  on  by  German  archaeologists,  the  results  of  which 
are  set  forth  in  a  magnificent  publication,  Altertuemer  von 
Pergamon,   published    by   the    German   government    (Berlin, 

188S-1913). 

(P.  58).  Attains  bequeathed  his  possessions  to  Rome, 
which  is  to  be  taken  as  a  "  diplomatic "  recognition  of  the 
status  quo,  just  as  Rome  claimed  that  Alexander  H  (Ptolemy 
IX)  had  bequeathed  Cyprus  to  her,  as  the  justification  for 
annexing  it  in  58  B.C.  and  as  Ptolemy  Apion  in  recognition 
of  the  inevitable  had  bequeathed  the  province  of  Cyrenaica 
on  his  death  in  96  B.C.  to  Rome. 

(P.  59).  The  rivers  of  Mesopotamia,  and,  more  par- 
ticularly, the  Euphrates,  bring  with  them  a  rich  deposit  from 
the  mountain  region  through  wliich  they  flow  and  which  gives 
to  the  soil  a  remarkable  fertility.  The  silt  thus  left  behind 
adds    steadily    to    the    land.     This    growth    of    land    at    the 


158    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

Persian  Gulf  goes  on  steadily  at  an  astonishing  rate.  Cities 
which  in  the  days  of  antiquity  lay  at  the  head  of  the  Persian 
Gulf  are  now  some  90  miles  from  the  coast.  When  Bagdad 
was  founded  in  the  ninth  century,  Basra  (or  Bassorah),  500 
miles  south,  was  its  port.  Since  then  the  accretion  of  soil 
has  necessitated  the  creation  of  a  second  port,  Fao — about 
60  miles  from  Basra. 

(P.  59).  In  connection  with  the  annual  deluge  pro- 
duced by  the  overflow  of  the  rivers,  it  may  be  noted  that 
the  Biblical  story  of  the  Deluge,  carried  by  the  Hebrews  to 
their  later  Palestinian  homes,  is  based  on  the  natural  occur- 
rence in  Mesopotamia  every  year  during  the  winter  season, 
prior  to  the  perfection  of  the  canal  system.  The  story  is  a 
nature  myth,  illustrating  the  change  from  the  dry  to  the  wet 
season,  as  the  creation  story  marks  the  change  from  the  wet  to 
the  dry  season.  See  Jastrow,  Hebrew  and  Babylonian  Tradi- 
tions, Chapter  II.  At  present  through  the  neglect  of  this 
system,  large  portions  of  southern  Mesopotamia  are  annually 
submerged. 

(P.  64).  The  best  general  work  on  the  Turks  is  by 
Vambery,  Das  Tiirkenvolk  (Leipzig,  1885).  Recent  investiga- 
tions of  value  are  Cahun,  Turcs  et  Mongols  (Paris,  1896), 
E.  H.  Parker,  A  Thousand  Years  of  the  Tartars  (London, 
1895)  and  La  Jonquiere,  Hist  aire  dc  I' Empire  Ottoman  (Paris, 
1914,  2  volumes).  H.  A.  Gibbons,  The  Foundation  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  (New  York,  1916)  is  excellent  for  the  period 
that  it  covers. 

(P.  83).  The  full  text  of  the  convention,  together  with 
supplementary  documents  (in  French),  will  be  found  at- 
tached to  David  Fraser,  The  Short  Cut  to  India  (London, 
1909).  PP-  316-381.  The  literature  on  the  Bagdad  Railway 
is  most  voluminous.  Besides  Fraser's  book  which  goes  fully 
into  the  subject,  one  may  refer  to  Andre  Cheradame,  La 
Macedoinc,  Le  Chemin  de  Per  de  Bagdad  (Paris,  1903)  for 
the  French  view;  to  Paul  Rohrbach,  Die  Bagdadbahn  (Ber- 
lin, 1902)  and  Jaeckh,  Deutschland  im  Orient  nach  devi  Balkan- 
krieg  (Munich,  1913)  for  the  German  view.  A  good  survey  up 
to  1914  will  be  found  in  two  articles  of  A.  Geraud,  The  Story 
of  the  Baghdad  Railway,  in  Nineteenth  Century  for  May  and 
June,  1914,  and  for  the  most  recent  developments  in  Dominian, 
The  Railroads  of  Turkey  (Bulletin  of  the  American  Geo- 
graphical Society,  1915,  xlvii,  pp.  934-940).  and  H.  Charles 
Woods,  The  Bagdad  Railway  and  Its  Tributaries  (Geograph- 


NOTES  159 

ical  Journal,  Volume  L,  July,  1917,  pp.  32-57).  For  a  general 
account  of  railways  in  Turkey  see  Coureau,  La  Locomotive  en 
Turquic  d'Asie  (Brussels,  1895),  George  Young,  Corps  de 
Droit,  Ottoman  (Paris,  1906),  or  Cheradame's  work.  To 
make  the  record  of  railways  in  Asia  Minor  complete,  it  should 
be  added  that  there  is  a  small  railway,  built  by  a  French 
company,  of  41  kilometres,  or  26  miles,  running  from  Brusa, 
the  ancient  capitol  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  to  its  port  Mudania, 
on  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  as  indicated  on  the  map.  Though 
begun  as  far  back  as  1873,  work  on  it  was  suspended  and  it 
was  not  opened  until  1892. 

(P.  98).  The  first  of  the  brothers.  Lieutenant  Lynch, 
came  with  Colonel  Chesney  in  1835  to  take  part  in  a  survey 
expedition  of  Mesopotamia.  This  expedition  transported  two 
small  steamers,  which  they  called  The  Tigris  and  The 
Euphrates,  in  pieces  across  the  desert  from  a  place  near 
Antioch  on  the  Orontes  to  the  Euphrates  at  Birejik.  The 
Tigris  was  lost  in  the  difficult  journey  along  the  Euphrates, 
but  the  other  boat  reached  the  Persian  Gulf  and  was  the 
first  steamboat  to  go  up  the  Tigris.  See  Chesney,  Narrative 
of  the  Euphrates  Expedition   (London,  1868). 

(P.  105).  The  funds  for  the  building  of  this  road  were 
obtained  through  contributions  from  Mohammedans  in  all 
parts  of  the  world — an  amazing  example  of  the  strong  hold 
that  the  pilgrimage  to  Mecca  still  has  upon  Moslems  and  will 
no  doubt  continue  to  have.  This  obligation  on  every  Moslem 
to  pay  a  visit  once  in  his  life  to  the  Holy  City  and  perform 
the  traditional  rites  creates  a  bond  of  union  among  Moslems, 
the  strength  of  which  cannot  be  overestimated.  The  rail- 
way to  Medina  (now  completed)  and  to  Mecca  will  by 
stimulating  travel  to  the  sacred  cities  tend  to  strengthen  the 
hold  of  Islam  on  its  votaries.  The  distance  from  Damascus 
to  Medina  is  820  miles.  The  entire  stretch  from  Aleppo  to 
Mecca  is  1354  miles ;  from  Damascus  to  Mecca,  1097.  See  on 
the  Hedjaz  Railway,  Maunsell  in  the  Geographical  Journal  for 
December,  1908,  and  in  the  National  Geographic  Magazine, 
Vol.  20  (1909),  pp.  156-193  (richly  illustrated). 

(P.  112).  See  Sir  Wm.  Willcocks'  Irrigation  of  Meso- 
potamia (London.  1911;  2  volumes — texts  and  charts).  The 
scheme  proposed  is  one  of  vast  proportions,  covering  an  area 
of  one  and  a  half  million  hectares  to  be  affected  by  barrage 
works.     Willcocks  divided  the  proposed  construction  into  six 


160    THE  WAR  AND  THE  BAGDAD  RAILWAY 

divisions  at  a  total  estimated  cost  of  twenty-nine  million 
Turkish  liras.  One  of  these  divisions,  the  Hindia  branch  of 
the  Euphrates,  was  completed  in  December,  1913,  and  is  now 
in  successful   operation. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  interesting  to  note  also 
plans  for  developing  irrigation  in  central  Asia  Minor.  A  Ger- 
man company  has  cut  a  canal  from  Lake  Beyshehr  to  Chumla, 
near  Konia,  to  irrigate  a  tract  of  12,000  square  kilometres 
and  which  will  transform  an  arid  wilderness  into  fertile 
fields  (Levant  Trade  Rcviezv  for  Alarch,  1915,  p.  353)-  This 
work  has  been  completed,  and  the  Turkish  government  is 
now  considering  plans  for  irrigation  in  the  Cilician  plain 
which  will  greatly  increase  the  cotton  and  sugar-cane  crops. 
The  plans  include  the  regulation  of  the  water  supply  of  three 
rivers,  the  Saihun,  the  Jihan  and  the  Berdanjaj.  The  total 
cost  is  estimated  at  four  million  Turkish  liras  ($17,700,000). 
See  Levant  Trade  Review  for  June,  1916,  p.  46. 

(P.  150).  The  vast  resources  of  Asia  Minor,  Northern 
Syria  and  Mesopotamia  can  hardly  be  exaggerated.  With 
railroad  connection  and  irrigation  works  (see  note  to  p.  112), 
the  development  of  the  natural  wealth  and  fertility  will  be 
the  crucial  factor  in  restoring  the  Near  East  to  the  position  it 
once  held  in  the  world.  The  northeastern  region  from  Diar- 
bekr  to  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  is  rich  in  copper  mines 
{Levant  Trade  Review,  June  16,  p.  79),  which  will  be  opened 
up  through  the  projected  railway  to  cover  the  stretch  from 
Angora-Sivas-Diarbekr  with  connections  to  Sinope  and  Trebi- 
zond  on  the  Black  Sea.  The  cotton  crop  in  the  province  of 
Adana  for  1914  amounted  to  120,000  bales.  It  is  said  that  the 
cotton  industries  of  Adana  supplied  a  large  proportion  of  the 
undergarments  and  summer  uniforms  for  the  Turkish  army 
during  the  present  war.  Through  the  proposed  irrigation 
scheme  for  the  Cilician  plain  (see  preceding  note),  the  cul- 
tivation will  be  still  further  increased.  The  rug  and  the 
fig  industries  in  the  district  of  Smyrna  are  among  the 
largest  in  the  world.  In  Mesopotamia  there  are  rich  oil  fields 
and  extensive  asphalt  deposits.  Through  irrigation  works 
in  Mesopotamia  the  cereal  products  will  again  realize  their 
astonishing  returns  for  which  the  region  was  famous  in 
antiquity.  The  irrigation  of  central  Asia  Minor  will  likewise 
turn  that  region  into  a  vast  agricultural  centre  of  untold 
possibilities.  See  further  Chapter  VI  in  Eraser,  Short  Cut  to 
India. 


111!  sSiHiiiiiii'r'^^  ^'^^''^^  ^^^'^'^ 

AA    000  851356    6 


